Laws and Regulations > Lookback Reviews > Regulatory Review of OSHA's PSDI Standard [29 CFR 1910.217(h)]

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Regulatory Review of OSHA's
Presence Sensing Device Initiation (PSDI) Standard
[29 CFR 1910.217(h)]


Pursuant to Section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act
and Section 5 of Executive Order 12866

Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Directorate of Evaluation and Analysis
Office of Evaluations and Audit Analysis

May 2004

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION AND NATURE OF THE REVIEW
CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND
CHAPTER 2: INDUSTRY PROFILE
2.1 Industry Sectors Covered by the Standard
2.2 Number of Power Presses in Use
2.3 Press Manufacturing and Using Industries
2.4 Conclusion
CHAPTER 3: INJURIES CAUSED BY MECHANICAL POWER PRESSES
3.1 Injuries
3.2 Causes of Accidents
3.3 National Emphasis Program
3.4 Conclusion
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF WHY THE PSDI STANDARD WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED
4.1 Third-Party Validation
4.2 Other Issues
CHAPTER 5: SECTION 610 REVIEW
5.1 PSDI Issues
5.2 Section 610 Review Criteria
5.3 Options
5.4 Nature of Comments Received
5.5 Conclusion
CHAPTER 6: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 REVIEW OF THE STANDARD
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I: REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT, SECTION 610
APPENDIX II: INTRODUCTION AND SECTION 5 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866



REGULATORY REVIEW OF OSHA'S PSDI STANDARD
[29 CFR 1910.217(h)]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


In 1988, OSHA added paragraph (h) to 1910.217, the standard for mechanical power presses. Paragraph (h) was intended to allow employers to install and use presence sensing device initiation (PSDI) systems. These systems rely on a light curtain or similar sensing system to know when no objects are in the danger zone between the fixed bed of a press and movable upper part (the ram). When a press equipped with PSDI senses that the danger zone is empty, it initiates the press cycle. Should something enter the zone while the ram is in motion, the PSDI system stops the press. OSHA believed that PSDI would provide productivity benefits for employers and safety for operators and other employees close to the press. As recommended by both industry and unions at the time, paragraph (h) required that OSHA-approved third parties validate the PSDI systems at installation and annually thereafter. OSHA adopted the standard because PSDI systems improve productivity, reduce worker fatigue, and protect both operators and other employees.

In the 15 years since the standard was changed, however, no third party has pursued OSHA approval and, therefore, PSDI systems have not been used on mechanical power presses. OSHA elected to conduct a review of the PSDI standard under section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act to determine why the standard had not been implemented and to identify how the standard could be changed to facilitate the use of PSDI systems and protect workers. Data indicate that 88 percent of the firms that use mechanical power presses are small entities.

This regulatory review of the PSDI Standard meets the requirements of both section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and Section 5 of Executive Order (EO) 12866. Under section 610, this review examines whether the standard should be continued without change, rescinded, or amended to minimize any significant impact on a substantial number of small entities, taking into consideration the continued need for the rule, comments and complaints received regarding the rule, complexity of the rule, whether the rule is duplicative and changes in technology and economic conditions since the issuance of the rule. Under Section 5 of EO 12866, this review examines whether the standard has become unjustified or unnecessary as a result of changed circumstances, and whether the standard is compatible with other regulations or is duplicative or inappropriately burdensome in the aggregate. This review also ensures that the regulation is consistent with the priorities and the principles set forth in EO 12866 within applicable law, and examines whether the effectiveness of the standard can be improved. To assist OSHA in this review, OSHA requested public comments on these issues.

This review of the PSDI standard under Regulatory Flexibility Act section 610 finds the following:
  • There is a continued need for a rule, but if the benefits OSHA sought in the 1988 rule are to be gained (i.e., improved worker safety and employer productivity), the rule needs to be changed.
  • The standard, as currently written, has not been implemented and is complex.
  • Paragraph (h) and 1910.217 are significantly different from the latest revision to American National Standards Institute (ANSI) B 11.1, the industry consensus standard for mechanical power presses. The standard does not overlap, duplicate, or conflict with other state or Federal rules.
  • The technology for PSDI systems themselves has not changed since paragraph (h) was adopted in 1988, but the technology for controlling mechanical power presses has changed considerably since 1910.217 was adopted. A number of operating modes that are not addressed in 1910.217 are now used. Press operation is now often controlled by computers, introducing hazards that are not addressed in the standard. Economic conditions of the industry have not changed in ways that would impact the use of power presses. There has, however, been a shift toward the use of hydraulic power presses, which are not regulated under 1910.217.
  • OSHA is considering revisions to the standard to facilitate installation and use of PSDI on part-revolution mechanical power presses. Because the PSDI standard has never been implemented, it has not had an economic impact of small entities. OSHA continues to believe that PSDI, if safely implemented, could provide economic benefits to employers and safety and health benefits to employees (e.g., reduction of fatigue).
This review of the PSDI Standard, consistent with Executive Order 12866, finds the following:
  • The PSDI standard has not been implemented. OSHA conducted this review to identify the problems with the standard so that the standard could be revised.
  • The standard is compatible with other OSHA standards. No other OSHA standard addresses the use of PSDI systems.
  • The standard has not met the President's priorities to the extent that it has not produced the benefits sought - allowing industry to use a system that would increase productivity and improve safety for employees. OSHA is considering revisions to the standard to encourage implementation.
  • The standard has been ineffective because it has not been implemented. OSHA is considering revision of the standard.
Conclusions and Recommendations

As part of this Section 610 review, OSHA published a Notice in the Federal Register on August 28, 2002 (67 FR 55181) to inform the public that the review was being conducted and to solicit comments. In its Federal Register Notice, OSHA presented the following four options for revising the standard:
  • Option 1 - Update all of 1910.217 to ANSI B 11.1 - 2001 or something quite similar.
  • Option 2 - Revise the third-party validation requirements.
  • Option 3 - Eliminate all requirements for third-party validation, possibly replace it with a self-certification requirement; leave the other PSDI requirements intact.
  • Option 4 - Replace OSHA's current PSDI requirements with the PSDI requirements in the new ANSI B 11.1.
Based on analyses and information obtained during this Section 610 review, OSHA has decided on Option 1, to update all of 1910.217 to ANSI B 11.1 - 2001 or something quite similar. Implementing this option would address industry concerns that the mechanical power presses standard (1910.217) is out-of-date and could be made safer. Five of the nine respondents who commented on this Section 610 review, in response to OSHA's August 28, 2002 Federal Register Notice, recommended that OSHA replace the entire mechanical power press standard with ANSI B 11.1-2001. PSDI is an integral part of that ANSI standard, and there is no validation requirement. Furthermore, many in the field believe this updating is over due, that there would be a range of benefits, and that it would lead to implementation of PSDI.


INTRODUCTION AND NATURE OF THE REVIEW

In 2002, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) began a review of its PSDI Standard under Section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act1 and Section 5 of Executive Order (EO) 12866 on Regulatory Planning and Review2.

The purpose of a review under Section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act:
"(S)hall be to determine whether such rules should be continued without change, or should be rescinded or amended consistent with the stated objectives of applicable statutes, to minimize any significant impact of the rules on a substantial number of small entities."

* * *

"(T)he Agency shall consider the following factors:
(1) The continued need for the rule;
(2) The nature of complaints or comments received concerning the rule from the public;
(3) The complexity of the rule;
(4) The extent to which the rule overlaps, duplicates or conflicts with other Federal rules, and, to the extent feasible, with State and local governmental rules; and
(5) The length of time since the rule has been evaluated or the degree to which technology, economic conditions, or other factors have changed in the area affected by the rule."
The review requirements of Section 5 of EO 12866 require agencies:
"To reduce the regulatory burden on the American people, their families, their communities, their State, local, and tribal governments, and their industries; to determine whether regulations promulgated by the [Agency] have become unjustified or unnecessary as a result of changed circumstances; to confirm that regulations are both compatible with each other and not duplicative or inappropriately burdensome in the aggregate; to ensure that all regulations are consistent with the President's priorities and the principles set forth in this Executive Order, within applicable law; and to otherwise improve the effectiveness of existing regulations."
To carry out these reviews, on August 28, 2002, OSHA asked the public for comments on all issues raised by these provisions (67 FR 55181). Specifically, OSHA requested comments on the impacts of the rule on small businesses; the benefits and utility of the rule in its current form and, if amended, in its amended form; the continued need for the rule; the complexity of the rule; and whether, and to what extent, the rule overlaps, duplicates, or conflicts with other Federal, State, and local government rules. OSHA also asked for comments on new developments in technology, economic conditions, or other factors affecting the ability of covered firms to comply with the PSDI Standard. Furthermore, OSHA asked for comments on alternatives to the rule that would minimize significant impacts on small businesses, while achieving the objectives of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

OSHA accepted written comments from August 28, 2002 through January 27, 2003. All documents and comments received relevant to the review and documents discussed in this report are available at the OSHA Docket Office, Docket No. S225A, Technical Data Center, Room N-2625, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20210, Telephone (202) 693-2350.



CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND

OSHA adopted 1910.217, the standard for mechanical power presses, in 1971. The standard was based on the 1971 edition of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) B 11.1, the industry consensus standard on mechanical power presses. The purpose of the mechanical power press standard is to protect employees from injuries that result from working with or around mechanical power presses. A mechanical power press is a two-part system, with a stationary bed or anvil and a movable upper part, the ram. A die or punch is placed on the ram; the ram descends into a die block, which is attached to the anvil. The punches and die block are referred to as the die set. A mechanical power press can be either full revolution or part revolution. A full revolution press cannot be stopped once the cycle begins. A part-revolution press has a brake that can stop the press in mid-cycle. Hydraulic and pneumatic power presses are not covered by the standard.

Under the pre-1988 rule, a number of systems, including presence sensing device (PSD) systems, could be used as a machine guard. Machine guards are needed to prevent an employee from having a hand in the danger zone when the press is stroking. A significant number of amputations and other injuries occur each year when using power presses because safety systems are not used, are bypassed, or malfunction. A PSD is basically a light curtain or other sensing device that indicates when no hands or other objects are within the danger zone of a power press.

