[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 238 (Thursday, December 11, 2014)][Notices][Pages 73631-73641]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-28994]
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
[Docket No. OSHA-2012-0035]
Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture; Application for Permanent
Variance and Interim Order; Grant of Interim Order; Request for
Comments
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA announces the application of Traylor/
Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture (collectively "Traylor JV" or "the
applicant") for a permanent variance and interim order from the
provisions of OSHA standards that regulate work in compressed air
environments and presents the Agency's preliminary finding to grant the
permanent variance. OSHA invites the public to submit comments on the
variance application to assist the Agency in determining whether to
grant the applicant a permanent variance based on the conditions
specified in this application.
DATES: Submit comments, information, documents in response to this
notice, and request for a hearing on or before January 12, 2015. The
interim order described in this notice became effective on July 11,
2013, and shall remain in effect until the completion of the Blue
Plains tunnel project or the interim order is modified or revoked.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments by any of the following methods:
1. Electronically: Submit comments and attachments electronically
at http://www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal eRulemaking Portal.
Follow the instructions online for making electronic submissions.
2. Facsimile: If submissions, including attachments, are not longer
than 10 pages, commenters may fax them to the OSHA Docket Office at
(202) 693-1648.
3. Regular or express mail, hand delivery, or messenger (courier)
service: Submit comments, requests, and any attachments to the OSHA
Docket Office, Docket No. OSHA-2012-0035, Technical Data Center, U.S.
Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-2625,
Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-2350 (TTY number: (877) 889-
5627). Note that security procedures may result in significant delays
in receiving comments and other written materials by regular mail.
Contact the OSHA Docket Office for information about security
procedures concerning delivery of materials by express delivery, hand
delivery, or messenger service. The hours of operation for the OSHA
Docket Office are 8:15 a.m.-4:45 p.m., e.t.
4. Instructions: All submissions must include the Agency name and
the OSHA docket number (OSHA-2012-0035). OSHA places comments and other
materials, including any personal information, in the public docket
without revision, and these materials will be available online at
http://www.regulations.gov. Therefore, the Agency cautions commenters
about submitting statements they do not want made available to the
public, or submitting comments that contain personal information
(either about themselves or others) such as Social Security numbers,
birth dates, and medical data.
5. Docket: To read or download submissions or other material in the
docket, go to http://www.regulations.gov or the OSHA Docket Office at
the address above. All documents in the docket are listed in the
http://www.regulations.gov index; however, some information (e.g.,
copyrighted material) is not publicly available to read or download
through the Web site. All submissions, including copyrighted material,
are available for inspection and copying at the OSHA Docket Office.
Contact the OSHA Docket Office for assistance in locating docket
submissions.
6. Extension of comment period: Submit requests for an extension of
the comment period on or before January 12, 2015 to the Office of
Technical Programs and Coordination Activities, Directorate of
Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution
Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210, or by fax to (202) 693-
1644.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is
available from the following sources:
Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue
NW., Room N-3647, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-1999;
email: Meilinger.francis2@dol.gov.
General and technical information: Contact Mr. David W. Johnson,
Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities,
Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200
Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210; phone:
(202) 693-2110 or email: johnson.david.w@dol.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Copies of this Federal Register notice. Electronic copies of this
Federal Register notice are available at http://www.regulations.gov.
This Federal Register notice, as well as news releases and other
relevant information, also are available at OSHA's Web page at
http://www.osha.gov.
Hearing Requests. According to 29 CFR 1905.15, hearing requests
must include: (1) A short and plain statement detailing how the
proposed variance would affect the requesting party; (2) a
specification of any statement or representation in the variance
application that the commenter denies, and a concise summary of the
evidence adduced in support of each denial; and (3) any views or
arguments on any issue of fact or law presented in the variance
application.
I. Notice of Application
On April 26, 2012, Traylor Bros., Inc., 835 N. Congress Ave.,
Evansville, IN 47715, and Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture, Blue
Plains Tunnel, 5000 Overlook SW., Washington, DC 20032, submitted under
Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSH
Act"; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 1905.11 ("Variances and other relief
under section 6(d)") an application for a permanent variance from
several provisions of the OSHA standard that regulates work in
compressed air at 29 CFR 1926.803. OSHA is addressing this request as
two separate applications: (1) Traylor Bros., Inc. ("Traylor")
request for a permanent variance for future tunneling projects; and (2)
Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture, Blue Plains Tunnel ("Traylor
JV" or "the applicant"). This notice only addresses the Traylor JV
application for an interim order and permanent variance for the Blue
Plains project.\1\ This notice does not address the Traylor application
for a permanent variance for future projects. That request will be
addressed separately.
