[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 28 (Wednesday, February 11, 2015)][Notices]
[Pages 7636-7646]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-02836]
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
[Docket No. OSHA-2014-0011]
Impregilo Healy Parsons Joint Venture; Application for Permanent
Variance and Interim Order; Grant of Interim Order; Request for
Comments
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA announces the application of Impregilo
Healy Parsons Joint Venture for a permanent variance and interim order
from the provisions of OSHA standards that regulate work in compressed
air environments and presents the Agency's preliminary finding to grant
the permanent variance. OSHA also announces its grant of an interim
order in this notice.
DATES: Submit comments, information, documents in response to this
notice, and request for a hearing on or before March 13, 2015. The
interim order specified by this notice becomes effective on February
11, 2015, and shall remain in effect until the completion of the
Anacostia River tunnel project or the interim order is modified or
revoked.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments by any of the following methods:
1. Electronically: Submit comments and attachments electronically
at http://www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal eRulemaking Portal.
Follow the instructions online for making electronic submissions.
2. Facsimile: If submissions, including attachments, are not longer
than 10 pages, commenters may fax them to the OSHA Docket Office at
(202) 693-1648.
3. Regular or express mail, hand delivery, or messenger (courier)
service: Submit comments, requests, and any attachments to the OSHA
Docket Office, Docket No. OSHA-2014-0011, Technical Data Center, U.S.
Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-2625,
Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-2350 (TTY number: (877) 889-
5627). Note that security procedures may result in significant delays
in receiving comments and other written materials by regular mail.
Contact the OSHA Docket Office for information about security
procedures concerning delivery of materials by express mail, hand
delivery, or messenger service. The hours of operation for the OSHA
Docket Office are 8:15 a.m.-4:45 p.m., e.t.
4. Instructions: All submissions must include the Agency name and
the OSHA docket number (OSHA-2014-0011). OSHA places comments and other
materials, including any personal information, in the public docket
without revision, and these materials will be available online at
http://www.regulations.gov. Therefore, the Agency cautions commenters
about submitting statements they do not want made available to the
public, or submitting comments that contain personal information
(either about themselves or others) such as Social Security numbers,
birth dates, and medical data.
5. Docket: To read or download submissions or other material in the
docket, go to http://www.regulations.gov or the OSHA Docket Office at
the address above. All documents in the docket are listed in the
http://www.regulations.gov index; however, some information (e.g.,
copyrighted material) is not publicly available to read or download
through the Web site. All submissions, including copyrighted material,
are available for inspection and copying at the OSHA Docket Office.
Contact the OSHA Docket Office for assistance in locating docket
submissions.
6. Copies of this Federal Register notice. Electronic copies of the
Federal Register notice are available at http://www.regulations.gov.
This Federal Register notice, as well as new releases and other
relevant information, also are available at OSHA's Web page at
http://www.osha.gov.
7. Extension of comment period: Submit requests for an extension of
the comment period on or before March 13, 2015 to the Office of
Technical Programs and Coordination Activities, Directorate of
Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution
Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210, or by fax to (202) 693-1644.
8. Hearing requests. According to 29 CFR 1905.15, hearing requests
must include: (1) A short and plain statement detailing how the
variance would affect the requesting party; (2) a specification of any
statement or representation in the variance application that the
commenter denies, and a concise summary of the evidence adduced in
support of each denial; and (3) any views or arguments on any issue of
fact or law present in the variance application.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is
available from the following sources:
Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue
NW., Room N-3647, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-1999;
email: Meilinger.francis2@dol.gov.
General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson,
Acting Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination
Activities, Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of
Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210;
phone: (202) 693-2110 or email: robinson.kevin@dol.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Notice of Application
On April 3, 2014, Impregilo Healy Parsons Joint Venture, ("IHP
JV" or "the applicant"), 2600 Independence Avenue SE, Washington, DC
20003, submitted an application for a permanent variance and interim
order under Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 ("OSH Act"; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 1905.11 ("Variances and
other relief under section 6(d)") from several provisions of the OSHA
standard that regulates work in compressed air at 29 CFR 1926.803. IHP
JV also requested an interim order pending OSHA's decision on the
application for a variance (Exhibit OSHA-2014-0011-0002, Request for
Variance). Specifically, the applicant seeks a variance from the
provisions of the standard that: (1) Prohibit compressed-air worker
exposure to pressures exceeding 50 pounds per square inch (p.s.i.)
except in an emergency (29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5)); \1\ (2) require the use
of the decompression values specified in decompression tables in
Appendix A of the compressed-air standard for construction (29 CFR
1926.803(f)(1)); and (3) require the use of automated operational
controls and a special decompression chamber (29 CFR
1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii), respectively).
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\1\ The decompression tables in Appendix A of subpart S express
the maximum working pressures as pounds per square inch gauge
(p.s.i.g.), with a maximum working pressure of 50 p.s.i.g.
Therefore, throughout this notice, OSHA expresses the 50 p.s.i.
value specified by Sec. 1926.803(e)(5) as 50 p.s.i.g., consistent
with the terminology in Appendix A, Table 1 of subpart S.
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According to its application, IHP JV is currently the general
contractor for the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority's
("DC Water") project to construct the Anacostia River tunnel. The
Anacostia River tunnel project design requires the ability to safely
perform hyperbaric interventions in compressed air at pressures higher
than allowed in the existing OSHA standard 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5) which
states: "No employee shall be subjected to pressure exceeding 50
(p.s.i.g.) except in emergency" (see footnote 1).
The applicant is a contractor that works on complex tunnel projects
using recently developed equipment and procedures for soft-ground
tunneling. The applicant's workers engage in the construction of
subaqueous tunnels below the water table through soft soils consisting
of clay, silt, and sand using advanced shielded mechanical excavation
techniques in conjunction with an Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring
Machine (EPBTBM).
IHP JV employs specially trained personnel for the construction of
the tunnel, and states that this construction project will use shielded
mechanical-excavation techniques. IHP JV asserts that its workers
perform hyperbaric interventions at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g.
in the excavation chamber of the EPBTBM. The hyperbaric interventions
consist of conducting inspections and maintenance work on the cutter-
head structure and cutting tools of the EPBTBM.
II. The Variance Application
A. Background
IHP JV asserts that innovations in tunnel excavation, specifically
with EPBTBMs, have, in most cases, eliminated the need to pressurize
the entire tunnel. This technology negates the requirement that all
members of a tunnel-excavation crew work in compressed air while
excavating the tunnel. These advances in technology modified
substantially the methods used by the construction industry to excavate
subaqueous tunnels compared to the caisson work regulated by the
current OSHA compressed-air standard for construction at 29 CFR
1926.803. Such advances reduce the number of workers exposed, and the
total duration of exposure, to hyperbaric pressure during tunnel
construction.
