UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Inspection Detail

Note: The following inspection has not been indicated as closed. Please be aware that the information shown may change, e.g. violations may be added or deleted. For open cases, in which a citation has been issued, the citation information may not be available for 5 days following receipt by the employer for Federal inspections or for 30 days following receipt by the employer for State inspections.

Inspection: 1544460.015 - Turn 2 Specialty Companies

Inspection Information - Office: Houston South

Investigation Summary

At 7:30 p.m. on July 27, 2021, employees were working on a valve when approximat ely 160,000 pounds of a mixture that included acetic acid, methyl iodide, methyl acetate, hydrogen iodide, and other materials were released. Employees were sen t in to the unit to modify the control valve so that it could be used as a point of isolation for a repair project to fix a leaking pipe spool in the methanol s upply line to the acetic acid reactor, scheduled for the next morning. The empl oyees received a permit from the facility operations group to enter and perform the work, but no one from the host employer walked out to the job with the team or went up to monitor their activities. The employees were not informed that sys tem was in an energized state, or that the reactor that the valve was immediatel y connected to contained hot and pressurized hazardous process materials in liqu id state. The valve was the only flow restriction device between the reactor and the spool of pipe that was to be worked on. The employees removed several faste ners from the valve assembly, enabling the actuator to be removed. In the proces s, the fasteners that secured the bonnet of the valve in place were also removed . With these fasteners removed, the pressure boundary seal made by securing the bonnet in place was compromised. The fluids in the system pushed the stem out of the valve through the valve top cap opening and process containment was lost. E mployees were exposed to the fluids that left the process. Two of the employees, a pipefitter and pipefitter foreman, died onsite due to thermal and chemical bu rns, and inhalation injuries. The third employee, a pipefitter, was rescued and transported to an offsite medical facility, where he was admitted for treatment and hospitalized for several weeks, before being transferred and subsequently re leased for continued recovery at home.

Keywords:burn, chemical, chemical burn, chemical exposure, citric acid, high pressure, high temperature, inhalation, methyl alcohol, pressure release, process safety, regulator valve