Beyond the guards, the standard also prevents injuries through limitations on how a press cycle may be initiated. Under the standard, initiation of a press cycle is done either by two-hand controls or foot controls3. The two-hand devices require the operator to press two palm buttons simultaneously; the buttons must be far enough apart that they cannot be pressed with one hand. Foot controls are often used in conjunction with harnesses that pull the operator's hands out of the danger zone as the press cycle begins. Both the two-hand controls and the harnesses are uncomfortable, increase worker fatigue, and increase the time between press cycles. Neither of these systems protect employees other than the press operator.

In 1988, OSHA added paragraph (h) to 1910.217 to allow the use of presence sensing device initiation (PSDI) on mechanical power presses. The 1988 rule was intended to allow employers to use PSD systems to initiate a press cycle when the system indicated that no objects were within the hazard zone. PSDI systems had been used on mechanical power presses in Europe for decades and since 1976 at one U.S. facility under a waiver. PSDI systems were also used on other power presses and other types of equipment. When properly installed and operated, they increase productivity and reduce operator fatigue. They also protect other employees near the press, who are not protected by manual actuation alone.

OSHA needed to amend 1910.217 to allow PSDI because the section specifically prohibited its use. The prohibition in 1910.217 was based on the 1971 version of ANSI B 11.1. When paragraph (h) was added in 1988, OSHA imposed a number of requirements for the use of PSDI systems based on a consensus of industry, union, and academic experts who commented on OSHA's proposal and on practices then used in Europe. OSHA required that every PSDI system had to be validated by an OSHA-certified third party and checked by a certified third party annually. The third-party validation was based on existing systems in Sweden and Germany, where the government certified this type of equipment. OSHA believed that national testing laboratories and industry organizations would conduct the third-party testing. A majority of commenters supported the rule; those who opposed it were split between those who believed PSDI was not safe and those who believed fewer requirements were appropriate. There was also the impression that mechanical power presses had different failure modes than other equipment that used PSDI systems; that is, that other equipment using PSDI failed safe (in case of failure, the equipment stopped rather than continued its motion) while mechanical presses did not.

Previous Characterization of Industry and Impacts

In its 1988 rulemaking, OSHA analyzed the impact of paragraph (h) on small entities as part of its economic impact analysis. At that time, OSHA estimated that approximately 73,000 employees would be affected by the standards. These employees are primarily punch and stamping press operators and job and die setters. OSHA estimated that 40 percent of the former group and 20 percent of the latter were operating mechanical power presses. These operators are employees in metal fabrication industries and the automotive industry.

OSHA estimated that PSDI would increase productivity an average of 24.3 percent per press. On a national level, OSHA estimated that the use of PSDI would save industry about $162 million a year. OSHA estimated that cost of installing PSDI systems and having them certified would be between $49 million and $77 million by 1991. OSHA also estimated that by 1996, 2,500 new presses would be equipped with PSDI, producing additional productivity savings. The total net annualized savings were estimated to be between $100 million and $129 million. Because of the cost savings, OSHA determined that the standard would not have a significant economic impact on small entities.

Reason for Selecting PSDI for Review

OSHA elected to review the PSDI standard because in the 15 years since its promulgation, no third party has pursued an application to become a validator. (Two parties briefly expressed interest in becoming validators, but did not pursue the matter.) Therefore, no company had been able to legally use PSDI systems on mechanical power presses except for one company, Interlake Stamping, which has a waiver from the rule since the late 1970s. In addition, the industry had recently revised ANSI B 11.1 and included standards for PSDI use with mechanical power presses. OSHA's review was intended to determine why no third party had come forward and how the standard could be changed to allow PSDI use with adequate safeguards.



CHAPTER 2: INDUSTRY PROFILE

This chapter characterizes the industry that uses mechanical power presses, the presses affected by the PSDI provisions, and estimates the number of mechanical power presses and establishments that use them. The chapter also reviews the economic status of the industry using mechanical power presses.

2.1 Industry Sectors Covered by the Standard

Mechanical power presses are used mainly in the following manufacturing industry categories: fabricated metal, industrial machinery, electrical machinery, transportation vehicle parts, and precision instruments. These industries all require metal parts, which are formed in presses, to create finished products. Exhibit 1 presents data on the number of establishments in each sectors (from the 1997 Economic Census) and the percentage of total presses that are used by the sectors (from The Economic Handbook of the Machine Tool Industry -2001-2002 ).
Exhibit 1: Industry Data

Industry Sector Establishments Percent of Total Presses
Fabricated Metal
(NAICS 332)
62,501 41.6%
Industrial Machinery
(NAICS 333)
30,665 20.7%
Precision Instruments
(NAICS 3445)
5,432 4.2%
Electrical Machinery
(NAICS 335)
6,946 22.8%
Transportation
(NAICS 336)
12,980 10.7%

Data are not available to determine the exact number of establishments within these sectors that use mechanical power presses. Presses, mechanical or otherwise, are not present in every facility in any one sector4. Moreover, in any sector, not all presses in use are mechanical. Nonetheless, it is important to note for this Section 610 review that most businesses in these sectors are small. As shown in Exhibit 2, approximately 88 percent of presses are being used in small businesses, based on the Small Business Administration definition of small business for these sectors (generally less than 500 employees).

The number of employees who operate mechanical power presses is not specifically known. The BLS Occupational Outlook Handbook 2002-2003 states that 372,000 people are employed as machine setters, operators, and tenders for metal cutting, punching, and press machines. Based on the number of all presses, punches, and shearing machines in 1996 American Machinist 15th Inventory, large mechanical power presses represent between 7 percent and 11 percent of those machines; consequently the number of employees working on these presses is likely to be between 30,000 and 40,000.

Exhibit 2
Distribution of Presses in the Metal Forming Industry, By Plant Size
(Indicated by Number of Employees)
Based on American Machinist 15th Inventory, 1996
Exhibit 2: Distribution of Presses in the Metal Forming Industry, By Plant Size (Indicated by Number of Employees) Based on American Machinist 15th Inventory, 1996
Text Version of Chart:
Type: Pie Chart depicting distribution of presses in the Metal Forming Industry by number of employees.
  • 1 to 19 = 12%
  • 20  to 99 = 44%
  • 100 to 499 = 32%
  • More than 500 = 12%

2.2 Number of Power Presses in Use

According to the American Machinist 15th Inventory, in 1996 there were 194,891 presses of all types (mechanical, hydraulic, and pneumatic) in use in the United States5. The 1996 inventory did not provide a breakdown of the 194,891 presses into mechanical, part-revolution, or large and, therefore, it is not possible to determine with any certainty the number of mechanical power presses in use. The Bureau of Census Current Industrial Reports for the Metalworking Machinery section provide breakdowns of U.S. production of presses by type and U.S. consumption of presses (production plus imports, minus exports). Between 1996 and 2002, large mechanical power presses represented 9.5 percent of total press production. Small presses represented 72% of the production6. The U.S. Department of Commerce classifies presses as either small (value less than $3,025) and large (value $3,025 or greater). New, part-revolution mechanical power presses all have values greater than $3,025 and, therefore, are considered to be large7. Part-revolution mechanical presses are the only type that OSHA permits to use PSDI.

If the percentage of mechanical power presses produced between 1996 and 2002 is representative of the total population of such presses, the number of large mechanical power presses would be about 20,000. This estimate is uncertain. Power presses can be used for decades, and it is likely that mechanical power presses represented a higher percentage of the total press population in the past. OSHA estimated in 1988 that part-revolution presses represented only 50 percent of mechanical power presses in use and, as can be seen from the data in the next section, about 2.6 times as many mechanical power presses have been exported as have been produced or imported. However, because large part-revolution presses have tended to replace full revolution presses, this analysis estimates that the number of part-revolution presses in use ranges from 10,000 to 30,000. These numbers are unlikely to increase in the immediate future because both the production and importation of mechanical presses is declining while the exportation of these presses is increasing. Between 1996 and 2001, the percentage of large power presses produced that were mechanical declined from 40 percent to 24 percent. Mechanical presses represented 35 percent of large presses shipped in 2002, but that increase was caused by a dramatic decline in the number of other large presses shipped in that year; the actual number of mechanical presses shipped continued to decline. From 1996 through the first quarter of 2003, large mechanical presses represented only 9 percent of U.S. press imports for domestic consumption but 59 percent of total U.S. press exports8.

Despite the uncertainty on the number of mechanical power presses, it is clear that they are still widely used and are still being produced and imported albeit at lower numbers than previously. The president of Rockford Systems stated that mechanical power presses will continue to be used because they are still faster than hydraulic presses and for some types of stamping they remain superior to hydraulic presses9. Jim Kirton of ISBLite noted that the speed of mechanical presses makes them preferable where volume is of importance10.


2.3 Press Manufacturing and Using Industries

According to the Bureau of Census Current Industrial Reports on metal working machinery, the metalworking machinery industry as a whole has been significantly affected by the recent economic slowdown. The value of shipments of metalworking machinery peaked in 1997 at $5 billion and has since declined steadily to less than $3 billion in 2001. Initial data for 2002 report shipments (including exports) of slightly more than $2 billion for the metalworking machinery sector as a whole.

The Current Industrial Reports on metal working machinery indicate that presses have similarly declined. From 1996 to 2002 the United States' shipment of large presses rose from 2,951 units in 1996 to 3,549 in 1999 before declining markedly to 1,727 in 2002. The value of press shipments also peaked in 1999 at $434 million and declined to $151 million in 2002. The different types of presses peaked at different points during the period, but all have declined significantly in recent years. Shipments of small presses peaked in 1998 at 9,198 then declined to 5,706 in 2002. Mechanical power presses peaked in 1999 at 1,342 before dropping by more than half to 611 in 2002. Hydraulic presses peaked in 2000 at 2,499 before falling to 1116 in 2002. Exhibits 3 and 4 present the unit sales and value of sales for 1996 through 2002.