Using shielded mechanical-excavation techniques, in conjunction
with precast concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBTBMs provide
methods to achieve the face pressures required to maintain a stabilized
tunnel face through various geologies, and isolate that pressure to the
forward section (the working chamber) of the EPBTBM. Interventions in
the working chamber take place only after halting tunnel excavation and
preparing the machine and crew for an intervention. Interventions occur
to inspect or maintain the mechanical-excavation components located in
the working chamber. Maintenance conducted in the working chamber
includes changing replaceable cutting tools and disposable wear bars,
and, in rare cases, repairing structural damage to the cutter head.
In addition to innovations in tunnel-excavation methods, research
conducted after OSHA published its compressed-air standard for
construction in 1971 resulted in advances in hyperbaric medicine. In
this regard, the applicant asserts that the use of decompression
protocols incorporating oxygen is more efficient, effective, and safer
for tunnel workers than compliance with the existing OSHA standard (29
CFR part 1926, subpart S, Appendix A decompression tables). According
to the applicant, contractors routinely and safely expose employees
performing interventions in the working chamber of EPBTBMs to
hyperbaric pressures up to 75 p.s.i.g., which is 50% higher than
maximum pressure specified by the existing OSHA standard (see 29 CFR
1926.803(e)(5)). The applicant asserts that these hyperbaric exposures
are possible because of advances in hyperbaric technology, a better
understanding of hyperbaric medicine, and the development of a project-
specific HOM (Hyperbaric Operations Manual) that requires specialized
medical support and hyperbaric supervision to provide assistance to a
team of specially trained man-lock attendants and hyperbaric workers.
The applicant contends that the alternative safety measures
included in its application provide its workers with a place of
employment that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain
under the existing provisions of OSHA's compressed-air standard for
construction. The applicant certifies that it provided employee
representatives of affected workers with
a copy of the variance application.\2\ The applicant also certifies
that it notified its workers of the variance application by posting, at
prominent locations where it normally posts workplace notices, a
summary of the application and information specifying where the workers
can examine a copy of the application. In addition, the applicant
informed its workers and their representatives of their rights to
petition the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health for a hearing on the variance application.
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\2\ See the definition of "Affected employee or worker" in
section V. D.
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B. Variance From Paragraph (e)(5) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Prohibition of
Exposure to Pressure Greater Than 50 p.s.i.g. (see Footnote 1)
The applicant states that it may perform hyperbaric interventions
at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. in the working chamber of the
EPBTBM; this pressure exceeds the pressure limit of 50 p.s.i.g.
specified for nonemergency purposes by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5). The
EPBTBM has twin man locks, with each man lock having two compartments.
This configuration allows workers to access the man locks for
compression and decompression, and medical personnel to access the man
locks if required in an emergency.
EPBTBMs are capable of maintaining pressure at the tunnel face, and
stabilizing existing geological conditions, through the controlled use
of propel cylinders, a mechanically driven cutter head, bulkheads
within the shield, ground-treatment foam, and a screw conveyor that
moves excavated material from the working chamber. As noted earlier,
the forward-most portion of the EPBTBM is the working chamber, and this
chamber is the only pressurized segment of the EPBTBM. Within the
shield, the working chamber consists of two sections: the staging
chamber and the forward working chamber. The staging chamber is the
section of the working chamber between the man-lock door and the entry
door to the forward working chamber. The forward working chamber is
immediately behind the cutter head and tunnel face.
The applicant will pressurize the working chamber to the level
required to maintain a stable tunnel face. Pressure in the staging
chamber ranges from atmospheric (no increased pressure) to a maximum
pressure equal to the pressure in the working chamber. The applicant
asserts that most of the hyperbaric interventions will be at or near
atmospheric pressure. However, the applicant maintains that they may
have to perform interventions at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
During interventions, workers enter the working chamber through one
of the twin man locks that open into the staging chamber. To reach the
forward part of the working chamber, workers pass through a door in a
bulkhead that separates the staging chamber from the forward working
chamber. The maximum crew size allowed in the forward working chamber
is three. At certain hyperbaric pressures (i.e., when decompression
times are greater than work times), the twin man locks allow for crew
rotation. During crew rotation, one crew can be compressing or
decompressing while the second crew is working. Therefore, the working
crew always has an unoccupied man lock at its disposal.
The applicant developed a project-specific HOM for the Anacostia
River tunnel project (Exhibit OSHA-2014-0011-0003, IHP JV Project-
Specific HOM) that describes in detail the hyperbaric procedures and
required medical examinations used during the tunnel-construction
project. The HOM is project-specific, and discusses standard operating
procedures and emergency and contingency procedures. The procedures
include using experienced and knowledgeable man-lock attendants who
have the training and experience necessary to recognize and treat
decompression illnesses and injuries. The attendants are under the
direct supervision of the hyperbaric supervisor and attending
physician. In addition, procedures include medical screening and review
of prospective compressed-air workers (CAWs). The purpose of this
screening procedure is to vet prospective CAWs with medical conditions
(e.g., deep vein thrombosis, poor vascular circulation, and muscle
cramping) that could be aggravated by sitting in a cramped space (e.g.,
a man lock) for extended periods or by exposure to elevated pressures
and compressed gas mixtures. A transportable recompression chamber
(shuttle) is available to extract workers from the hyperbaric working
chamber for emergency evacuation and medical treatment; the shuttle
attaches to the topside medical lock, which is a large recompression
chamber. The applicant believes that the procedures included in the HOM
provide safe work conditions when interventions are necessary,
including interventions above 50 p.s.i.g.
C. Variance From Paragraph (f)(1) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement To
Use OSHA Decompression Tables
OSHA's compressed-air standard for construction requires
decompression in accordance with the decompression tables in Appendix A
of 29 CFR part 1926, subpart S (see 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)). As an
alternative to the OSHA decompression tables, the applicant proposes to
use newer decompression schedules that supplement breathing air used
during decompression with pure oxygen. The applicant asserts that these
decompression protocols are safer for tunnel workers than the
decompression protocols specified in Appendix A of 29 CFR part 1926,
subpart S. Accordingly, the applicant proposes to use the 1992 French
Decompression Tables to decompress CAWs after they exit the hyperbaric
conditions in the working chamber.
Depending on the maximum working pressure and exposure times, the
1992 French Decompression Tables provide for air decompression with or
without oxygen. IHP JV asserts that oxygen decompression has many
benefits, including reducing decompression time by about 33 percent,
and significantly lowering the rate of decompression illness (DCI),
compared to the air-decompression tables in Appendix A of 29 CFR part
1926, subpart S. In addition, the HOM requires a physician certified in
hyperbaric medicine to manage the medical condition of CAWs during
hyperbaric exposures and decompression. A trained and experienced man-
lock attendant also will be present during hyperbaric exposures and
decompression. This man-lock attendant will operate the hyperbaric
system to ensure compliance with the specified decompression table. A
hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in hyperbaric
operations, procedures, and safety, will directly oversee all
hyperbaric interventions, and ensure that staff follow the procedures
delineated in the HOM or by the attending physician.
