Inspection Detail

Inspection: 307828632 - Herbert Malarkey Roofing Company

Inspection Information - Office: Or-E-Portland - Safety 1 1054111

Inspection Nr: 307828632

Report ID: 1054191

Date Opened: 08/05/2004

Site Address:
Herbert Malarkey Roofing Company
3131 N Columbia Blvd
Portland, OR 97217

Mailing Address:
Po Box 17217, Portland, OR 97217

Union Status: Union

SIC:2952

NAICS: 324122/Asphalt Shingle and Coating Materials Manufacturing

Inspection Type: Accident

Scope: Partial

Advanced Notice: N

Ownership: Private

Safety/Health: Health

Close Conference: 09/03/2004

Planning Guide: Health-Manufacturing

Emphasis:

Case Closed: 12/22/2004

Violation Summary
Violations/Penalties	Serious	Willful	Repeat	Other	Unclass	Total
Initial Violations	1					1
Current Violations	1					1
Initial Penalty	$1,500	$0	$0	$0	$0	$1,500
Current Penalty	$1,500	$0	$0	$0	$0	$1,500
FTA Penalty	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0

Violation Items
#	Citation ID	Citaton Type	Standard Cited	Issuance Date	Abatement Due Date	Current Penalty	Initial Penalty	FTA Penalty	Contest	Latest Event	Note
1.	01001	Serious	701076001 C	09/24/2004	10/04/2004	$1,500	$1,500	$0		-

Investigation Summary

Investigation Nr: 201634599

Event: 08/01/2004

Employee is burned in vapor explosion

At approximately 9:30 a.m. on August 1, 2004, Employee #1 was beginning the process of transferring hot asphalt from a blending tank to a holding tank. The blending tank was nearly filled with hot asphalt which was heated to approximately 385 degrees Fahrenheit. Added into the hot asphalt were styrenic block copolymer pellets are which are known to form flammable hydrocarbons in the presence of heat above 250 degrees Fahrenheit. Employee #1 was standing on an enclosed platform above the tanks and was opening a transfer valve. A flash fire occurred in the blending tank, which had a large top hatch with an unlatched door. He was thrown backwards and struck the transfer pipe. Employee #1 was hospitalized with second-degree burns on both forearms and the left side of his face. One possible ignition source was an elevator lift and chute system that was not grounded and bonded. Another possible ignition source was clumps of un-dissolved pellets that were found conglomerated around the elevator chute entry point due to the upper agitator paddle for the blending tank breaking off several days before the explosion. Per the styrenic block copolymer MSDS, the pellets "contain residual unsaturation which can undergo exothermic oxidative degradation. Accumulation of product in areas exposed to elevated temperatures for extended periods in air may result in self-heating and auto-ignition". A third possible ignition source was the tank transfer valve wheel that was being opened by Employee #1 at the time that the fire occurred. One final factor was the blockage of the tank's vent, which was 90-percent plugged with styrenic pellets, reducing the emergency relief capacity.

Keywords: BURN, FLAMMABLE LIQUID, UNSECURED, FIRE, EXPLOSION, HOT ASPHALT, STYRENE, VALVE, FACE, TANK

Investigated Inspection
#	Inspection	Age	Sex	Degree of Injury	Nature of Injury	Occupation
1	307828632			Hospitalized injury	Burn/Scald(Heat)	Occupation not reported

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