Exhibit 3: Number of Presses Shipped by Type
(Bureau of Census Current Industrial Reports)

  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
Small 8072 8916 9198 8752 7579 7195 5706 55,418
Mechanical 1187 1194 1277 1342 935 688 611 7,234
Hydraulic 1764 1974 2084 2207 2499 2176 1116 13,820
Total 11,023 12,084 12,559 12,301 11,013 10,059 7,433 76,472

Exhibit 4: Value of Press Shipment by Type (million $)
(Bureau of Census Current Industrial Reports)

  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Small $5.0 $6.5 $6.3 $5.2 $6.2 $4.0 $2.9
Mechanical $299.6 $306.0 $293.8 $314.3 $190.4 $95.9 $79.9
Hydraulic $97.5 $109.7 $99.4 $114.2 $103.1 $80.5 $68.7
Total $402.1 $422.2 $399.5 $433.7 $299.7 $180.4 $151.5

The number of presses shipped does not reflect the entire U.S. market for presses because many presses (new and used) are exported and even larger numbers are imported as press production has shifted to other nations. Importation of mechanical presses has been basically flat while exportation of these presses has increased significantly. Exhibit 5 presents imports and exports of all presses.
Exhibit 5: Number of Presses Exported, and Imported
(US International Trade Commission Data)

  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
(Jan-March)
Total
Imports                  
Small 6639 31054 16503 10282 12160 11490 9738 884 99750
Hydraulic 3784 6537 4919 4182 5811 5235 8940 1683 41091
Mechanical 1613 2089 1876 2379 2029 1869 1740 262 13857
Exports                  
Small 1757 2649 5202 5350 4408 3091 4662 1286 28405
Hydraulic 1165 1355 1579 1517 1632 1153 1172 217 9790
Mechanical 5080 5844 3613 4664 5969 12407 15812 2173 55562

As important for the use of PSDI is the economic health of the industries that use presses. The Census Annual Survey of Manufacturers indicates that most of the primary customers for presses have experienced a decline in shipments and employment in recent years; although 2002 data for these sectors are not available, shipments and employment in 2002 are likely to show a continuing decline because of the general weakness in the U.S. economy in 2002. Exhibits 6 and 7 present the value of shipments and number of production workers in the industries that are the primary users of presses.
Exhibit 6: Value of Shipments for Sectors Using Presses (billion $)
(Bureau of Census Annual Survey of Manufacturers)

  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Metal Stamping 12 12.6 13.4 14.6 12.1
Motor vehicle parts stamping 23.6 24 24.8 24 21.9
Precision instruments 11.6 12 12.2 12.9 13.6
Electrical equipment 112 116 118 125 114
Motor vehicle parts 178 184 203 204 187
Machinery (all) 271 281 277 291 267

Exhibit 7: Number of Production Workers for Sectors Using Presses (thousands)
(Bureau of Census Annual Survey of Manufacturers)

  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Metal Stamping 71 74 74 77 70
Motor vehicle parts stamping 105 101 100 98 94
Precision instruments 24.7 24.1 22.8 23.5 24.7
Electrical equipment 432 432 433 431 396
Motor vehicle parts 630 636 646 643 584
Machinery (all) 936 943 919 914 844

2.4 Conclusion

The domestic market for power presses has contracted, but the industrial sectors that use power presses have experienced much smaller declines. Within the press category, mechanical power presses have a declining share, but a substantial number of these presses continue to be used, both because this equipment has a long useful life and because there are some jobs for which hydraulic presses are not an adequate substitute. Although the number of employees operating mechanical power presses is uncertain, the number is likely to be at least 40,000. In addition to operators, presses can injure other employees who are in the area of the press so that the number of employees at risk of injury from inadequately guarded and controlled presses is higher than the 40,000 estimate.


CHAPTER 3: INJURIES CAUSED BY MECHANICAL POWER PRESSES

To evaluate the problems that an effective PSDI provision might help alleviate, this chapter estimates the number of mechanical power press-related injuries. Because fatalities from power press accidents are rare, employee injuries are the focus of the chapter. The analysis reviews three sources of accident information: employer reporting, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports, and workers compensation data from Ohio and Oregon, two states that have state-wide injury databases. Finally, the chapter considers the causes of power press-related accidents.

One complication, discussed in greater detail below, is that different organizations categorize presses or related equipment differently. The Association for Manufacturing Technology (AMT) limited its classification of presses to mechanical, hydraulic, and pneumatic presses. Brake presses are in a separate category, as are punches; brake presses bend material, punches cut holes in material. The BLS press data divide presses into two groups: printing presses and all other presses. The category that the analysis used, all presses except printing presses, includes the following classifications: punch presses, brake presses, assembly presses, unspecified, and not elsewhere classified (n.e.c.). The two state worker's compensation databases use similar categories.


3.1 Injuries

Section 1910.217(g) data

Section 1910.217(g) requires employers to report any injuries that occur with mechanical power presses. These reports are the only source of data on injuries that are solely from mechanical power presses. OSHA has compiled data for the period 1995 through 2000; partial year data for 1994 and 2001 were available for this analysis. The 1910.217(g) data compiled for this analysis do not include all accidents reported under 1910.217(g) because some reports were filed with local OSHA offices and some may have been filed with state OSHA offices. In addition, it is unlikely that all employers have complied with the rule. The data, therefore, do not present a complete record of accidents involving mechanical power presses. However, they represent the best source of data for these presses because they are the only data that are unequivocally linked to mechanical power presses as opposed to hydraulic presses or other machinery that is sometimes labeled as presses.

As illustrated in Exhibit 8, the number of accidents reported over a six-year period indicates a relatively consistent pattern, with a slight downward trend. The exhibit shows that mechanical power presses continue to cause serious injuries.

Exhibit 8: Mechanical Power Press Accidents Reported to OSHA under 1910.217(g)

Year Amputations Crush Fatalities Fractures Lacerations Other Total
1995 67 26 1 13 24 12 143
1996 68 26 0 10 18 4 126
1997 68 21 0 21 22 6 138
1998 68 29 0 18 17 7 139
1999 59 28 0 9 16 2 114
2000 54 26 0 18 12 4 114
Total 384 138 1 89 109 35 774

Bureau of Labor Statistics Data

BLS publishes extensive data on all press injuries. BLS collects injury data using a combination of surveys, interviews, and other techniques. BLS reported that approximately 6,000 injuries per year occurred on non-printing presses from 1992 to 1999, compared to the 120 injuries per year that were recorded under 1910.217(g)11. While the BLS data are useful in describing injuries from press use, the results cannot be directly compared with the 1910.217(g) data because the press categorization is not the same.

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the applicability of the BLS press categories to mechanical power presses is unclear. It is possible that power presses are aggregated in the punch press category or they may be grouped in the "not elsewhere classified" category. Although data on the number of punch presses, brake presses, and assembly presses are not available in a form that provides any confidence that the categorization being applied is equivalent to the categories used by the machine tool industry, it is useful to compare the level of injuries from various types of presses to the total number of presses. Exhibit 9 provides the BLS data for different types of presses12. As can be seen, most of the injuries occurred on presses whose type was not identified. Column 3 of Exhibit 9 reallocates the injuries from unidentified presses by assuming that they occurred among the four press categories at the same rate that injuries reported for the categories occurred. The number of assembly presses is unknown; the industry does not use that phrase to describe presses in its inventories. The number of brake presses is also uncertain; in 1996, press brakes constituted about 20 percent of the shipments of bending and forming machines. If power presses are among the presses "nec" category, the injury rate with these machines is lower than that of punch and brake presses.

Exhibit 9: Injuries by Press Type

Press Type 1996 Total Injuries 1996 Injuries with Unspecified Presses Allocated to Other Categories  Number of Units in AMT 1996 Inventory
Unspecified presses 1,819    
Assembly presses 157 255  
Brake presses 445 723 79,705*
Punch presses 790 1,284 48,564
Presses, not elsewhere classified 590 959 194,891
* Bending and forming machines. Brake presses are a subset of this category.

BLS data are used to support general trends in press accidents rather than direct tracking of mechanical power press accidents. For all types of presses, BLS data indicate that 48,00013 injuries occurred over the period of 1992 to 1999. About one third of injuries are not categorized (i.e., they are listed as "other"); for those injuries that are categorized, the leading injuries are amputations, cuts/punctures, followed by fractures, bruises, and sprains/strains (see Exhibit 10).

Exhibit 10
Punch Press Injuries by Nature
Based on BLS Injury Data, 1992 - 1999
Exhibit 10: Punch Press Injuries by Nature Based on BLS Injury Data, 1992 - 1999
Text Version of Chart:
Type: Bar graph depicting punch press injuries by nature.
  • Other = 2,555
  • Amputations = 1,689
  • Cuts, punctures = 1,673
  • Fractures = 1,261
  • Bruises = 641
  • Sprains, strains = 529

Amputations, the most serious of the injuries, appear to have declined slightly for all types of presses in the seven-year period ending in 1999, the last year for which BLS data are available (see Exhibit 11). As shown in Exhibit 12, BLS data also indicate that most reported amputations (2,365 of 5,510) occur on press types that are not elsewhere classified or are unspecified. For presses that are categorized, punch presses have the most amputations (1,689), followed by brake presses (898), and assembly presses (245).
Exhibit 11
Number of Amputations for All Press Categories
Based on BLS Injury Data, 1992 - 1999
Exhibit 11: Number of Amputations for All Press Categories Based on BLS Injury Data, 1992 - 1999
Text Version of Chart:
Type: Line graph depicting number of amputations for all press categories.
  • 1992 = 796
  • 1993 = 667
  • 1994 = 866
  • 1995 = 714
  • 1996 = 475
  • 1997 = 691
  • 1998 = 644
  • 1999 = 657

Exhibit 12
Distribution of Amputations by Press Category
Based on BLS Injury Data, 1992 - 1999
Exhibit 12: Distribution of Amputations by Press Category Based on BLS Injury Data, 1992 - 1999
Text Version of Chart:
Type: Bar graph depicting distribution of amputations by press category.
  • Punch presses = 1,689
  • Unspecified presses = 1,451
  • Presses, not elsewhere classified = 914
  • Brake presses = 898
  • Assembly presses = 245

The BLS data do not provide information on accident rates, and the lack of information on the number of presses in use makes it difficult to determine whether the number of accidents per worker or press has changed over time. As discussed in Chapter 2, during the period covered by the BLS data (1992 through 1999) the economy and the sectors that use power presses were growing as were shipments of power presses. It is possible, therefore, that the decline in the number of accidents over that period represents a lower rate of accidents as well. NIOSH, however, in its comments on this review, provided press amputation rates of 6 to 7 amputations per 1,000 workers, a rate that NIOSH stated did not change significantly from 1992 to 2000.