The applicant asserts that at higher hyperbaric pressures,
decompression times exceed 75 minutes. The HOM establishes protocols
and procedures that provide the basis for alternate means of protection
for CAWs under these conditions. Accordingly, based on these protocols
and procedures, the applicant requests to use the 1992 French
Decompression Tables for hyperbaric interventions up to 52 p.s.i.g. for
the Anacostia River tunnel project. The applicant is committed to
follow the decompression procedures described in the project-specific
HOM during these interventions.
D. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of 29 CFR 1926.803,
Automatically Regulated Continuous Decompression
According to the applicant, breathing air under hyperbaric
conditions increases the amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in a CAW's
tissues. The greater the hyperbaric pressure under these conditions,
and the more time spent under the increased pressure, the greater the
amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in the tissues. When the pressure
decreases during decompression, tissues release the dissolved nitrogen
gas into the blood system, which then carries the nitrogen gas to the
lungs for elimination through exhalation. Releasing hyperbaric pressure
too rapidly during decompression can increase the size of the bubbles
formed by nitrogen gas in the blood system, resulting in DCI, commonly
referred to as "the bends." This description of the etiology of DCI
is consistent with current scientific theory and research on the issue
(see footnote 11 in this notice discussing a 1985 NIOSH report on DCI).
The 1992 French Decompression Tables proposed for use by the
applicant provide for stops during worker decompression (i.e., staged
decompression) to control the release of nitrogen gas from tissues into
the blood system. Studies show that staged decompression, in
combination with other features of the 1992 French Decompression Tables
such as the use of oxygen, result in a lower incidence of DCI than the
OSHA decompression requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803, which specify the
use of automatically regulated continuous decompression (see footnotes
8 through 15 in this notice for references to these studies).\3\ In
addition, the applicant asserts that staged decompression is at least
as effective as an automatic controller in regulating the decompression
process because:
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\3\ In the study cited in footnote 9 of this notice, starting at
page 338, Dr. Eric Kindwall notes that the use of automatically
regulated continuous decompression in the Washington State safety
standards for compressed-air work (from which OSHA derived its
decompression tables) was at the insistence of contractors and the
union, and against the advice of the expert who calculated the
decompression table and recommended using staged decompression. Dr.
Kindwall then states, "Continuous decompression is inefficient and
wasteful. For example, if the last stage from 4 psig . . . to the
surface took 1 h, at least half the time is spent at pressures less
than 2 psig . . . , which provides less and less meaningful bubble
suppression . . . " In addition, the report referenced in footnote
5 under the section titled, "Background on the Need for Interim
Decompression Tables" addresses the continuous-decompression
protocol in the OSHA compressed-air standard for construction,
noting that "[a]side from the tables for saturation diving to deep
depths, no other widely used or officially approved diving
decompression tables use straight line, continuous decompressions at
varying rates. Stage decompression is usually the rule, since it is
simpler to control."
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1. A hyperbaric supervisor (a competent person experienced and
trained in hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety) directly
supervises all hyperbaric interventions and ensures that the man-lock
attendant, who is a competent person in the manual control of
hyperbaric systems, follows the schedule specified in the decompression
tables, including stops; and
2. The use of the 1992 French Decompression Tables for staged
decompression offers an equal or better level of management and control
over the decompression process than an automatic controller and results
in lower occurrences of DCI.
Accordingly, the applicant is applying for a permanent variance
from the OSHA standard at 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii), which requires
automatic controls to regulate decompression. As noted above, the
applicant is committed to conduct the staged decompression according to
the 1992 French Decompression Tables under the direct control of the
trained man-lock attendant and under the oversight of the hyperbaric
supervisor.
E. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement
of Special Decompression Chamber
The OSHA compressed-air standard for construction requires
employers to use a special decompression chamber when total
decompression time exceeds 75 minutes (see 29 CFR
1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)). Another provision of OSHA's compressed-air
standard calls for locating the special decompression chamber adjacent
to the man lock on the atmospheric pressure side of the tunnel bulkhead
(see 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(2)(vii)). However, since only the working
chamber of the EPBTBM is under pressure, and only a few workers out of
the entire crew are exposed to hyperbaric pressure, the man locks
(which, as noted earlier, connect directly to the working chamber) are
of sufficient size to accommodate the exposed workers. In addition,
available space in the EPBTBM does not allow for an additional special
decompression lock. Again, the applicant uses the man locks, each of
which adequately accommodates a three-member crew, for this purpose
when decompression lasts up to 75 minutes. When decompression exceeds
75 minutes, crews can open the door connecting the two compartments in
each man lock during decompression stops or exit the man lock and move
into the staging chamber where additional space is available. This
alternative enables CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent
neuromuscular problems during decompression.
F. Multi-State Variance
As stated earlier in this notice, IHP JV applied for a permanent
variance and interim order for its Anacostia River tunnel project only.
The Anacostia River tunnel project is located entirely in the District
of Columbia and thus under Federal OSHA's exclusive jurisdiction.
Therefore, any variance OSHA grants IHP JV will have effect only in the
District of Columbia.
Twenty-seven state safety and health plans have been approved by
OSHA under section 18 of the (OSH) Act.\4\ As part of the permanent
variance process, the Directorate of Cooperative and State Programs
will notify the State Plans of IHP JV's variance application and grant
of the Anacostia River tunnel project interim order.
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\4\ Five State Plans (Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New
York, and the Virgin Islands) limit their occupational safety and
health authority to state and local employers only. State Plans that
exercise their occupational safety and health authority over both
public- and private-sector employers are: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming.
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Additionally, OSHA notes that four State Plans have previously
granted sub-aqueous tunnel construction variances and imposed different
or additional requirements and conditions (California, Nevada, Oregon,
and Washington). California also promulgated new standards \5\ for
similar sub-aqueous tunnel construction work.
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\5\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7,
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
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III. Description of the Conditions Specified by the Application for a
Permanent Variance
This section describes the alternative means of compliance with 29
CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) and provides
additional detail regarding the proposed conditions that form the basis
of IHP JV's application for a permanent variance.
Proposed Condition A: Scope
The scope of the permanent variance limits coverage to the work
situations specified under this proposed condition. Clearly defining
the scope of the permanent variance provides IHP JV, IHP JV's
employees, and OSHA with necessary information regarding the
work situations in which the proposed permanent variance would apply.
