Powered by GoogleTranslate

Inspection Detail

Inspection: 306365230 - Fresno Wastewater Treatment Plant

Inspection Information - Office: Fresno District Office

 

Inspection Nr: 306365230
Report ID: 0950625
Date Opened: 01/25/2007

Site Address:
Fresno Wastewater Treatment Plant
5607 W Jensen Ave
Fresno, CA 93706

Mailing Address:
, , 00000

Union Status: Union

SIC:9511

NAICS: 924110/Administration of Air and Water Resource and Solid Waste Management Programs


Inspection Type: Accident

Scope: Partial

Advanced Notice: N

Ownership: LocalGovt

Safety/Health: Safety

Close Conference: 01/25/2007

Emphasis:

Case Closed: 11/17/2008


Related Activity
Type Activity Nr Safety Health
Accident 362102899
Violation Summary
Violations/Penalties Serious Willful Repeat Other Unclass Total
Initial Violations 2 1 3
Current Violations 2 1 3
Initial Penalty $8,100 $0 $0 $600 $0 $8,700
Current Penalty $2,970 $0 $0 $600 $0 $3,570
FTA Penalty $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

Violation Items
# Citation ID Citaton Type Standard Cited Issuance Date Abatement Due Date Current Penalty Initial Penalty FTA Penalty Contest Latest Event Note
1. 01001 Other 3329 D 02/08/2007 02/26/2007 $600 $600 $0 02/22/2007 F - Formal Settlement  
2. 02001 Serious 3314 G02 A 02/08/2007 02/26/2007 $2,700 $4,050 $0 02/22/2007 F - Formal Settlement  
3. 03001 Serious 3314 J01 02/08/2007 02/26/2007 $270 $4,050 $0 02/22/2007 F - Formal Settlement  

Investigation Summary

Investigation Nr: 201088374
Event: 08/08/2006
Employee Is Injured by Pressurized Gas Release

At approximately 9:00 p.m. on August 8, 2006, Employees #1 and #2 attempted to clean out a heat exchanger. The heat exchanger was part of a natural gas piping system in the power generation facility of a wastewater treatment plant. The heat exchanger contained methane and natural gas, pressurized to approximately 300 pounds per square inch. Approximately 200 parts per million of hydrogen sulfide contaminant was present in the natural gas. The natural gas piping system contained two compressors, labeled Compressor A and Compressor B. The heat exchanger that Employees #1 and #2 were to clean out was connected to Compressor B. Compressor B was off and Compressor A was running. Employees #1 and #2 incorrectly assumed that since compressor B was not running, it had already been isolated from Compressor A by a closed valve. However, the valve between compressor A and B was in the "open" position. Employee #2 began removing a plug on the Compressor B heat exchanger, with a pneumatic impact gun, while Employee #1 was standing directly behind him. When the heat exchanger plug was removed, the pressurized natural gas came out of the 0.5-inch plug opening and blew Employees #2 and #1 back. The natural gas did not ignite. Employee #1 was rendered unconscious from the impact. Employee #2 initiated emergency shutdown of the natural gas system and notified other employees about the emergency. An ambulance was called, but neither employee was hospitalized.

Keywords: COMPRESSOR, UNCONSCIOUSNESS, NATURAL GAS, LOCKOUT, HIGH PRESSURE PIPE, HIGH PRESSURE, VALVE, STRUCK BY, PRESSURE RELEASE

Investigated Inspection
# Inspection Age Sex Degree of Injury Nature of Injury Occupation
1 306365230 Non Hospitalized injury Other Power plant operators
2 306365230 Non Hospitalized injury Poisoning(Systemic) Power plant operators
Back to Top

Thank You for Visiting Our Website

You are exiting the Department of Labor's Web server.

The Department of Labor does not endorse, takes no responsibility for, and exercises no control over the linked organization or its views, or contents, nor does it vouch for the accuracy or accessibility of the information contained on the destination server. The Department of Labor also cannot authorize the use of copyrighted materials contained in linked Web sites. Users must request such authorization from the sponsor of the linked Web site. Thank you for visiting our site. Please click the button below to continue.

Close