Abstract: On October 26, 2010, an employee was working for an oil and gas well drilling firm. He was found unresponsive near a water well's electric pump control box. He had been electrocuted. An investigation established certain findings. 1) Circuits, equipment, and enclosures that were part of the water well pump were not grounded. 2) The heavy-duty circuit-breaking plug that was on the power cord to the 3-phase submersible water pump was designed to have and was equipped with a grounding contact. This contact, however, was not used. 3) A 10 AWG, three-conductor (black, yellow, red), type THW cable that used between the breaking plug and the motor contactor did not have a grounding conductor (green). 4) The control panel enclosure that contained the 60-amp motor contactor and the ON/OFF selector switch operator was designed with contacts for securing grounding conductors, but they were not used. 5) The 10 AWG, four-conductor, type THW cable that was used between the motor contactor and submersible pump motor had a grounding conductor, but it was not connected to the grounding contact in the control panel enclosure. The investigation established additional information. The water well had been drilled and the associated equipment installed by an oil field service company that specialized in water well drilling. The aboveground electrical circuits and equipment that controlled the submersible well water pump were repaired twice within a 24-hour period before the fatal incident by representatives of the oil field service company. The power cord had been exposed to physical damage, as pallets of mud-mixing supply were placed on top of the cord. The power cord between the plug and motor contactor had at least three separate splices and showed signs of burning. The electrical cords to the submersible pump entered an industrial control panel enclosure and were not connected to strain relief devices or fittings. A tug on the cord could be directly transmitted to terminal screws.