According to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer (or class or group of
employers \6\) may request a permanent variance for a specific
workplace or workplaces (multiple sites). If granted, the variance
applies to the specific employer(s) that submitted the application. In
this instance, if OSHA were to grant a permanent variance, it would
apply to the IHP JV's Anacostia River tunnel project only. As a result,
it is important to understand that the variance would not apply to any
other employers such as other joint ventures the applicant may
undertake in the future. However, the variance rules of practice do
contain provisions for future modification of permanent variances.
Under the provisions of 29 CFR 1905.13, an applicant may submit an
application to modify or amend a permanent variance to add or include
additional employers for the project.
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\6\ A class or group of employers (such as members of a trade
alliance or association) may apply jointly for a variance provided
an authorized representative for each employer signs the application
and the application identifies each employer's affected facilities.
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Proposed Condition B: Application
This proposed condition specifies the circumstances under which the
permanent variance would be in effect, notably only for hyperbaric work
performed during interventions. The proposed condition places clear
limits on the circumstances under which the applicant can expose its
employees to hyperbaric pressure.
Proposed Condition C: List of Abbreviations
Proposed condition C defines a number of abbreviations used in the
proposed permanent variance. OSHA believes that defining these
abbreviations serves to clarify and standardize their usage, thereby
enhancing the applicant's and its employees' understanding of the
conditions specified by the proposed permanent variance.
Proposed Condition D: Definitions
The proposed condition defines a series of terms, mostly technical
terms, used in the proposed permanent variance to standardize and
clarify their meaning. Defining these terms serves to enhance the
applicant's and its employees' understanding of the conditions
specified by the interim order and proposed permanent variance.
Proposed Condition E: Safety and Health Practices
This proposed condition requires the applicant to develop and
submit to OSHA an HOM specific to the Anacostia River tunnel project at
least six months before using the EPBTBM for tunneling operations.
Additionally, the proposed condition includes a series of related
hazard prevention and control requirements and methods (e.g.,
decompression tables, job hazard analyses (JHA), operations and
inspections checklists, incident investigation, recording and
notification to OSHA of recordable hyperbaric injuries and illnesses,
etc.) designed to ensure the continued effective functioning of the
hyperbaric equipment and operating system.
Review of the HOM enables OSHA to: (1) Determine that the safety
and health instructions and measures it specifies would be appropriate
and would adequately protect the safety and health of the CAWs; and (2)
request the applicant to revise or modify the HOM if it finds that the
hyperbaric safety and health procedures are not suitable for the
specific project and would not adequately protect the safety and health
of the CAWs. Once approved, the project specific HOM becomes part of
the variance, thus enabling OSHA to enforce its safety and health
procedures and measures.\7\
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\7\ Publication of this Federal Register notice announcing IHP
JV's application for a permanent variance and grant of a project-
specific interim order constitutes acknowledgement by OSHA of the
acceptability of the HOM provided by IHP JV for the Anacostia River
tunnel project.
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Proposed Condition F: Communication
Proposed condition F would require the applicant to develop and
implement an effective system of information sharing and communication.
Effective information sharing and communication ensures that affected
workers receive updated information regarding any safety-related
hazards and incidents, and corrective actions taken, prior to the start
of each shift. The condition also requires the applicant to ensure that
reliable means of emergency communications are available and maintained
for affected workers and support personnel during hyperbaric
operations. Availability of such reliable means of communications would
enable affected workers and support personnel to respond quickly and
effectively to hazardous conditions or emergencies that may develop
during EPBTBM operations.
Proposed Condition G: Worker Qualification and Training
This proposed condition would require the applicant to develop and
implement an effective qualification and training program for affected
workers. The condition specifies the factors that an affected worker
must know to perform safely during hyperbaric operations, including how
to enter, work in, and exit from hyperbaric conditions under both
normal and emergency conditions. Having well-trained and qualified
workers performing hyperbaric intervention work ensures that they
recognize, and respond appropriately to, hyperbaric safety and health
hazards. These qualification and training requirements enable affected
workers to cope effectively with emergencies, as well as the discomfort
and physiological effects of hyperbaric exposure, thereby preventing
injury, illness, and fatalities among workers.
Paragraph (2)(e) of this proposed condition also would require the
applicant to provide affected workers with information they can use to
contact the appropriate healthcare professionals if they believe that
they are developing hyperbaric-related health effects. This requirement
provides for early intervention and treatment of DCI and other health
effects resulting from hyperbaric exposure, thereby reducing the
potential severity of these effects.
Proposed Condition H: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
Proposed condition H would require the applicant to develop,
implement, and operate a program of frequent and regular inspections of
the EPBTBM's hyperbaric equipment and support systems, and associated
work areas. This condition would help to ensure the safe operation and
physical integrity of the equipment and work areas necessary to conduct
hyperbaric operations. The condition would also enhance worker safety
by reducing the risk of hyperbaric-related emergencies.
Paragraph (3) of this proposed condition would require the
applicant to document tests, inspections, corrective actions, and
repairs involving the EPBTBM, and maintain these documents at the job
site for the duration of the job. This requirement would provide the
applicant with information needed to schedule tests and inspections to
ensure the continued safe operation of the equipment and systems, and
to determine that the actions taken to correct defects in hyperbaric
equipment and systems were appropriate, prior to returning them to service.
Proposed Condition I: Compression and Decompression
This proposed condition would require the applicant to consult with
its designated medical advisor regarding special compression or
decompression procedures appropriate for any unacclimated CAW. This
proposed provision would ensure that the applicant consults with the
medical advisor, and involves the medical advisor in the evaluation,
development, and implementation of compression or decompression
protocols appropriate for any CAW requiring acclimation to the
hyperbaric conditions encountered during EPBTBM operations.
Accordingly, CAWs requiring acclimation would have an opportunity to
acclimate prior to exposure to these hyperbaric conditions. OSHA
believes this condition would prevent or reduce adverse reactions among
CAWs to the effects of compression or decompression associated with the
intervention work they perform in the EPBTBM.
Proposed Condition J: Recordkeeping
Proposed condition J would require the applicant to maintain
records of specific factors associated with each hyperbaric
intervention. The information gathered and recorded under this
provision, in concert with the information provided under proposed
condition K (using OSHA 301 Incident Report form to investigate and
record hyperbaric recordable injuries as defined by 29 CFR 1904.4,
1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12), would enable the applicant and OSHA to
determine the effectiveness of the permanent variance in preventing DCI
and other hyperbaric-related effects.\8\
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\8\ See 29 CFR 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631);
recordkeeping forms and instructions
(http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf*);
OSHA Recordkeeping Handbook
(http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/handbook/index.html); and updates
to OSHA's recordkeeping rule Web page ((79 FR 56130);
http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping2014/index.html)).
