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Inspection Detail

Inspection: 300398435 - International Paper Company - Louisiana Mill

Inspection Information - Office: Baton Rouge Area Office

 

Inspection Nr: 300398435
Report ID: 0625700
Date Opened: 11/02/1997

Site Address:
International Paper Company - Louisiana Mill
705 Colliers Lane
Bastrop, LA 71226

Mailing Address:
, , 00000

Union Status: Union

SIC:2621

NAICS: 0 


Inspection Type: Accident

Scope: Partial

Advanced Notice: Y

Ownership: Private

Safety/Health: Safety

Close Conference: 04/29/1998

Planning Guide: Safety-Manufacturing

Emphasis:

Case Closed: 07/19/2001


Related Activity
Type Activity Nr Safety Health
Accident 361125115
Complaint 74317801 Yes
Violation Summary
Violations/Penalties Serious Willful Repeat Other Unclass Total
Initial Violations 3 3
Current Violations 3 3
Initial Penalty $0 $0 $0 $0 $56,000 $56,000
Current Penalty $0 $0 $0 $0 $56,000 $56,000
FTA Penalty $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

Violation Items
# Citation ID Citaton Type Standard Cited Issuance Date Abatement Due Date Current Penalty Initial Penalty FTA Penalty Contest Latest Event Note
1. 01001A Unclass 19100146 F07 04/30/1998 05/26/1998 $18,667 $18,667 $0 -  
2. 01001B Unclass 19100146 F08 04/30/1998 05/26/1998 $0 $0 $0 -  
3. 01001C Unclass 19100146 F12 04/30/1998 05/26/1998 $0 $0 $0 -  
4. 01002 Unclass 19100178 P01 04/30/1998 05/11/1998 $18,667 $18,667 $0 -  
5. 01003 Unclass 5A0001 04/30/1998 03/31/1999 $18,666 $18,666 $0 -  

Investigation Summary

Investigation Nr: 200550200
Event: 10/31/1997
One employee killed, four injured, by chemical spill

At approximately 10:00 a.m. on October 31, 1997, Employees #1 through #5 were near the north heavy black liquor storage tank. Black liquor is a highly corrosive combination of sodium hydroxide, sodium sulfide, wood fibers, and other components of negligible quantities, with a pH of between 12 and 14; in this tank, the mixture was 45 percent solids. The 40 ft diameter by 60 ft tall tank was on the east side of the facility and was receiving black liquor from the power plant during a normal boil-out of the concentrators. The liquor entered the tank from the side, at a height of approximately 8 ft, under 60 psi pressure, and at 295 degrees F, as opposed to the contents of the tank, which was at 235 degrees F. Steam at 60 psi and weak liquor also entered the tank through the same location during boil-out. On the day of the accident, the boil-out process started at approximately 7:45 a.m. and the liquid level in the tank rose dramatically over a short period of time. At about 8:00 a.m., the level started to rise from 36 to 45 ft; just prior to 10:00 a.m., the level spiked to 55 ft. It was normal for the liquor level to rise rapidly during the boil-out of the concentrators, which was done approximately every three weeks. During normal operations, black liquor circulated through the north heavy black liquor storage tank from the evaporators, with the level running at approx 37 ft. On this day, the tank had filled to approximately the 43 ft level, as indicated from control room readings, when it failed and ruptured at the 20 ft level. Approximately 300,000 gallons of the hot, heavy, black liquor was released. Employee #1 was coated with the material and was killed. Employees #2 and #5 suffered burns and were admitted to the LSU/Shreveport burn unit. Employees #3 and #4 were treated locally and released. The storage tank was an atmospheric tank constructed to API 650 standards and inspected using API 653. It was made of A36 carbon steel plate in 6 ft to 10 ft rings of various thickness ranging from 0.5 in. for the top course (#6) to 0.645 in. for the bottom course (#1), with a 08125 in. thick base. The tank was placed in service in 1992 and had been experiencing a high rate of corrosion (between 0.03 and 0.07 in. per year) on the interior surface. From 1992 until 1996, the company had used it only for black liquor, with flashing as the only major problem occurring. Since the liquor entered the tank from the top, flashing would occur near the outlet. The company solved this problem by installing a bell-shaped covering at the end of the inlet pipe. The company did not consider black liquor to be a covered process under the PSM standard.

Keywords: BURN, STORAGE TANK, EQUIPMENT FAILURE, RUPTURE, CORROSIVE, CHEMICAL BURN, SPILL, TANK, ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE, HIGH TEMPERATURE

Investigated Inspection
# Inspection Age Sex Degree of Injury Nature of Injury Occupation
1 300398435 Fatality Burn(Chemical) Machine operators, not specified
2 300398435 Hospitalized injury Burn(Chemical) Machinery maintenance occupations
3 300398435 Non Hospitalized injury Burn(Chemical) Electricians
4 300398435 Non Hospitalized injury Burn(Chemical) Supervisors, production occupations
5 300398435 Hospitalized injury Burn(Chemical) Chemical engineers
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