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\1\ See Section III discussion of proposed condition A Scope.
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Traylor JV also requested an interim order pending OSHA's decision
on the application for a variance (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0002).
Specifically, this notice addresses the application submitted by
Traylor JV (for the Blue Plains Tunnel project) in which the applicant
seeks a permanent variance and interim order from the provisions of the
standard that: (1) Prohibit compressed-air worker exposure to pressures
exceeding 50 pounds per square inch (p.s.i.) except in an emergency (29
CFR 1926.803(e)(5)); \2\ (2) require the use of the decompression
values specified in decompression tables in Appendix A of the
compressed-air standard for construction (29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)); and
(3) require the use of automated operational controls and a special
decompression chamber (29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii),
respectively).
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\2\ The decompression tables in Appendix A of subpart S express
the maximum working pressures as pounds per square inch gauge
(p.s.i.g.), with a maximum working pressure of 50 p.s.i.g.
Therefore, throughout this notice, OSHA expresses the 50 p.s.i.
value specified by Sec. 1926.803(e)(5) as 50 p.s.i.g., consistent
with the terminology in Appendix A, Table 1 of subpart S.
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The applicant is a contractor that works on complex tunnel projects
using recently developed equipment and procedures for soft-ground
tunneling. The applicant's workers engage in the construction of
tunnels using advanced shielded mechanical excavation techniques in
conjunction with an earth pressure balanced tunnel boring machine
(EPBTBM).
According to its application, Traylor is currently the managing
partner of Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture ("Traylor JV"), the
general contractor for the DC Water and Sewer Authority's project to
construct the Blue Plains tunnel. Traylor JV asserts that generally, it
bores tunnels (i.e., Blue Plains tunnel) below the water table through
soft soils consisting of clay, silt, and sand. Traylor JV employs
specially trained personnel for the construction of the tunnel, and
states that this construction will use shielded mechanical-excavation
techniques. Traylor JV asserts that its workers perform hyperbaric
interventions at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. in the excavation
chamber of the EPBTBM; these interventions consist of conducting
inspections and maintenance work on the cutter-head structure and
cutting tools of the EPBTBM.
Traylor JV asserts that innovations in tunnel excavation,
specifically with EPBTBMs, have, in most cases, eliminated the need to
pressurize the entire tunnel. This technology negates the requirement
that all members of a tunnel-excavation crew work in compressed air
while excavating the tunnel. These advances in technology modified
substantially the methods used by the construction industry to excavate
subaqueous tunnels compared to the caisson work regulated by the
current OSHA compressed-air standard for construction at 29 CFR
1926.803. Such advances reduce the number of workers exposed, and the
total duration of exposure, to hyperbaric pressure during tunnel
construction.
Using shielded mechanical-excavation techniques, in conjunction
with precast concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBTBMs provide
methods to achieve the face pressures required to maintain a stabilized
tunnel face through various geologies, and isolate that pressure to the
forward section (the working chamber) of the EPBTBM. Interventions in
the working chamber (the pressurized portion of the EPBTBM) take place
only after halting tunnel excavation and preparing the machine and crew
for an intervention. Interventions occur to inspect or maintain the
mechanical-excavation components located in the working chamber.
Maintenance conducted in the working chamber includes changing
replaceable cutting tools and disposable wear bars, and, in rare cases,
repairing structural damage to the cutter head.
In addition to innovations in tunnel-excavation methods, Traylor JV
asserts that innovations in hyperbaric medicine and technology improve
the safety of decompression from hyperbaric exposures. According to
Traylor JV, the use of decompression protocols incorporating oxygen is
at least as effective for tunnel workers as compliance with the
decompression tables specified by the existing OSHA standard (29 CFR
1926, subpart S, Appendix A decompression tables). These hyperbaric
exposures are possible due to advances in technology, a better
understanding of hyperbaric medicine, and the development of a project-
specific Hyperbaric Operations Manual (HOM) that requires specialized
medical support and hyperbaric supervision to provide assistance to a
team of specially trained man-lock attendants and hyperbaric or
compressed-air workers.