Workers Compensation Data

Employees who are injured on the job commonly file for workers compensation creating another potential source of information on injuries sustained from mechanical power press accidents. Worker's compensation data from private insurance companies were not available for the analysis; therefore, the analysis contacted two states (Ohio and Oregon) that have state-run compensation systems. The Oregon data, discussed in the next section, are aggregate data for 20 years so trends in the number of accidents cannot be obtained. Injury data from the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation cover the Metal Stamped Goods Manufacturing Industry and contain relevant information on injuries from presses, although not specifically from mechanical power presses14. The Ohio data present figures for accepted injury claims from private employers and support the BLS data, showing a declining trend in the number of amputations (see Exhibit 13).

Exhibit 13
Amputations of Fingers and Thumbs
Number of Ohio Worker's Compensation for the Metal Stamped
Goods Manufacturing Industry (Private Employers Only), 1993 - 2001
Exhibit 13: Amputations of Fingers and Thumbs Number of Ohio Worker's Compensation for the Metal Stamped Goods Manufacturing Industry (Private Employers Only), 1993 - 2001
Text Version of Chart:
Type: Line graph depicting number of Ohio Worker's Compensation for the Metal Stamped Goods Manufacturing Industry (private employees only).
  • 1993 = 44
  • 1994 = 66
  • 1995 = 51
  • 1996 = 63
  • 1997 = 50
  • 1998 = 52
  • 1999 = 42
  • 2000 = 49
  • 2001 = 36

Interlake Stamping

In 1976, OSHA granted a variance to Interlake Stamping Company of Willoughby, Ohio, to allow the company to use PSDI on an experimental basis. The variance was granted based on a document submitted by the Swedish National Board of Industrial Safety, which indicated that the Board's experience had shown no accidents related to the functioning of the light curtain in the PSDI mode. In granting the variance, OSHA stated that the system reduced worker fatigue, a recognized cause of accidents15. Interlake Stamping has continued to operate PSDI systems under its variance. According to Wayne Gronstein, president of Interlake Stamping, in the 26 years of using PSDI, the company has never had a worker injured while using the PSDI system16.

3.2 Causes of Accidents

NIOSH research provided several reasons why accidents happen on mechanical power presses even with OSHA-mandated safeguards17. With respect to amputations, NIOSH research indicated that accidents are often caused by failure of machine guards. Operators are not always protected by safeguarding because there are wide variations in hand speed among males, females, younger workers, and older workers. For example, employees with greater hand speed might "after-reach" for a piece after activation. Based on injury frequency and severity, operator hand speeds, and extent of worker exposure, young male operators appear to be at greater risk than other mechanical power press operators. In addition, accidents occur when safeguards are deactivated or overridden for convenience or productivity.

The 1910.217(g) data also indicate the causes of the injuries sustained while using mechanical power presses. As shown in Exhibit 14, for the period 1994 through 2001, the single largest cause of accidents is bypassing the existing safety system, followed by accidental tripping, safety failure, and scrap removal. The data are somewhat difficult to interpret with confidence because the description of causes is not necessarily consistent across respondents, nor do all respondents provide all of the information.

Exhibit 14: Causes of Mechanical Power Press Injuries18

Accident Cause Total Full-Revolution Part-Revolution
Bypass Safety 193 78 87
Accidental Trip 138 62 54
Scrap Removal 136 56 66
Safety Failure 135 57 60
Other 124 45 60
No Safeguard 99 53 31
Repeat Press 73 45 17
Press Failure 33 6 23

The 1910.217(g) data also provide information on the frequency of accidents for types of feeding (hands-in, hands-out, automatic), actuation methods (hand or foot controls), and safety controls (barriers, pull-outs, PSD). Without data on the number of presses equipped with particular types of controls and using feeding methods, it is not possible to determine whether the accident rate associated with one or more of these is disproportionate.

The Oregon Workers Compensation Division data are grouped into the same categories of presses that BLS uses and presented as aggregate numbers of accepted claims over 20 years. The data do not provide the causes of injuries in the detail that the 1910.217(g) data do, but they do provide some insight into other factors that may affect the number of injuries. Exhibit 15 presents the causes of press accidents from 1982-2001.

Exhibit 15: Causes of Mechanical Power Press Injuries 1982-2001
Oregon Workers Compensation Data

Event or Exposure Assembly presses Brake Presses Punch Presses Other Presses 20 Year Total
20 Year Total 28 65 61 1,257 1,411
Caught In Equipment Or Material 13 60 48 735 856
Overexertion 5 3 2 231 241
Struck By/Against An Object 9 2 9 186 206
Contact With Temp. Extremes 0 0 0 61 61
Fall To Same Level 0 0 0 20 20
Fall From Elevation 0 0 1 7 8
Rubbed, Abraded 0 0 0 4 4
Contact With Electric Current 0 0 0 4 4
Contact With Objects, Other 1 0 1 1 3
Explosion 0 0 0 1 1
Nonclassifiable 0 0 0 7 7

The Oregon data also provide information on an issue of importance to PSDI, the possibility that employees other than the machine operator will be injured by presses. PSDI is the only means of initiating a press cycle that protects both operators and other employees. As shown in Exhibit 16, the Oregon data indicate that only 50 percent of the total injuries caused by punch presses and other presses were to the press operators.
Exhibit 16: Employees Injured by Presses 1982-2001
Oregon Workers Compensation Data

Occupation Assembly Presses Brake Presses Punch Presses Other Presses 20 Year Total
Total 28 65 61 1,257 1,411
Machine Operator, Except Precision Machines 20 41 60 630 721
Laborer 2 8 17 137 164
Precision Production 3 7 7 110 127
Repairers/Mechanics 1 2 2 68 73
Other 2 7 5 312 326

Finally, the Oregon data provide information on an issue that NIOSH raised in its comments, the problem of operator error. Exhibit 17 illustrates how disability claims from press injuries vary with experience. The data show that the majority of all disabling claims from press-related injuries occur to workers who have been on the job less than one year. It is not possible from the data available to determine whether the rate of injuries is as strongly related to time on the job as absolute number of injuries are; there may be fewer long term press operators than less experienced operators. Nonetheless, these data support the information provided by industry experts, James Barrett (Link) and Jim Kirton (ISB), who stated that the majority of the accidents they have investigated involve workers who have been on the job for less than a year. Barrett and Kirton stated these people are often untrained. Dennis Ebens (Rockford Systems) also noted the lack of training and language problems as contributing to the causes of accidents19.
Exhibit 17
Number of Disabling Claims From Press Injuries, by Number of Years on the Job
Based on Oregon Worker Compensation Data, 1982 - 2001
Exhibit 17: Number of Disabling Claims From Press Injuries, by Number of Years on the Job Based on Oregon Worker Compensation Data, 1982 - 2001
Text Version of Chart:
Type: Bar graph depicting the number of disabling claims from press injuries, by number of years on the job.
  • During year 1 = 631
  • Years 2-3 = 255
  • Years 6-10 = 140
  • Years 4-5 = 126
  • Years 11-25 = 125
  • Information N/A = 113
  • Years 26-35 = 15
  • Over 36 Years = 6

3.3 National Emphasis Program

In 1997, OSHA began a National Emphasis Program (NEP) on amputations that occur while using mechanical power presses. The NEP, issued on February 28, 1997, provided detailed requirements for inspection procedures. In 1999, the NEP was expanded to cover additional presses and other equipment (e.g., shears, slitters, slicers, and saws). OSHA has provided new guidance for industry to help them identify safe work practices and improvements that can be implemented to reduce injuries. The NEP program in conjunction with local emphasis programs has surpassed its goal of reducing the amputation rate by seven percent from the 1993-1995 baseline. In the 1993 to 1995 period, the rate of amputations was 1.45 per 10,000 full time workers across all industrial sectors. The rate has declined steadily to 1.05 per 10,000 in FY 2000. Approximately 50 percent of the amputations occur in the manufacturing sector; saws and presses consistently ranked among the most dangerous sources.

3.4 Conclusion

The data analyzed for the NEP evaluation indicate that the overall rate of amputation across all industrial sectors in 2000 was 1.05 per 10,000 workers. The data presented in this chapter indicate that the rate of amputations for mechanical power presses is considerably higher. The data reported under 1910.217(g) for 2000 included 54 amputations for a workforce that is estimated to be far less than 100,000; this is more than five times the rate for all sectors. Presses also cause other injuries (fractures, crushed fingers or hands). The data support the NEP finding that presses continue to pose serious hazards to operators. In addition, the Oregon data indicate that other workers are also injured by these machines. Therefore, additional steps are needed to reduce injuries for employees operating or working near power presses.

Because PSDI systems have been severely restricted for mechanical power presses in the U.S., data on the effectiveness of these systems are limited. The one U.S. company operating PSDI-equipped presses under a variance reports that it has not had a single accident associated with the PSDI systems. This finding is consistent with the Swedish experience on which OSHA based its original approval of the variance.


CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF WHY THE PSDI STANDARD WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED

This chapter reviews the results of interviews with eight industry and union sources on why the PSDI standard has never been implemented. All of the interviewees were either members of the ANSI B 11 committee or the ANSI B 11.1 subcommittee.