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Proposed Condition K: Notifications
Under this proposed condition, the applicant would be required,
within specified periods, to notify OSHA of: (1) Any recordable
injuries, illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of
an eye, or fatality that occur as a result of hyperbaric exposures
during EPBTBM operations; (2) provide OSHA with a copy of the incident
investigation report (using OSHA 301 form) of these events; (3) include
on the 301 form information on the hyperbaric conditions associated
with the recordable injury or illness, the root-cause determination,
and preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented by the
applicant; and (4) its certification that it informed affected workers
of the incident and the results of the incident investigation.
This proposed condition also would require the applicant to: notify
the Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities (OTPCA)
and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office within 15 working days
should the applicant need to revise its HOM to accommodate changes in
its compressed-air operations that affect its ability to comply with
the conditions of the proposed permanent variance; and would provide
OSHA's OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office, at the end of
the project, with a report evaluating the effectiveness of the
decompression tables.
These notification requirements would enable the applicant, its
employees, and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent
variance in providing the requisite level of safety to the applicant's
workers and, based on this determination, whether to revise or revoke
the conditions of the proposed permanent variance. Timely notification
would permit OSHA to take whatever action may be necessary and
appropriate to prevent further injuries and illnesses. Providing
notification to employees would inform them of the precautions taken by
the applicant to prevent similar incidents in the future.
This proposed condition would also require the applicant to notify
OSHA if it ceases to do business, has a new address or location for its
main office, or transfers the operations covered by the proposed
permanent variance to a successor company. In addition, the condition
specifies that OSHA must approve the transfer of the permanent variance
to a successor company. These requirements would allow OSHA to
communicate effectively with the applicant regarding the status of the
proposed permanent variance, and expedite the Agency's administration
and enforcement of the permanent variance. Stipulating that an
applicant would be required to have OSHA's approval to transfer a
variance to a successor company would provide assurance that the
successor company has knowledge of, and will comply with, the
conditions specified by proposed permanent variance, thereby ensuring
the safety of workers involved in performing the operations covered by
the proposed permanent variance.
IV. Grant of Interim Order
As noted earlier, the applicant requested an interim order that
would remain in effect until completion of the Anacostia River tunnel
project, or until the Agency makes a decision on its application for a
permanent variance. During this period, the applicant will fully comply
with the conditions of the interim order as an alternative to complying
with the requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803 (hereafter, "the standard")
that:
1. Prohibit employers using compressed air under hyperbaric
conditions from subjecting workers to pressure exceeding 50 p.s.i.g.,
except in emergency (29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5));
2. Require the use of decompression values specified by the
decompression tables in Appendix A of the compressed-air standard (29
CFR 1926.803(f)(1)); and
3. Require the use of automated operational controls and a special
decompression chamber (29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii),
respectively).
After reviewing the application, OSHA preliminarily determined
that:
1. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, effective
alternative measures to the prohibition of using compressed air under
hyperbaric conditions exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. The proposed alternative
measures include use of engineering and administrative controls of the
hazards associated with work performed in compressed-air conditions
exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. while engaged in the construction of a subaqueous
tunnel using advanced shielded mechanical-excavation techniques in
conjunction with an EPBTBM. Prior to conducting interventions in the
EPBTBM's pressurized working chamber, the applicant halts tunnel
excavation and prepares the machine and crew to conduct the
interventions. Interventions involve inspection, maintenance, or repair
of the mechanical-excavation components located in the working chamber.
2. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, safe hyperbaric
work procedures, emergency and contingency procedures, and medical
examinations for the project's CAWs. The applicant compiled these
standard operating procedures into a project-specific HOM. The HOM
discusses the procedures and personnel qualifications for performing
work safely during the compression and decompression phases of
interventions. The HOM also specifies the
decompression tables the applicant proposes to use. Depending on the
maximum working pressure and exposure times during the interventions,
the tables provide for decompression using air, pure oxygen, or a
combination of air and oxygen. The decompression tables also include
delays or stops for various time intervals at different pressure levels
during the transition to atmospheric pressure (i.e., staged
decompression). In all cases, a physician certified in hyperbaric
medicine will manage the medical condition of CAWs during
decompression. In addition, a trained and experienced man-lock
attendant, experienced in recognizing decompression sickness or
illnesses and injuries, will be present. Of key importance, a
hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in hyperbaric
operations, procedures, and safety, will directly supervise all
hyperbaric operations to ensure compliance with the procedures
delineated in the project-specific HOM or by the attending physician.
3. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, a training program
to instruct affected workers in the hazards associated with conducting
hyperbaric operations.
4. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective
alternative to the use of automatic controllers that continuously
decrease pressure to achieve decompression in accordance with the
tables specified by the standard. The alternative includes using the
1992 French Decompression Tables for guiding staged decompression to
achieve lower occurrences of DCI, using a trained and competent
attendant for implementing appropriate hyperbaric entry and exit
procedures, and providing a competent hyperbaric supervisor, and
attending physician certified in hyperbaric medicine, to oversee all
hyperbaric operations.
5. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective
alternative to the use of the special decompression chamber required by
the standard. EPBTBM technology permits the tunnel's work areas to be
at atmospheric pressure, with only the face of the EPBTBM (i.e., the
working chamber) at elevated pressure. The applicant limits
interventions conducted in the working chamber to performing required
inspection, maintenance, and repair of the cutting tools on the face of
the EPBTBM. The EPBTBM's man lock and working chamber provide
sufficient space for the maximum crew of three CAWs to stand up and
move around, and safely accommodate decompression times up to 360
minutes. Therefore, OSHA preliminarily determined that the EPBTBM's man
lock and working chamber function as effectively as the special
decompression chamber required by the standard.
OSHA conducted a review of the scientific literature regarding
decompression to determine whether the alternative decompression method
(i.e., the 1992 French Decompression Tables) the applicant proposed
would provide a workplace as safe and healthful as that provided by the
standard. Based on this review, OSHA preliminarily determined that
decompressions conducted in tunneling operations performed with these
tables \9\ result in a lower occurrence of DCI than the decompression
tables specified by the standard.10 11 12
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\9\ In 1992, the French Ministry of Labour replaced the 1974
French Decompression Tables with the 1992 French Decompression
Tables, which differ from OSHA's decompression tables in Appendix A
by using: (1) Staged decompression as opposed to continuous (linear)
decompression; (2) decompression tables based on air or both air and
pure oxygen; and (3) emergency tables when unexpected exposure times
occur (up to 30 minutes above the maximum allowed working time).
\10\ Kindwall, EP (1997). Compressed air tunneling and caisson
work decompression procedures: development, problems, and solutions.
Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 24(4), pp. 337-345. This article
reported 60 treated cases of DCI among 4,168 exposures between 19
and 31 p.s.i.g. over a 51-week contract period, for a DCI incidence
of 1.44% for the decompression tables specified by the OSHA
standard.