OSHA initiated a technical review of the Traylor JV's variance
application and developed a set of follow-up questions that it sent to
Traylor JV on September 17, 2012 (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0010). On October
26, 2012, Traylor JV submitted its response and a request for an
interim order for the Blue Plains Tunnel Project (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-
0008). In its response to OSHA's follow-up questions, Traylor JV
indicated that the maximum pressure to which it is likely to expose
workers during interventions for the Blue Plains tunnel project is 52
p.s.i.g. and would not involve the use of trimix breathing gas
(composed of a mixture of oxygen, nitrogen, and helium in varying
concentrations used for breathing by compressed air workers for
compression and decompression when working at pressures exceeding 73 p.s.i.g.).
Therefore, to work effectively on this project, Traylor JV must perform
hyperbaric interventions in compressed air at pressures higher than the
maximum pressure specified by the existing OSHA standard, 29 CFR
1926.803(e)(5), which states: "No employee shall be subjected to
pressure exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. except in emergency" (see footnote 2).
OSHA considered Traylor JV's application for a permanent variance
and interim order for the Blue Plains tunnel project. OSHA determined
that Traylor JV proposed an alternative that will provide a workplace
as safe and healthful as that provided by the standard. On July 11,
2013, OSHA granted Traylor JV a project-specific interim order for the
completion of the Blue Plains tunnel (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0007) in order
to permit the applicant to begin work while OSHA continued to consider
its application for a permanent variance.
II. The Variance Application
A. Background
Traylor JV asserts that the advances in tunnel excavation
technology described in Section I of this notice modified significantly
the equipment and methods used by contractors to construct subaqueous
tunnels, thereby making several provisions of OSHA's compressed-air
standard for construction at 29 CFR 1926.803 inappropriate for this
type of work. These advances reduce both the number of workers exposed,
and the total duration of exposure, to the hyperbaric conditions
associated with tunnel construction.
Using shielded mechanical-excavation techniques, in conjunction
with pre-cast concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBTBMs
provide methods to achieve the face pressures required to maintain a
stabilized tunnel face, through various geologies, while isolating that
pressure to the forward section (working or excavation chamber) of the
EPBTBM.
Interventions involving the working chamber (the pressurized
chamber at the head of the EPBTBM) take place only after the applicant
halts tunnel excavation and prepares the machine and crew for an
intervention. Interventions occur to inspect or maintain the
mechanical-excavation components located in the forward portion of the
working chamber. Maintenance conducted in the forward portion of the
working chamber includes changing replaceable cutting tools, disposable
wear bars, and, in rare cases, repairs to the cutter head due to
structural damage.
In addition to innovations in tunnel-excavation methods, research
conducted after OSHA published its compressed-air standard for
construction in 1971, resulted in advances in hyperbaric medicine. In
this regard, the applicant asserts that the use of decompression
protocols incorporating oxygen is more efficient, effective, and safer
for tunnel workers than compliance with the existing OSHA standard (29
CFR 1926, subpart S, Appendix A decompression tables). According to the
applicant, contractors routinely and safely expose employees performing
interventions in the working chamber of EPBTBMs to hyperbaric pressures
up to 75 p.s.i.g., which is 50% higher than maximum pressure specified
by the existing OSHA standard (see 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5)).
The applicant contends that the alternative safety measures
included in its application provide its workers with a place of
employment that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain
under the existing provisions of OSHA's compressed-air standard for
construction. The applicant certifies that it provided employee
representatives of affected workers with a copy of the variance
application.\3\ The applicant also certifies that it notified its
workers of the variance application by posting, at prominent locations
where it normally posts workplace notices, a summary of the application
and information specifying where the workers can examine a copy of the
application. In addition, the applicant informed its workers and their
representatives of their rights to petition the Assistant Secretary of
Labor for Occupational Safety and Health for a hearing on the variance
application.
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\3\ See the definition of "Affected employee or worker" in
section V.D.
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B. Variance From Paragraph (e)(5) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Prohibition of
Exposure to Pressure Greater Than 50 p.s.i.g. (See Footnote 1)
The applicant states that it may perform hyperbaric interventions
at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. in the working chamber of the
EPBTBM; this pressure exceeds the pressure limit of 50 p.s.i.g.
specified for nonemergency purposes by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5). The
EPBTBM has twin man locks, with each man lock having two compartments.
This configuration allows workers to access the man locks for
compression and decompression, and medical personnel to access the man
locks if required in an emergency.