4.1 Third-Party Validation

Whatever other issues there may be with paragraph (h), the main reason that the PSDI provisions have not been implemented is that no organization has come forward to serve as a third party validator. OSHA originally adopted third-party validation for the following reasons:
  • A similar approach was used in Germany and Sweden, and many experts believed it would work in the U.S.
  • OSHA-approved Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories (NRTLs), which are third-party product certifiers, perform activities similar to that contemplated for a validator, and it was expected that NRTL's would apply to be validators. The standard was also designed to allow industry organizations to establish semi-independent entities to serve as validators.
  • The annual recertification of PSDI systems was assumed to make the validation profitable for the validating organization and, therefore, worth any investment in equipment and training.
  • Liability would be limited because the employer or assembler would certify compliance; the third party only validated the certification.
  • Many experts commented that the rule would work.
Each of the industry sources20 interviewed provided the same set of reasons as follows for why no organization completed the process of gaining OSHA approval as a third party21:
  • The standard requires the third party to validate that no single failure will result in an injury. Given that a mechanical power press has a single brake, a single clutch, and a single transmission, it is impossible to state that a single failure will not result in an injury. A catastrophic mechanical failure could, and occasionally has, resulted in injuries. The only machine guard that prevents operator injuries in this case is the automatic pullback device. Pullbacks, like the other non-PSD guards, do not protect non-operators who are sometimes the ones injured. Consequently, no third party (or original equipment manufacturer (OEM)) would be willing to make the validation that OSHA requires.
  • Any organization that served as a third party would be taking on considerable potential liability, sharing with the OEM exposure should an injury occur. Because injuries continue to occur and lawsuits against OEMs are not uncommon, most testing organizations do not want to take the risk.
  • Third-party testing organizations usually test to a specific test standard that covers a particular kind of item (e.g., hardhats, electrical wires). Paragraph (h) requires the testing of the press, the PSD, and the control system, plus the installation. Combined with liability concerns, this type of validation raises substantial concerns about the ability of organizations to do the validation.
4.2 Other Issues

The interviewees mentioned a number of other problems with paragraph (h). None of these is seen as a bar to implementation, but they are seen as burdensome, unnecessary, or questionable.
  • James Barrett (Link) and James Kirton (ISBLite) stated that the requirement to dismantle the brake if any spring is broken is too strict. Modern brakes are built to function with some disabled springs. Retooling a brake is evidently a major operation and one unlikely to be undertaken unless necessary. Others disagree with this position.
  • Mr. Barrett also stated that the requirement to estimate or simulate brake wear is unnecessary because the brake monitor constantly checks stopping distance.
  • Mr. Barrett and Dennis Ebens (Rockford Systems) stated that the stopping distance formula has problems. The new B 11.1 has a more detailed version of the formula. In addition, the 63 in/second constant for body speed appears to be open to debate. The current constant assumes the operator is seated. If the operator were not seated, the figure might need to be higher.

CHAPTER 5: SECTION 610 REVIEW

This chapter discusses general issues that affect decisions on revision of the PSDI standard, the issues that a section 610 review must address, the options OSHA considered in soliciting comments and deciding on changes to the rule, and the comments received on the review and options.

5.1 PSDI Issues

In considering how to proceed, OSHA considered some general issues that create the context for any discussion of a change to the rule.
  • PSDI is used in Europe and in the U.S. on equipment other than mechanical power presses, including hydraulic presses.
  • The ANSI B 11.1 committee has recently (November 2001) updated the B 11.1 standard and included requirements for the use of PSDI on part-revolution presses. These standards are basically the same standards ANSI committees have adopted for PSDI use on hydraulic presses, press brakes, and robots.
  • The European Union Directive on machinery (Directive 98/37/EC) supersedes the earlier Swedish and German regulations. The directive requires self-certification or third-party certification for a wide variety of equipment and safety components. Although PSD, movable guards, and presses are among the covered equipment, PSDI does not have separate requirements.
One reason OSHA imposed stringent PSDI requirements for mechanical presses was that OSHA believed that other machines failure safe (i.e., the stroke stops) while mechanical power presses continue to stroke when they fail. William Gaskin (Precision Metalforming Association) and James Barrett (Link), indicate that this is not always true; other machines using PSDI, including hydraulic presses, can and do fail in ways that are unsafe. Mr. Barrett stated that hydraulic presses are more likely to fail than mechanical power presses because they have more parts that can fail; when lines break, the ram can continue to stroke down. Mr. Gaskin noted that hydraulic presses have different stopping times from mechanical power presses, but both can and do fail catastrophically although catastrophic failure is very rare in both cases. Improperly installed or retrofitted PSDI systems on other equipment pose serious safety issues. The Illinois Department of Commerce and Community Affairs in its comment stated that the consequences of PSDI failure are not different from the consequences of PSD failure when used as a guard. The requirements that the three ANSI B 11 subcommittees have developed for PSDI in the three revised standards are basically the same, which implies that all of these machines have the same safety problems.

OSHA originally considered the third-party requirements in Germany and Sweden as a model for paragraph (h). European Union rules have superseded the national standards. The European Union Directive 98/37/EC requires that for certain machinery and safety components, the manufacturer must either self-certify or submit the equipment to a third party approved by the national government. If a manufacturer self certifies, it must submit information to a third party, who maintains it on file. The safety components covered by the certification requirement include "electro-sensitive devices designed specifically to detect persons to ensure their safety (non-material barriers, sensor mats, electromagnetic detectors, etc.)," which means, among others, PSD units; PSDI is not listed separately. The Directive also includes logic units and automatic movable screens for presses among covered safety components. Presses, including press brakes, with or without the safety components, are covered if there is manual loading or unloading and movable parts that move more than six mm and have speeds exceeding 30 mm/s. The requirements also apply to 16 other types of machinery including saws and plastic and rubber moulding machines. (See Annex IV of the Directive for the list of covered equipment.)


5.2 Section 610 Review Criteria

Section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act directs agencies to review impacts of regulations on small businesses. Section 610 also provides that agencies should specifically consider the following five areas in reviewing the impact of a regulation on small businesses22:
  1. The continued need for the standard.
  2. The concerns about the complexity of the rule.
  3. The extent to which the rule overlaps, duplicates, or conflicts with other Federal rules, and to the extent feasible, with state and local governmental rules.
  4. The degree to which technology, economic conditions, and other factors have changed to affect the standard.
  5. The nature of complaints and comments received by OSHA about the standard.
As discussed in Chapter 2, data from The Economic Handbook of the Machine Tool Industry 2001-2002 indicate that 88 percent of the industrial facilities that use presses have fewer than 500 employees; 56 percent have fewer than 100 employees. Consequently, any rule that applies to power presses will affect a substantial number of small entities because the Small Business Administration standard for small entities for the manufacturing sectors affected by the press standard is 500 or fewer employees.

Continued Need for the Rule

As discussed in Chapter 1, OSHA selected the PSDI standard for review because no third-party has pursued OSHA approval as a third-party validator so use of PSDI on mechanical power presses cannot be implemented. Consequently, the predicted productivity and safety benefits OSHA sought in the 1988 standard have not been achieved. If these benefits are to be achieved, the standard must be revised to facilitate implementation of PSDI.

Complexity of the Rule

The standard, as currently written, has not been implemented and is complex. The requirements in the standard for PSDI systems are different from those in the latest update to the ANSI B 11.1 standard. In some cases, the rule may be more stringent and, in other cases, the rule is not as stringent as the B 11.1 - 2002 standard.

Extent to which the Rule Overlaps, Duplicates, or Conflicts with other Rules

The standard does not overlap, duplicate, or conflict with other state or Federal rules. Paragraph (h) and 1910.217 are substantially different from the latest revision to ANSI B 11.1, the industry consensus standard.

Changes in Technology, Economic Conditions, and other Factors

The technology for PSDI systems themselves has not changed since the paragraph (h) was adopted in 1988, but the technology for controlling mechanical power presses has changed considerably since 1910.217 was adopted. Press operation is now often controlled by computers, introducing hazards that are not addressed in the standard (e.g., press failures caused by hardware failures or software flaws).

Economic conditions of the industry have not changed in ways that would impact the use of power presses. Fewer mechanical power presses are being used, but a substantial number of such presses remain in use. One major change that does not affect the use of the presses is that some of the major U.S. producers of mechanical presses have gone out of business; new presses are more likely to be imported than was the case in the past. The U.S. continues to export substantial numbers of mechanical power presses.


5.3 Options

As part of its section 610 review, OSHA published a notice in the Federal Register on August 28, 2002 (67 FR 55181) to inform the public that the review was being conducted and to solicit comments. In its Federal Register notice, OSHA sought comments on the following options for revising the standard as well as asking for other options.

Option 1 - Update all of 1910.217 to ANSI B 11.1 - 2001 or something quite similar.

This option would update 1910.217 to B 11.1-2001, or something quite similar. This option would address the industry concern that 1910.217 is out-of-date and could be made safer.

Option 2 - Revise the third-party validation requirements.

This option would amend the requirements in paragraph (h) that make it more difficult for a third party to validate equipment. Specifically, the option would remove the requirement that no single failure could lead to an injury. Other requirements might need to be amended.

Option 3 - Eliminate third-party validation; leave the other requirements of (h) intact.

This option would remove all requirements for third-party validation, but leave the other PSDI rules intact. Self-certification could be substituted.

Option 4 - Replace (h) with the PSDI requirements in the new ANSI B 11.1.

This option would replace paragraph (h) with the ANSI B 11.1-2001 requirements for PSDI. This approach would revise 1910.217 to reflect newer safety standards for PSDI than are included in (h). Setting requirements for PSDI would require considering the existing requirements in paragraph (c) on PSD, as the two are linked.


5.4 Nature of Comments Received

Nine individuals and organizations submitted comments and background materials (see public docket S-225A). The following summarizes the comments received.

Replace 29 CFR 1910.217 with ANSI B 11.1-2001

Five of the nine commenters recommended that OSHA replace the entire mechanical power press standard with ANSI B 11.1-2001. NIOSH stated that this option would take advantage of the effort of press safety experts to keep ANSI standards current with new technology and safety practice. NIOSH added that adopting this option could have risk reduction potential by reducing exposure to hazards, especially those due to human error. Rockford Systems stated that this adoption would not only allow PSDI to be implemented (since ANSI B11.1-2001 has no validation requirement), it would also provide substantial improvements to other areas of 1910.217 that are outdated and lacking (see specific issues below). Rockford noted that other than the addition of PSDI provisions in 1988, most of 1910.217 has not been changed since it was first published in 1971, when OSHA adopted the 1971 revision of the ANSI B11.1 standard. Rockford said that ANSI has since made three major revisions to the B11.1 standard and, given that mechanical power presses and associated equipment are continuously evolving, the 2001 edition is reflective of the most commonly used and time-tested state of the art.

Rockford stated that there are several areas of 1910.217 that are incomplete, confusing, or subject to misinterpretation (see specific issues below). Rockford stated that ANSI B11.1-2001 is very complete and up to date. It uses current language that is easy to understand, and its two-column format provides explanatory information to clarify the standard. If this change were made, Rockford stated that it would definitely benefit employers in the metal stamping industry and manufacturers of presses. It would also simplify things since there would be only one set of requirements instead of employers trying to decide whether to meet the requirements of OSHA or ANSI.