\11\ Sealey, JL (1969). Safe exit from the hyperbaric
environment: medical experience with pressurized tunnel operations.
Journal of Occupational Medicine, 11(5), pp. 273-275. This article
reported 210 treated cases of DCI among 38,600 hyperbaric exposures
between 13 and 34 p.s.i.g. over a 32-month period, for an incidence
of 0.54% for the decompression tables specified by the Washington
State safety standards for compressed-air work, which are similar to
the tables in the OSHA standard. Moreover, the article reported 51
treated cases of DCI for 3,000 exposures between 30 and 34 p.s.i.g.,
for an incidence of 1.7% for the Washington State tables.
\12\ In 1985, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) published a report entitled "Criteria for Interim
Decompression Tables for Caisson and Tunnel Workers"; this report
reviewed studies of DCI and other hyperbaric-related injuries
resulting from use of OSHA's tables. This report is available on
NIOSH's Web site: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/decompression/default.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The review conducted by OSHA found several research studies
supporting the determination that the 1992 French Decompression Tables
result in a lower rate of DCI than the decompression tables specified
by the standard. For example, H.L. Anderson studied the occurrence of
DCI at maximum hyperbaric pressures ranging from 4 p.s.i.g. to 43
p.s.i.g. during construction of the Great Belt Tunnel in Denmark (1992-
1996); \13\ this project used the 1992 French Decompression Tables to
decompress the workers during part of the construction. Anderson
observed 6 DCS cases out of 7,220 decompression events, and reported
that switching to the 1992 French Decompression tables reduced the DCI
incidence to 0.08%. The DCI incidence in the study by H.L. Andersen is
substantially less than the DCI incidence reported for the
decompression tables specified in Appendix A. OSHA found no studies in
which the DCI incidence reported for the 1992 French Decompression
Tables were higher than the DCI incidence reported for the OSHA
decompression tables, nor did OSHA find any studies indicating that the
1992 French Decompression Tables were more hazardous to employees than
the OSHA decompression tables.\14\ Therefore, OSHA preliminarily
concludes that the proposed use of the 1992 French Decompression Tables
would protect workers at least as effectively as the OSHA decompression
tables.
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\13\ Anderson HL (2002). Decompression sickness during
construction of the Great Belt tunnel, Denmark. Undersea and
Hyperbaric Medicine, 29(3), pp. 172-188.
\14\ Le P[eacute]chon JC, Barre P, Baud JP, Ollivier F.
(September 1996). Compressed air work--French tables 1992--
operational results. JCLP Hyperbarie Paris, Centre Medical
Subaquatique Interentreprise, Marseille: Communication a l'EUBS, pp.
1-5 (see Ex. OSHA-2014-0011-0004).
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Based on a review of available evidence, the experience of State
Plans that either granted variances (Nevada, Oregon, and Washington)
\15\ or promulgated a new standard (California) \16\ for hyperbaric
exposures occurring during similar subaqueous tunnel-construction work,
and the information provided in the applicant's variance application,
OSHA is issuing an interim order.
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\15\ These state variances are available in the docket: Exs.
OSHA-2014-0011-0005 (Nevada), OSHA-2014-0011-0006 (Oregon), and
OSHA-2014-0011-0007 (Washington).
\16\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7,
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
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Under the interim order and variance application, instead of
complying with the requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1),
(g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii), IHP JV will: (1) Comply with the
conditions listed below under "Specific Conditions of the Interim
Order and the Application for a Permanent Variance" for the period
between the date of this notice and completion of the Anacostia River
tunnel project or the date OSHA publishes its final decision on IHP
JV's application in the Federal Register; (2) comply fully with all
other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; and (3) provide a copy
of this Federal Register
notice to all employees affected by the conditions, including the
affected employees of other employers, using the same means it used to
inform these employees of its application for a permanent variance.
Additionally, this interim order will remain in effect until one of the
following conditions occurs: (1) Completion of the IHP JV tunnel
project; (2) OSHA publishes its final decision on the variance
application in the Federal Register; or (3) OSHA modifies or revokes
the interim order in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13.
V. Specific Conditions of the Interim Order and the Application for a
Permanent Variance
The following conditions apply to the interim order OSHA is
granting to IHP JV. These conditions specify the alternative means of
compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5),
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii). In addition, the proposed
conditions included in this notice specify the alternative means of
compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5),
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) that IHP JV is proposing for its
permanent variance. The proposed conditions would apply to all
employees of IHP JV exposed to hyperbaric conditions. These proposed
conditions would be: \17\
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\17\ In these conditions, the future conditional form of the
verb (e.g., "would") pertains to the application for a permanent
variance (designated as "permanent variance"). Under the interim
order, the applicant is required to comply with these conditions in
lieu of complying with the requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5),
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii).
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A. Scope
The permanent variance would apply only to work:
1. That occurs in conjunction with construction of the Anacostia
River tunnel project, a subaqueous tunnel constructed using advanced
shielded mechanical-excavation techniques and involving operation of an
EPBTBM;
2. Performed under compressed-air and hyperbaric conditions up to
52 p.s.i.g. at the Anacostia River tunnel project;
3. In the EPBTBM's forward section (the working chamber) and
associated hyperbaric chambers used to pressurize and decompress
employees entering and exiting the working chamber;
4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5),
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii), IHP JV would be required to
comply fully with all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926;
and
5. The interim order granted for the Anacostia River tunnel project
will remain in effect until one of the following conditions occurs (1)
completion of the Anacostia River tunnel project; or (2) OSHA modifies
or revokes this interim order or grants IHP JV's request for a
permanent variance in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13.
B. Application
The permanent variance would apply only when IHP JV stops the
tunnel-boring work, pressurizes the working chamber, and the CAWs
either enter the working chamber to perform interventions (i.e.,
inspect, maintain, or repair the mechanical-excavation components), or
exit the working chamber after performing interventions.
C. List of Abbreviations
Abbreviations used throughout this proposed permanent variance
would include the following:
1. CAW--Compressed-air worker
2. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
3. DCI--Decompression Illness
4. EPBTBM--Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine
5. HOM--Hyperbaric Operations and Safety Manual
6. JHA--Job hazard analysis
7. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities
D. Definitions
The following definitions would apply to this proposed permanent
variance. These definitions would supplement the definitions in IHP
JV's project-specific HOM.
1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is
affected by the conditions of this proposed permanent variance, or any
one of his or her authorized representatives. The term "employee" has
the meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.)
2. Atmospheric pressure--the pressure of air at sea level,
generally 14.7 p.s.i.a., 1 atmosphere absolute, or 0 p.s.i.g.
