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Occupational Safety and Health Administration OSHA

Inspection Detail

Inspection: 306618505 - Atk Thiokol Corp

Inspection Information - Office: Utah

Nr: 306618505Report ID: 0854910Open Date: 02/15/2005

Atk Thiokol Corp
9160 North Highway 83
Corinne, UT 84307
Union Status: NonUnion
SIC: 3764/Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Propulsion Units and Propulsion Unit Parts
NAICS: 336415/Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Propulsion Unit and Propulsion Unit Parts Manufacturing
Mailing: 9160 North Highway 83, Corinne, UT 84307

Inspection Type:Accident
Scope:Partial Advanced Notice:Y
Safety/Health:Health Close Conference:04/14/2005
Planning Guide: Health-Manufacturing Close Case:09/26/2005
Emphasis: S:Amputations, S:General Industry

Related Activity:TypeIDSafetyHealth

Violation Summary
Serious Willful Repeat Other Unclass Total
Initial Violations 1 1
Current Violations 1 1
Initial Penalty $6,300 $0 $0 $0 $0 $6,300
Current Penalty $6,300 $0 $0 $0 $0 $6,300
FTA Amount $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

Violation Items
# ID Type Standard Issuance Abate Curr$ Init$ Fta$ Contest LastEvent
  1. 01001 Serious 40004 B 08/05/2005 08/09/2005 $6,300 $6,300 $0 -

Accident Investigation Summary
Summary Nr: 201561248Event: 02/14/2005Explosion Kills One Employee And Injuries Another
At approximately 10:46 p.m. on February 14, 2005, Employee #1 and Employee #2 were in the process of manually transferring material from a filter receiver into a 5-gallon bucket. The filter receiver, made of stainless steel, was 4 ft by 4 ft by 2 ft on the outside. The filter receiver was equipped with 4 caster wheels, approximately 4-in., located 8-in. off at each corner. The filter receiver had a 6-in. false bottom giving an effective 18-in. inside depth. A metal grid frame 1 ft by 1 ft was attached 6 in. from the bottom and was used to support a filter tray. A polypropylene, 25-micron filter blanket covered the bottom and sides of the filter receiver with some overhang. The filter receiver was equipped with a fitting on the bottom to facilitate either vacuum or supplied air through the false bottom of the filter receiver. Employee #1 and Employee #2 had brought in extra tools to facilitate the transfer when the material became hard to remove from the filter tray. This equipment included a 52-ounce cast aluminum scoop and a large, 3-ft polypropylene shovel. These tools, specifically the aluminum scoop were not approved for use as part of the process. An unexpected material in the bottom of the filter receiver exploded. It's assumed that the use of the aluminum scoop most likely caused the initiation of the explosion due to impact force. Employee #1 was killed. Employee #2 received substantial burn injuries to over 70 percent of her body and was hospitalized.
Keywords: burn, heat, work rules, explosion, equipment approval
Inspection Degree Nature Occupation
1 306618505 Hospitalized injury Burn/Scald(Heat) Occupation not reported
2 306618505 Fatality Burn/Scald(Heat) Occupation not reported

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