The Illinois Department of Commerce and Community Affairs stated that the current standard contains exhaustive provisions that are difficult or impossible to comply with. They suggested that in the short-term, OSHA should issue a directive to allow employers to use PSDI if their equipment complies with the ANSI B 11.1-2001 standard. Over the longer term, they recommended that OSHA replace 1910.217 with the new ANSI standard. Judy Goodrich, a former OSHA employee who worked on the standard for 15 years, also recommended that OSHA adopt ANSI B 11.1-2001. She noted that PSDI is currently known as programmable controls, which can be monitored for self-checking and fail-safe operations. The ANSI committee that developed the latest version of the standard was comprised of industry experts.

The B 11 Accredited Standards Committee did not explicitly state that 1910.217 should be replaced with the new B 11.1, but they stressed the importance of consistency between 1910.217 and ANSI B11.1. They said that inconsistencies between the two standards will not further the goal of OSHA, the B11 Accredited Standards Committee, or the machine tool community in advancing the understanding, practice, and the technology of safeguarding for the purpose of providing a safe and efficient work place.

George Schreck stated that 1910.217 should be rewritten using ANSI B 11.1-2001 as a guide, but that the new standard should not be substituted for 1910.217. His reasons were as follows:
  • ANSI B 11.1-2001 has requirements for both the supplier and user. Requirements on the supplier would involve an expansion of OSHA's jurisdiction.
  • ANSI B 11.1-2001 does not require the accident reporting found in 1910.217(g).
  • ANSI B 11.1-2001 includes a number of other consensus standards that have generally not been incorporated in national standards (e.g., the boiler and pressure vessel code) and that the user might not be aware of.
  • ANSI B 11.1-2001 lacks any certification/validation by any responsible entity (including the user). The 1995 ANSI B 11.2 for hydraulic presses required self certification.
  • Some of the requirements in 1910.217(h) should remain (other than third party validation).
Mr. Schreck also recommended that OSHA consider expanding subpart O to include the entire ANSI B 11 series for industrial machinery and that OSHA through training and inspections ensure more even compliance expertise with industrial machine tools beyond mechanical power presses.

Finally, Roger Wooden stated that the current standard is too complicated for anyone to make improvements to productivity or safety. He noted that PSDI would greatly reduce operator carpal tunnel syndrome and recommended adoption of ANSI B 11.1-2001.

Replace paragraph (h) with the ANSI B 11.1 PSDI requirements

Three commenters supported changing the PSDI requirements in 1910.217(h). The B 11 Accredited Standards Committee stated that 1910.217(h) be amended to incorporate the language within Clause 10 of ANSI B11.1 in its entirety (clause 10 is the clause that covers PSDI requirements). Grant Prideco, a manufacturer of oilfield drill pipes and drill stem products, recommended that 1910.217 be updated to reflect ANSI B 11.1-2001 PSDI sections. As an alternative, they suggested removing PSDI from 1910.217 and placing the ANSI B 11.1-2001 PSDI requirements in 1910.212 so that they apply to all machines using PSDI systems. Although NIOSH recommended replacement of the entire section, it stated that it could also support the option of replacing paragraph (h) with the ANSI B 11.1-2001 PSDI requirements.

Data to support the rule change

Judy Goodrich disagreed with the statement in the notice that OSHA lacks data on the safety of PSDI. She noted that Interlake Stamping has been using PSDI for 26 years and has never had a worker injury with the system. She stated that the most frequent cause of injury with mechanical power press is accidental activation of a foot or hand control while the operator was reaching into the press. PSDI would prevent stroking in this situation. NIOSH also recommended information from Interlake Stamping be used to examine the effect of the rule change. NIOSH suggested that to track the impact of the change, OSHA could require reporting of injuries from PSD-foot control, PSD-hand control, and PSDI presses for five years.

Third Party Certification

On the issue of whether third party certification is needed for PSDI, NIOSH noted that OSHA does not require third-party certification for other safeguards. NIOSH stated that its data indicate that there are far more injuries from presses that use the other safeguards than from presses that use PSD. NIOSH data indicate that the rate of amputations from presses did not change from 1992 to 2000. NIOSH stated that PSDI could reduce the accident rate.

NIOSH further noted that certification or validation does not reduce injuries due to human error. Manual initiation of a press cycle places most of the responsibility for injury reduction on the operator. A NIOSH study showed that as press cycling rates increase, operator error rates increase. The same study indicated that the fixed barrier/foot control method of press operation, which does not require certification, poses a greater injury hazard than PSD/foot control method. NIOSH stated that human error and the potential to defeat the safeguard could be better controlled with PSDI than with the other options that currently do not require certification.

NIOSH also believes that PSDI offers improved protection from injury hazards for both operators and nearby workers. PSDI protects other workers unlike existing two-hand controls or pullouts, which can put adjacent workers at risk. NIOSH cites a 1983 study that suggests that working stress is also reduced because of the reduced hand motion. PSDI also eliminates the hazards of inadvertently activating foot controls.

The Illinois Department of Commerce and Community Affairs stated that PSD systems can be used to stop a press without third-party verification. Because the Department views stopping a press as more critical than starting it, the Department saw no reason for requiring third party verification for initiation.

One commenter made no recommendations on the specific options offered, but noted that PSD systems can be by-passed. He recommended training and inspections of mechanical guards.

Specific problems with 1910.217

Although two commenters stated generally that the current standard is too complicated, only the B 11 Accredited Standards Committee and Rockford Systems provided detailed comments on paragraph (h). The B 11 Committee made the following recommendations:
    Incorporations from ANSI B 11.1-2001. To minimize confusion within the machine tool industry, and to harmonize 29 CFR 1910.217(h) with not only ANSI B11.1-2001, but also ANSI B11.2-2000 "Safety Requirements for Hydraulic Power Presses," ANSI B11.3-2003 "Safety Requirements for Power Presses Brakes," and ANSI/RIA R15.06-1999 (Robot and Robot Systems Safeguarding), all of which have permissive language concerning PSDI. OSHA should incorporate the following supporting definitions/clauses (including explanatory information) from ANSI B 11.1-2001:
      3.11 - Definition of "break"
      3.76 - Definition of "presence-sensing device"
      3.77 - Definition of "presence-sensing device initiation (PSDI)"
      6.11.4.3.8 - Prohibition of PSDI on presses using full-revolution clutches
      6.12.3.3.8 - Requirements of PSDI as an operating mode
      6.12.3.5.4 - Requires the presence-sensing device used as an actuating means comply with clause 8.5.3.8
      8.5.3. - Minimum requirements of the presence-sensing safeguarding device.
    Safe Openings in Guards. Safe Openings in Guards impacts the installation of the presence-sensing device and the requirement of not being able to reach around, under, or over the sensing field. The values for the Safe Opening in Guards should also be applied to the area between the guard and the sensing field.

    Section 1910.217 Table O-10 should be replaced with the figure D10 and table D1 in ANSI B 11.1-2001 so as to bring the regulation in line with the current findings of Liberty Mutual. The values in Table O-10 came from the original (1950s) research by Liberty Mutual. Stover Snook et al. updated and published this research in the mid-1990s, taking into account current demographics of the American workforce (more females, Asians, Hispanics, et al.). The newer values are slightly more restrictive (reflecting those changes in the work force just mentioned), but are not considered to be so substantial in nature as to result in a negative impact to industry or the American economy. ANSI/RIA R15.06 has adopted these updated values for safe openings in guards, and with the recent (April 29, 2003) ANSI approval of B11.19 on performance criteria of safeguarding (a revision of the 1990 standard), all of the B11 series of standards have effectively updated to the newer Liberty Mutual anthropometric values.

    Control Reliability. OSHA should update 1910.217(b)(13) Control Reliability and adopt the current B11 version of this requirement. In a past review by the B11 ASC of the B11 series of safety standards, other voluntary standards that touch on his subject, and even 1910.217(b)(13), it was found that there were several versions of Control Reliability requirements, all of which were causing a great deal of confusion within American industry. The language that appears in ANSI B 11.1-2002 currently appears in 11 approved B11 American National Standards, as well as five others that are close to completing their revisions.
Rockford Systems identified the following problems with 1910.217(h):
    (h)(2)(ii) Brake and clutch requirements. The requirement for calculating the average value of the stopping times at 45 degrees, 60 degrees, and 90 degrees and making sure they are not more than 125 percent of the average value at the top crankshaft position is overburdening and is not needed. Some presses may have average stopping times on the downstroke that are more than 125 percent of the average value at top. This does not mean there is something wrong with the brake-it just shows that gravity is working to increase the stopping time on the downstroke, whereas it is working to decrease the stopping time on the upstroke. The difference between the stopping times on the downstroke and upstroke may be more than 25 percent, but this does not mean the brake is bad.

    (h)(4) Flywheels and bearings. If the bearings for the crankshaft and back shaft were to be inspected, lubricated, and maintained to reduce the possibility of bearing seizure, the employer would be required to remove the crank shaft, back shaft, intermediate shafts, gears, and flywheel for inspection once a year. After inspection, these components would need to be reassembled on the press. This would take the press out of production for a period of one to five days based on the press's size and drive system, and it would be a considerable cost to the employer. This is an unnecessary overburden.

    (h)(S)(ii) Brake monitoring. There are numerous things that can cause a press to stop differently after originally verifying the brake monitoring setting, such as machine temperature, tool loading, energy transferred, etc. The requirement of prior approval of the validation organization for brake monitoring adjustment would overburden the employer.

    (h)(6)(xi) Cycle control and control systems. If there is more than one operator of a press used for PSDI and they are operating on the same side of the press, it doesn't make sense that each operator shall be protected by a separate, independently functioning presence-sensing device. This requirement would add the expense of an additional presence-sensing device, add to the installation cost, and the location of the devices would hinder the operators' ability to feed and retrieve workpieces.

    (h)(8)(i) Safety system. This paragraph is impossible to comply with due to the many mechanical, electrical, and pneumatic components that could fail. In addition, a single operating error from an individual is not predictable.

    (h)(9)(iii) Safeguarding the point of operation. There is no reason that the sensing fields of presence-sensing devices shall only cover one side of the press. Where would the application of safeguarding two, three, or even four sides with one presence-sensing device cause an unsafe condition?