EPBTBMs are capable of maintaining pressure at the tunnel face, and
stabilizing existing geological conditions, through the controlled use
of propel cylinders, a mechanically driven cutter head, bulkheads
within the shield, ground-treatment foam, and a screw conveyor that
moves excavated material from the working chamber. As noted earlier,
the forward-most portion of the EPBTBM is the working chamber, and this
chamber is the only pressurized segment of the EPBTBM. Within the
shield, the working chamber consists of two sections: The staging
chamber and the forward working chamber. The staging chamber is the
section of the working chamber between the man-lock door and the entry
door to the forward working chamber. The forward working chamber is
immediately behind the cutter head and tunnel face.
The applicant will pressurize the working chamber to the level
required to maintain a stable tunnel face. Pressure in the staging
chamber ranges from atmospheric (no increased pressure) to a maximum
pressure equal to the pressure in the working chamber. The applicant
asserts that most of the hyperbaric interventions will be around 14.7
p.s.i.g. However, the applicant maintains that they may have to perform
interventions at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
During interventions, workers enter the working chamber through one
of the twin man locks that open into the staging chamber. To reach the
forward part of the working chamber, workers pass through a door in a
bulkhead that separates the staging chamber from the forward working
chamber. The maximum crew size allowed in the forward working chamber
is three. At certain hyperbaric pressures (i.e., when decompression
times are greater than work times), the twin man locks allow for crew
rotation. During crew rotation, one crew can be compressing or
decompressing while the second crew is working. Therefore, the working
crew always has an unoccupied man lock at its disposal.
The applicant developed a project-specific HOM for the Blue Plains
tunnel (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0003) that describes in detail the
hyperbaric procedures and required medical examinations used during the
tunnel-construction project. The HOM discusses standard operating
procedures and emergency and contingency procedures. The procedures
include using experienced and knowledgeable man-lock attendants who
have the training and experience necessary to recognize and treat
decompression illnesses and injuries. The attendants
are under the direct supervision of the hyperbaric supervisor and
attending physician. In addition, procedures include medical screening
and review of prospective compressed-air workers (CAWs). The purpose of
this screening procedure is to vet prospective CAWs with medical
conditions (e.g., deep vein thrombosis, poor vascular circulation, and
muscle cramping) that could be aggravated by sitting in a cramped space
(e.g., a man lock) for extended periods or by exposure to elevated
pressures and compressed gas mixtures. A transportable recompression
chamber (shuttle) is available to extract workers from the hyperbaric
working chamber for emergency evacuation and medical treatment; the
shuttle attaches to the topside medical lock, which is a large
recompression chamber. The applicant believes that the procedures
included in the HOM provide safe work conditions when interventions are
necessary, including interventions above 50 p.s.i.g.
C. Variance From Paragraph (f)(1) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement To
Use OSHA Decompression Tables
OSHA's compressed-air standard for construction requires
decompression in accordance with the decompression tables in Appendix A
of 29 CFR 1926, subpart S (see 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)). As an
alternative to the OSHA decompression tables, the applicant proposes to
use newer decompression schedules that supplement breathing air used
during decompression with pure oxygen. The applicant asserts that these
decompression protocols are safer for tunnel workers than the
decompression protocols specified in Appendix A of 29 CFR 1926, subpart
S.
Accordingly, the applicant proposes to use the 1992 French
Decompression Tables to decompress CAWs after they exit the hyperbaric
conditions in the working chamber. Depending on the maximum working
pressure and exposure times, the 1992 French Decompression Tables
provide for air decompression with or without oxygen. Traylor JV
asserts that oxygen decompression has many benefits, including (1)
keeping the partial pressure of nitrogen in the lungs as low as
possible; (2) keeping external pressure as low as possible to reduce
the formation of bubbles in the blood; (3) removing nitrogen from the
lungs and arterial blood and increasing the rate of elimination of
nitrogen; (4) improving the quality of breathing during decompression
stops so that workers are less tired and to prevent bone necrosis; (5)
reducing decompression time by about 33 percent as compared to air
decompression; and (6) reducing inflammation. As described in Section
IV of this notice, OSHA's review of the use of oxygen in several major
tunneling projects completed in the past indicates that it contributed
significantly to the reduction of decompression illness (DCI) and other
associated adverse effects observed and reported among CAWs.