3. Compressed-air worker--an individual who is specially trained
and medically qualified to perform work in a pressurized environment
while breathing air at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
4. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees,
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to
eliminate them.\18\
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\18\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Decompression illness--an illness (also called decompression
sickness (DCS) or the bends) caused by gas bubbles appearing in body
compartments due to a reduction in ambient pressure. Examples of
symptoms of decompression illness include (but are not limited to):
Joint pain (also known as the "bends" for agonizing pain or the
"niggles" for sight pain); areas of bone destruction (termed dysbaric
osteonecrosis); skin disorders (such as cutis marmorata, which causes a
pink marbling of the skin); spinal cord and brain disorders (such as
stroke, paralysis, paresthesia, and bladder dysfunction);
cardiopulmonary disorders, such as shortness of breath; and arterial
gas embolism (gas bubbles in the arteries that block blood flow).\19\
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\19\ See Appendix 10 of "A Guide to the Work in Compressed Air
Regulations 1996," published by the United Kingdom Health and
Safety Executive available from NIOSH at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive/pdfs/NIOSH-254/compReg1996.pdf*.
Note: Health effects associated with hyperbaric intervention
but not considered symptoms of DCI can include: barotrauma (direct
damage to air-containing cavities in the body such as ears, sinuses
and lungs); nitrogen narcosis (reversible alteration in
consciousness that may occur in hyperbaric environments and is
caused by the anesthetic effect of certain gases at high pressure);
and oxygen toxicity (a central nervous system condition resulting
from the harmful effects of breathing molecular oxygen
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(O2) at elevated partial pressures).
6. Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine--the machinery
used to excavate the tunnel.
7. Hot work--any activity performed in a hazardous location that
may introduce an ignition source into a potentially flammable
atmosphere.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Also see 29 CFR 1910.146(b).
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8. Hyperbaric--at a higher pressure than atmospheric pressure.
9. Hyperbaric intervention--a term that describes the process of
stopping the EPBTBM and preparing and executing work under hyperbaric
pressure in the working chamber for the purpose of inspecting,
replacing, or repairing cutting tools and/or the cutterhead structure.
10. Hyperbaric Operations Manual--a detailed, project-specific
health and safety plan developed and implemented by IHP JV for working
in compressed air during the construction of the Anacostia River
tunnel.
11. Job hazard analysis--an evaluation of tasks or operations to
identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary controls.
12. Man lock--an enclosed space capable of pressurization, and used
for compressing or decompressing any employee or material when either
is passing into or out of a working chamber.
13. Pressure--a force acting on a unit area. Usually expressed as
pounds per square inch (p.s.i.).
14. p.s.i.--pounds per square inch, a common unit of measurement of
pressure; a pressure given in p.s.i. corresponds to absolute pressure.
15. p.s.i.a--pounds per square inch absolute, or absolute pressure,
is the sum of the atmospheric pressure and gauge pressure. At sea-
level, atmospheric pressure is approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Adding 14.7 to
a pressure expressed in units of p.s.i.g. will yield the absolute
pressure, expressed as p.s.i.a.
16. p.s.i.g.--pounds per square inch gauge, a common unit of
pressure; pressure expressed as p.s.i.g. corresponds to pressure
relative to atmospheric pressure. At sea-level, atmospheric pressure is
approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Subtracting 14.7 from a pressure expressed in
units of p.s.i.a. yields the gauge pressure, expressed as p.s.i.g.
17. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to the
subject matter, the work, or the project.\21\
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\21\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m).
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18. Working chamber--an enclosed space in the EPBTBM in which CAWs
perform interventions, and which is accessible only through a man lock.
E. Safety and Health Practices
1. IHP JV would have to develop and implement a project-specific
HOM, and submit the HOM to OSHA for approval at least six months before
using the EPBTBM. IHP JV would have to receive a written
acknowledgement from OSHA regarding the acceptability of the HOM.\22\
The HOM would provide the governing safety and health requirements
regarding hyperbaric exposures during the tunnel-construction project.
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\22\ This notice constitutes such acknowledgement by OSHA of the
acceptability of the HOM provided by IHP JV for the Anacostia River
tunnel project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. IHP JV would have to implement the safety and health
instructions included in the manufacturer's operations manuals for the
EPBTBM, and the safety and health instructions provided by the
manufacturer for the operation of decompression equipment.
3. IHP JV would have to use air as the only breathing gas in the
working chamber.
4. IHP JV would have to use the 1992 French Decompression Tables
for air, air-oxygen, and oxygen decompression specified in the HOM,
specifically, the tables titled "French Regulation Air Standard
Tables."
5. IHP JV would have to equip man locks used by its employees with
an oxygen-delivery system as specified by the HOM. IHP JV would be
required to not store oxygen or other compressed gases used in
conjunction with hyperbaric work in the tunnel.
6. Workers performing hot work under hyperbaric conditions would
have to use flame-retardant personal protective equipment and clothing.
7. In hyperbaric work areas, IHP JV would have to maintain an
adequate fire-suppression system approved for hyperbaric work areas.
8. IHP JV would have to develop and implement one or more JHAs for
work in the hyperbaric work areas, and review, periodically and as
necessary (e.g., after making changes to a planned intervention that
affects its operation), the contents of the JHAs with affected
employees. The JHAs would have to include all the job functions that
the risk assessment \23\ indicates are essential to prevent injury or
illness.
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\23\ See ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012, American National Standard for
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. IHP JV would have to develop a set of checklists to guide
compressed-air work and ensure that employees follow the procedures
required by this proposed permanent variance (including all procedures
required by the HOM, which this proposed variance would incorporate by
reference). The checklists would have to include all steps and
equipment functions that the risk assessment indicates are essential to
prevent injury or illness during compressed-air work.
10. IHP JV would have to ensure that the safety and health
provisions of the HOM adequately protect the workers of all contractors
and subcontractors involved in hyperbaric operations.\24\
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\24\ See ANSI/ASSE A10.33-2011, American National Standard for
Construction and Demolition Operations--Safety and Health Program
Requirements for Multi-Employer Projects, for reference.
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F. Communication
1. Prior to beginning a shift, IHP JV would have to implement a
system that informs workers exposed to hyperbaric conditions of any
hazardous occurrences or conditions that might affect their safety,
including hyperbaric incidents, gas releases, equipment failures, earth
or rock slides, cave-ins, flooding, fires, or explosions.
2. IHP JV would have to provide a power-assisted means of
communication among affected workers and support personnel in
hyperbaric conditions where unassisted voice communication is
inadequate.
(a) IHP JV would have to use an independent power supply for
powered communication systems, and these systems would have to operate
such that use or disruption of any one phone or signal location will
not disrupt the operation of the system from any other location.
(b) IHP JV would have to test communication systems at the start of
each shift and as necessary thereafter to ensure proper operation.