    (h)(9)(iv) Safeguarding the point of operation. Why would blanking of a portion of the sensing field not be permitted? If the minimum object sensitivity is small enough, one or two channels of the light curtain could be blanked and still maintain the one and one-fourth inches minimum object sensitivity.

    (h)(9)(v) Safeguarding the point of operation. The requirement for taking averages of multiple measurements at each of three positions (45 degrees, 60 degrees, and 90 degrees) of crankshaft angular position and using the longest of the three averages as the stopping time for calculating the safety distance is overburdening, and none of these three positions may provide the longest stopping time on the downstroke of the press. ANSI B11.1-2001 does not specify an angle-the stopping time should be measured at a point during the hazardous portion of the stroke where the stopping time is the longest. Also, the safety distance formula in this paragraph includes adding a factor of two multiplied by the increase in the stopping time allowed by the brake monitor. There is no reason that the increase in the stopping time allowed by the brake monitor should be multiplied by two-this increase in the stopping time should, by itself, be sufficient for the formula.

    (h)(10)(iii) Inspection and maintenance. See the previous comments regarding paragraph (h)(4).

    (h)(11) Safety system certification/validation. The requirement for a third-party validation organization should be removed. PSDI for mechanical power presses should be self-certifying as with all other standards, such as ANSI B11.1-2001.

    Appendices A through D are far too complex and difficult with which to comply.
Rockford stated that in addition to the current review of PSDI, all of 29 CFR 1910.217 should be examined and identified the following are areas of concern within paragraphs (b) and (c) of 29 CFR 1910.217:
    (b)(2) Brakes. This paragraph requires the brake capacity to be sufficient to stop the motion of the slide quickly. This is impossible for a full-revolution-clutch press during its cycle.

    (b)(3)(i) Machines using full revolution positive clutches. This paragraph requires that machines using full-revolution clutches incorporate a single-stroke mechanism. If a full-revolution-clutch press only operates in the continuous mode of operation, why is this a mandatory requirement? For years, the ANSI B11.1 standard has asked for single-stroke capability. The interpretation has been that if a full-revolution-clutch press needs to be single-stroked, a single- stroke mechanism or single-stroke control (electrical and/or pneumatic) can satisfy this requirement.

    (b)(3) Machines using full revolution positive clutches. Except for the two-hand trip requirements in (b)(3)(6), there is no guideline in (b)(3) for full-revolution-clutch controls. The ANSI B11.1-2001 standard provides an excellent guideline for full-revolution-clutch press controls along with details for various modes of operation.

    (b)(7)(ii) Machines using part revolution clutches. This paragraph only requires one red color stop control for each part-revolution clutch/brake control system. ANSI B11.1-2001 requires that each operator station have a red stop control. This is especially important on large presses when there are multiple operation stations and the operators are unable to see each other.

    (b)(7)(iii) Machines using part revolution clutches. There are several other modes of operation in addition to inch, single stroke, and continuous. ANSI B11.1-2001 provides guidelines for the operator-maintained continuous, automatic single stroke, and continuous-on-demand modes of operation.

    (b)(7)(v)(d) Machines using part revolution clutches. The exception allowing single-stroke, two-hand controls manufactured and installed before August 31, 1971 to not meet the requirements of this paragraph is dangerous. There should be no exceptions.

    (b)(7)(xi) Machines using part revolution clutches. The exception allowing clutch/brake air-valve controls manufactured and installed before August 31, 1971 to not meet the requirements of this paragraph is dangerous. Again, there should be no exceptions.

    (b)(8)(vi) Electrical. The word minimize in this paragraph is too vague and subject to misinterpretation.

    (b)(13) Control reliability. The language in this paragraph is old and allows the employer to detect a failure by a simple test. This could be unsafe. The language in ANSI B11.1-2001 for this subject is written better and is easier to understand.

    (c)(3)(ii) Point of operation devices. The language in this paragraph is too basic and provides no detailed guidelines for compliance. ANSI B11.1-2001 has requirements explaining that someone should not be able to reach over, under, around, or through the gate, and that the gate shall be capable of returning to the open position should it encounter an obstruction. ANSI B11.1-2001 also requires that the gate must open to reset the anti repeat system before a successive cycle can be initiated, that there must be adequate visibility to the point of operation, that the gate must not create a hazard, and that a Type B gate cannot be used on full-revolution-clutch presses.

    (c)(3)(iii) Point of operation devices. There are no guidelines for blanking in this paragraph. In addition, the safety distance formula is not complete because it does not take into consideration important factors such as the response time of the control, the additional time allowed by the brake monitor before it detects stop-time deterioration, the response time of the device and its interface, or the added distance due to the penetration factor based on the presence-sensing device's minimum object sensitivity. The inadequacies of this safety distance formula could possibly allow the presence-sensing device's sensing field to be placed too close to the point-of-operation hazard, allowing operators and other employees to be injured. In addition, the required 90 position of crankshaft rotation for where the stopping time is measured may not provide the longest stopping time on the downstroke of the press. This paragraph does not provide any guidelines for pass-through and ambient light situations. The ANSI B11.1-2001 standard considers and addresses all of these factors and situations.

    (c)(3)(iv) Point of operation devices. There are no guidelines in this paragraph requiring fasteners, pins, and other components used to secure and maintain the setting to prevent loosening, slipping, or failure during use. There are also no guidelines stating that die or tooling set-up protrusions shall be protected so they shall not interfere with the normal pulling action of the hand attachments, that the pulling members and hand attachments shall be of a substantial material that will resist deterioration from environmental conditions, or that work gloves shall be worn over the hand attachments and worn when the adjustment is checked. ANSI B11.1-2001 addresses all of these issues.

    (c)(3)(v) Point of operation devices. There are no guidelines in this paragraph requiring fasteners, pins, and other components used to secure and maintain the setting to prevent loosening, slipping, or failure during use. There is also no requirement that the holding members and hand attachments shall be of a substantial material that will resist deterioration from environmental conditions. ANSI 811.1-2001 addresses both of these issues.

    (c)(3)(vii) Point of operation devices. The safety distance formula is not complete because it does not take into consideration important factors such as the response time of the control, the additional time allowed by the brake monitor before it detects stop-time deterioration, or the response time of the device and its interface (e.g., capacitive palm buttons). The inadequacies of this safety distance formula could possibly allow the two hand controls to be placed too close to the point-of-operation hazard, allowing operators to be injured. In addition, the required 90 position of crankshaft rotation for where the stopping time is measured may not provide the longest stopping time on the downstroke of the press. The ANSI B11.1-2001 standard considers and addresses all of these factors and situations.

    (c)(5) Additional requirements for safeguarding. This paragraph is very confusing for the employer. OSHA does not provide any guidelines in 29 CFR 1910.217 for safeguarding auxiliary equipment used on or around mechanical power presses. The ANSI B11.1-2001 standard provides a guideline for work-envelope safeguarding along with line drawing illustrations.
5.5 Conclusion

Determination of Whether the Rule Should be Continued, Amended, or Rescinded to Minimize Significant Economic Impacts on a Substantial Number of Small Entities

OSHA is considering revisions to the standard to facilitate installation and use PSDI on part-revolution mechanical power presses. Because the PSDI standard has never been implemented, it has not had an economic impact of small entities. However, Interlake Stamping found that over the first five years of its use of PSDI under its variance, PSDI improved its productivity from the presses by 30 percent23. Consequently, OSHA continues to believe that PSDI, if safely implemented, could provide economic benefits to employers and health benefits to employees.



CHAPTER 6: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 REVIEW OF THE STANDARD

Executive Order 12866 on Regulatory Planning and Review states that agencies of the Federal government must review their existing significant rules "to determine whether any such regulations should be modified or eliminated so as to make the Agency's regulatory program more effective in achieving the regulatory objectives, less burdensome, or in greater alignment with the President's priorities and principles set forth in this Executive Order." This review focuses on four major points:
  1. Whether the standard has become unjustified or unnecessary as a result of changed circumstances.
  2. Whether standards are compatible with each other and not duplicative or inappropriately burdensome in the aggregate.
  3. Whether the standard is consistent with the President's priorities.
  4. Whether the effectiveness of the standard can be improved.
This review of the PSDI Standard, consistent with Executive Order 12866, finds that the standard has not been implemented and needs to be modified to gain the productivity and safety benefits that OSHA sought when PSDI was added to the standard in 1988.

Whether the PSDI Standard Has Become Unjustified or Unnecessary as a Result of Changed Circumstances

The PSDI Standard has not been implemented. OSHA conducted this review to identify the problems with the standard so that the standard could be revised. OSHA continues to believe that requirements for PSDI are needed, a position consistent with the recently adopted industry consensus standard, which contains a number of requirements for any PSDI system used on part revolution mechanical power presses.

Whether the Standard is Compatible with Other Regulations and Not Duplicative or Inappropriately Burdensome in the Aggregate

The standard is compatible with other OSHA standards. No other OSHA standard addresses the use of PSDI systems.

Whether the Standard is Consistent With the President's Priorities

The PSDI amendments to the standard were incorporated to carry out the President's priorities of improving productivity, particularly for small entities, while maintaining or improving worker safety. The amendment, however, has not met this goal because the standard has not been implemented. Consequently, OSHA is considering revision to the standard to better implement the President's goals.

Whether the Effectiveness of the Standard Can Be Improved

As the standard is currently written, PSDI has not been used for mechanical power presses; it will probably not be used in the future. Therefore, economic benefits from improved productivity will not occur. The effectiveness of the standard in preventing injuries may be improved by revising the standard to allow use of PSDI. PSDI may reduce stress on operators of the presses. Workers in the vicinity of the press would receive improved protection when PSDI is used. Information does not exist to estimate the amount of added protection.



CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Accidents with mechanical power presses continue to occur, resulting in serious injuries to workers every year. PSDI, if properly designed, installed, and used, would increase productivity and could reduce the likelihood of accidents. OSHA has conducted this review to determine why the existing standard that allows use of PSDI has never been implemented and to identify how the standard could be changed to facilitate safe use of PSDI in a manner that protects worker safety. Based on comments received and its analysis, OSHA is considering changes to 1910.217 and other alternatives. In its Federal Register Notice (67 FR 55181) informing the public that the review was being conducted and soliciting comments, OSHA presented the following four options for revising the standard:
  • Option 1 - Update all of 1910.217 to ANSI B 11.1 - 2001 or something quite similar.
  • Option 2 - Revise the third-party validation requirements.
  • Option 3 - Eliminate all requirements for third-party validation, possibly replace it with a self-certification requirement; leave the other PSDI requirements intact.
  • Option 4 - Replace OSHA's current PSDI requirements with the PSDI requirements in the new ANSI B 11.1.
Based on analyses and information obtained during this Section 610 review, OSHA has decided on Option 1, to update all of 1910.217 to ANSI B 11.1 - 2001 or something quite similar. Implementing this option would address industry concerns that the mechanical power presses standard (1910.217) is out-of-date and could be made safer. Five of the nine respondents who commented on this Section 610 review, in response to OSHA's August 28, 2002 Federal Register Notice, recommended that OSHA replace the entire mechanical power press standard with ANSI B 11.1-2001. PSDI is an integral part of that ANSI standard, and there is no validation requirement. Furthermore, many in the field believe this updating is over due, that there would be a range of benefits, and that it would lead to implementation of PSDI.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT,
SECTION 610


610. Periodic review of rules
(a) Within one hundred and eighty days after the effective date of this chapter, each agency shall publish in the Federal Register a plan for the periodic review of the rules issued by the agency which have or will have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities. Such plan may be amended by the agency at any time by publishing the revision in the Federal Register. The purpose of the review shall be to determine whether such rules should be continued without change, or should be amended or rescinded, consistent with the stated objectives of applicable statutes, to minimize any significant economic impact of the rules upon a substantial number of such small entities. The plan shall provide for the review of all such agency rules existing on the effective date of this chapter within ten years of that date and for the review of such rules adopted after the effective date of this chapter within ten years of the publication of such rules as the final rule. If the head of the agency determines that completion of the review of existing rules is not feasible by the established date, he shall so certify in a statement published in the Federal Register and may extend the completion date by one year at a time for a total of not more than five years.

(b) In reviewing rules to minimize any significant economic impact of the rule on a substantial number of small entities in a manner consistent with the stated objectives of applicable statutes, the agency shall consider the following factors--
(1) the continued need for the rule;

(2) the nature of complaints or comments received concerning the rule from the public;

(3) the complexity of the rule;

(4) the extent to which the rule overlaps, duplicates or conflicts with other Federal rules, and, to the extent feasible, with State and local governmental rules; and

(5) the length of time since the rule has been evaluated or the degree to which technology, economic conditions, or other factors have changed in the area affected by the rule.
(c) Each year, each agency shall publish in the Federal Register a list of the rules which have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, which are to be reviewed pursuant to this section during the succeeding twelve months. The list shall include a brief description of each rule and the need for and legal basis of such rule and shall invite public comment upon the rule.

APPENDIX II: INTRODUCTION AND SECTION 5 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866

REGULATORY PLANNING AND REVIEW

The American people deserve a regulatory system that works for them, not against them: a regulatory system that protects and improves their health, safety, environment, and well-being and improves the performance of the economy without imposing unacceptable or unreasonable costs on society; regulatory policies that recognize that the private sector and private markets are the best engine for economic growth; regulatory approaches that respect the role of State, local, and tribal governments; and regulations that are effective, consistent, sensible, and understandable. We do not have such a regulatory system today.

With this Executive order, the Federal Government begins a program to reform and make more efficient the regulatory process. The objectives of this Executive order are to enhance planning and coordination with respect to both new and existing regulations; to reaffirm the primacy of Federal agencies in the regulatory decision-making process; to restore the integrity and legitimacy of regulatory review and oversight; and to make the process more accessible and open to the public. In pursuing these objectives, the regulatory process shall be conducted so as to meet applicable statutory requirements and with due regard to the discretion that has been entrusted to the Federal agencies.

Accordingly, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Statement of Regulatory Philosophy and Principles.

(a) The Regulatory Philosophy. Federal agencies should promulgate only such regulations as are required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are made necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of private markets to protect or improve the health and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of the American people. In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating. Costs and benefits shall be understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider. Further, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute requires another regulatory approach.

(b) The Principles of Regulation. To ensure that the agencies' regulatory programs are consistent with the philosophy set forth above, agencies should adhere to the following principles, to the extent permitted by law and where applicable:

(1) Each agency shall identify the problem that it intends to address (including, where applicable, the failures of private markets or public institutions that warrant new agency action) as well as assess the significance of that problem.

(2) Each agency shall examine whether existing regulations (or other law) have created, or contributed to, the problem that a new regulation is intended to correct and whether those regulations (or other law) should be modified to achieve the intended goal of regulation more effectively.

(3) Each agency shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing information upon which choices can be made by the public.

(4) In setting regulatory priorities, each agency shall consider, to the extent reasonable, the degree and nature of the risks posed by various substances or activities within its jurisdiction.

(5) When an agency determines that a regulation is the best available method of achieving the regulatory objective, it shall design its regulations in the most cost-effective manner to achieve the regulatory objective. In doing so, each agency shall consider incentives for innovation, consistency, predictability, the costs of enforcement and compliance (to the government, regulated entities, and the public), flexibility, distributive impacts, and equity.

(6) Each agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.

(7) Each agency shall base its decisions on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other information concerning the need for, and consequences of, the intended regulation.

(8) Each agency shall identify and assess alternative forms of regulation and shall, to the extent feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities must adopt.

(9) Wherever feasible, agencies shall seek views of appropriate State, local, and tribal officials before imposing regulatory requirements that might significantly or uniquely affect those governmental entities. Each agency shall assess the effects of Federal regulations on State, local, and tribal governments, including specifically the availability of resources to carry out those mandates, and seek to minimize those burdens that uniquely or significantly affect such governmental entities, consistent with achieving regulatory objectives. In addition, as appropriate, agencies shall seek to harmonize Federal regulatory actions with related State, local, and tribal regulatory and other governmental functions.

(10) Each agency shall avoid regulations that are inconsistent, incompatible, or duplicative with its other regulations or those of other Federal agencies.

(11) Each agency shall tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on society, including individuals, businesses of differing sizes, and other entities (including small communities and governmental entities), consistent with obtaining the regulatory objectives, taking into account, among other things, and to the extent practicable, the costs of cumulative regulations.

(12) Each agency shall draft its regulations to be simple and easy to understand, with the goal of minimizing the potential for uncertainty and litigation arising from such uncertainty.

Sec. 5. Existing Regulations.

In order to reduce the regulatory burden on the American people, their families, their communities, their State, local, and tribal governments, and their industries; to determine whether regulations promulgated by the executive branch of the Federal Government have become unjustified or unnecessary as a result of changed circumstances; to confirm that regulations are both compatible with each other and not duplicative or inappropriately burdensome in the aggregate; to ensure that all regulations are consistent with the President's priorities and the principles set forth in this Executive order, within applicable law; and to otherwise improve the effectiveness of existing regulations:

(a) Within 90 days of the date of this Executive order, each agency shall submit to OIRA a program, consistent with its resources and regulatory priorities, under which the agency will periodically review its existing significant regulations to determine whether any such regulations should be modified or eliminated so as to make the agency's regulatory program more effective in achieving the regulatory objectives, less burdensome, or in greater alignment with the President's priorities and the principles set forth in this Executive order. Any significant regulations selected for review shall be included in the agency's annual Plan. The agency shall also identify any legislative mandates that require the agency to promulgate or continue to impose regulations that the agency believes are unnecessary or outdated by reason of changed circumstances.

(b) The Administrator of OIRA shall work with the Regulatory Working Group and other interested entities to pursue the objectives of this section. State, local, and tribal governments are specifically encouraged to assist in the identification of regulations that impose significant or unique burdens on those governmental entities and that appear to have outlived their justification or be otherwise inconsistent with the public interest.

(c) The Vice President, in consultation with the Advisors, may identify for review by the appropriate agency or agencies other existing regulations of an agency or groups of regulations of more than one agency that affect a particular group, industry, or sector of the economy, or may identify legislative mandates that may be appropriate for reconsideration by the Congress.



Footnotes

1. 63 FR 34139 (June 23, 1998). For complete text of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Section 610,  5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., see Appendix I.

2. For the text of EO 12866, see Appendix II.

3. Technically, two-hand controls, two-hand trips, foot controls, and foot trips. The difference between controls and trips is the length of time the control must be held down.

4. Unless explicitly stated, the term "presses" is assumed to include all types of presses - hydraulic, pneumatic, and mechanical.

5. According to Section E of the AMT Handbook, which obtained data from the American Machinist 15th Inventory, 1996.

6. Bureau of Census, Current Industrial Reports, Metalworking Machinery, 1997 to 2001 annual reports and 2002 quarterly reports.

7. Dennis Ebens, President, Rockford Systems.

8. U.S. International Trade Commission data from http://dataweb.usitc.gov.

9. Dennis Ebens, Rockford System, personnel communication.

10. J, Kirton, personal communication

11. Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Number of Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Involving Days Away from Work." Because mechanical power presses rarely cause deaths, only the BLS injury and illness databases were used for the analysis.

12. 1996 injury were used because the data on number of presses is from 1996

13. Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Number of Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Involving Days Away from Work."

14. The Ohio database includes claims made to the state insurance system. Businesses that have private insurance are not included in the data.

15. 41 FR 36703, August 31, 1976.

16. Wayne Gronstein, personal communication.

17. Injuries and Amputations Resulting from Work with Mechanical Power Presses, NIOSH Current Intelligence Bulletin 49, May 1987.

18. The totals for full-revolution and part-revolution presses do not add to total reported causes because not all respondents indicated the press type.

19. Personal communications with Barrett, Kirton, and Ebens.

20. Wayne Gronstein, Interlake Stamping; Dennis Ebens, president, Rockford Systems; James Barrett, Link; James Kirton, ISBLite; William Gaskin, Precision Metalforming Association.

21. Two organization sent letters to OSHA to ask for certification, but neither responded to OSHA's request for more information.

22. Regulatory Flexibility Act 610 (b) (1).

23. Wayne Gronstein, Interlake Stamping, personal communication.