G. Worker Qualifications and Training
IHP JV would have to:
1. Ensure that each affected worker receives effective training on
how to safely enter, work in, exit from, and undertake emergency
evacuation or rescue from, hyperbaric conditions, and document this
training.
2. Provide effective instruction, before beginning hyperbaric
operations, to each worker who performs work, or controls the exposure
of others, in hyperbaric conditions, and document this instruction. The
instruction would have to include topics such as:
(a) The physics and physiology of hyperbaric work;
(b) Recognition of pressure-related injuries;
(c) Information on the causes and recognition of the signs and
symptoms associated with decompression illness, and other hyperbaric
intervention-related health effects (e.g., barotrauma, nitrogen
narcosis, and oxygen toxicity);
(d) How to avoid discomfort during compression and decompression;
and
(e) Information the workers can use to contact the appropriate
healthcare professionals should the workers have concerns that they may
be experiencing adverse health effects from hyperbaric exposure.
3. Repeat the instruction specified in paragraph (b) of this
proposed condition periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making
changes to its hyperbaric operations).
4. When conducting training for its hyperbaric workers make this
training available to OSHA personnel and notify the OTPCA at OSHA's
national office and OSHA's nearest affected Area Office before the
training takes place.
H. Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
1. IHP JV would have to initiate and maintain a program of frequent
and regular inspections of the EPBTBM's hyperbaric equipment and
support systems (such as temperature control, illumination,
ventilation, and fire-prevention and fire-suppression systems), and
hyperbaric work areas, as required under 29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2) by:
(a) Developing a set of checklists to be used by a competent person
in conducting weekly inspections of hyperbaric equipment and work
areas; and
(b) Ensuring that a competent person conducts daily visual checks
and weekly inspections of the EPBTBM.
2. If the competent person determines that the equipment
constitutes a safety hazard, IHP JV would have to remove the equipment
from service until it corrects the hazardous condition and has the
correction approved by a qualified person.
3. IHP JV would have to maintain records of all tests and
inspections of the EPBTBM, as well as associated corrective actions and
repairs, at the job site for the duration of the job.
I. Compression and Decompression
IHP JV would have to consult with its attending physician
concerning the need for special compression or decompression exposures
appropriate for CAWs not acclimated to hyperbaric exposure.
J. Recordkeeping
IHP JV would have to maintain a record of any recordable injuries,
illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an eye, or
fatality (as defined by 29 CFR part 1904 Recording and Reporting
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses), resulting from exposure of an
employee to hyperbaric conditions by completing the OSHA 301 Incident
Report form and OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses.
Note: Examples of important information to include on the OSHA
301 Incident Report form (along with the corresponding question on
the form) would have to address the following: The task performed
(Question (Q) 14); an estimate of the CAW's workload (Q 14); the
composition of the gas mixture; the pressure worked at (Q 14);
temperature in the work and decompression environments (Q 14); did
something unusual occur during the task or decompression (Q 14);
time of symptom onset (Q 15); duration of time between decompression
and onset of symptoms (Q 15); nature and duration of symptoms (Q
16); a medical summary of the illness or injury (Q 16); duration of
the hyperbaric intervention (Q 17); any possible contributing
factors (Q 17); the number of prior interventions completed by
injured or ill CAW (Q 17); the number of prior interventions
completed by injured or ill CAW at that pressure (Q 17); the contact
information for the treating healthcare provider (Q 17); and the
date and time of last hyperbaric exposure for this CAW.
In addition to completing the OSHA 301 Incident Report form and
OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses, IHP JV would have
to maintain records of:
1. The date, times (e.g., began compression, time spent
compressing, time performing intervention, time spent decompressing),
and pressure for each hyperbaric intervention.
2. The name of each individual worker exposed to hyperbaric
pressure and the decompression protocols and results for each worker.
3. The total number of interventions and the amount of hyperbaric
work time at each pressure.
4. The post-intervention physical assessment of each individual CAW
for signs and symptoms of decompression illness, barotrauma, nitrogen
narcosis, oxygen toxicity or other health effects associated with work
in compressed air or mixed gasses for each hyperbaric intervention.
K. Notifications
1. To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein,
IHP JV would have to:
(a) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office of
any recordable injuries, illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations,
amputations, loss of an eye, or fatality (by submitting the completed
OSHA 301 Incident Report form \25\) resulting from exposure of an
employee to hyperbaric conditions including those that do not require
recompression treatment (e.g., nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity,
barotrauma), but still meet the recordable injury or illness criteria
(of 29 CFR 1904). The notification would have to be made within 8 hours
of the incident, or after becoming aware of a recordable injury or
illness, and a copy of the incident investigation (OSHA 301) would have
to be provided within 24 hours of the incident, or after becoming aware
of a recordable injury or illness. In addition to the information
required by the OSHA 301, the incident-investigation report would have
to include a root-cause determination, and the preventive and
corrective actions identified and implemented.
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\25\ See footnote 8.
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(b) Provide certification within 15 days of the incident that it
informed affected workers of the incident and the results of the
incident investigation (including the root-cause determination and
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented).
(c) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office
within 15 working days and in writing, of any change in the compressed-
air operations that affects IHP JV's ability to comply with the
proposed conditions specified herein.
(d) Upon completion of the Anacostia River tunnel project, evaluate
the effectiveness of the decompression tables used throughout the
project, and provide a written report of this evaluation to the OTPCA
and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office.
Note: The evaluation report would have to contain summaries of:
(1) The number, dates, durations, and pressures of the hyperbaric
interventions completed; (2) decompression protocols implemented
(including composition of gas mixtures (air and/or oxygen), and the
results achieved; (3) the total number of interventions and the
number of hyperbaric incidents (decompression illnesses and/or
health effects associated with hyperbaric interventions as recorded
on OSHA 301 and 300 forms, and relevant medical diagnoses and
treating physicians' opinions); and (4) root-causes, and preventive
and corrective actions identified and implemented.
(e) To assist OSHA in administering the proposed conditions
specified herein, inform the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area
Office as soon as possible after it has knowledge that it will:
(i) Cease to do business;
(ii) Change the location and address of the main office for
managing the tunneling operations specified by the project-specific
HOM; or
(iii) Transfer the operations specified herein to a successor
company.
(f) Notify all affected employees of this proposed permanent
variance by the same means required to inform them of its application
for a variance.
2. OSHA would have to approve the transfer of the proposed
permanent variance to a successor company.
VI. Authority and Signature
David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, 200 Constitution Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20210, authorized the preparation of this notice.
Accordingly, the Agency is issuing this notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
655(d), Secretary of Labor's Order No.
1-2012 (77 FR 3912, Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR 1905.11.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2015-02836 Filed 2-10-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