In addition, the HOM requires a physician certified in hyperbaric
medicine to manage the medical condition of CAWs during hyperbaric
exposures and decompression. A trained and experienced man-lock
attendant also will be present during hyperbaric exposures and
decompression. This man-lock attendant will operate the hyperbaric
system to ensure compliance with the specified decompression table. A
hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in hyperbaric
operations, procedures, and safety, directly oversees all hyperbaric
interventions, and ensures that staff follow the procedures delineated
in the HOM or by the attending physician.
The applicant asserts that at higher hyperbaric pressures,
decompression times exceed 75 minutes. The HOM establishes protocols
and procedures that provide the basis for alternate means of protection
for CAWs under these conditions. Accordingly, based on these protocols
and procedures, the applicant requests to use the 1992 French
Decompression Tables for hyperbaric interventions up to 52 p.s.i.g. for
completion of the Blue Plains tunnel project. The applicant is
committed to follow the decompression procedures described in the Blue
Plains tunnel project-specific HOM during these interventions.
D. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of 29 CFR 1926.803,
Automatically Regulated Continuous Decompression
According to the applicant, breathing air under hyperbaric
conditions increases the amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in a CAW's
tissues. The greater the hyperbaric pressure under these conditions,
and the more time spent under the increased pressure, the greater the
amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in the tissues. When the pressure
decreases during decompression, tissues release the dissolved nitrogen
gas into the blood system, which then carries the nitrogen gas to the
lungs for elimination through exhalation. Releasing hyperbaric pressure
too rapidly during decompression can increase the size of the bubbles
formed by nitrogen gas in the blood system, resulting in DCI, commonly
referred to as "the bends." This description of the etiology of DCI
is consistent with current scientific theory and research on the issue
(see footnote 12 in this notice discussing a 1985 NIOSH report on DCI).
The 1992 French Decompression Tables proposed for use by the
applicant provide for stops during worker decompression (i.e., staged
decompression) to control the release of nitrogen gas from tissues into
the blood system. Studies show that staged decompression, in
combination with other features of the 1992 French Decompression Tables
such as the use of oxygen, result in a lower incidence of DCI than the
OSHA decompression requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803, which specify the
use of automatically regulated continuous decompression (see footnotes
9 through 14 in this notice for references to these studies).\4\ In
addition, the applicant asserts that staged decompression is at least
as effective as an automatic controller in regulating the decompression
process because:
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\4\ In the study cited in footnote 10, starting at page 338, Dr.
Eric Kindwall notes that the use of automatically regulated
continuous decompression in the Washington State safety standards
for compressed-air work (from which OSHA derived its decompression
tables) was at the insistence of contractors and the union, and
against the advice of the expert who calculated the decompression
table and recommended using staged decompression. Dr. Kindwall then
states, "Continuous decompression is inefficient and wasteful. For
example, if the last stage from 4 psig . . . to the surface took 1
h, at least half the time is spent at pressures less than 2 psig . .
., which provides less and less meaningful bubble suppression. . .
." In addition, the report referenced in footnote 5 under the
section titled, "Background on the Need for Interim Decompression
Tables" addresses the continuous-decompression protocol in the OSHA
compressed-air standard for construction, noting that "[a]side from
the tables for saturation diving to deep depths, no other widely
used or officially approved diving decompression tables use straight
line, continuous decompressions at varying rates. Stage
decompression is usually the rule, since it is simpler to control."
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1. A hyperbaric supervisor (a competent person experienced and
trained in hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety) directly
supervises all hyperbaric interventions and ensures that the man-lock
attendant, who is a competent person in the manual control of
hyperbaric systems, follows the schedule specified in the decompression
tables, including stops; and
2. The use of the 1992 French Decompression Tables for staged
decompression offers an equal or better level of management and control
over the decompression process than an automatic controller and results
in lower occurrences of DCI.
Accordingly, the applicant is applying for a permanent variance
from the OSHA standard at 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii), which requires
automatic controls to regulate decompression. As noted above, the
applicant is committed to conduct the staged decompression according to
the 1992 French Decompression Tables under the direct control of the
trained man-lock attendant and under the oversight of the hyperbaric
supervisor.
E. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement
of Special Decompression Chamber
The OSHA compressed-air standard for construction requires
employers to use a special decompression chamber when total
decompression time exceeds 75 minutes (see 29 CFR
1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)). Another provision of OSHA's compressed-air
standard calls for locating the special decompression chamber adjacent
to the man lock on the atmospheric pressure side of the tunnel bulkhead
(see 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(2)(vii)). However, since only the working
chamber of the EPBTBM is under pressure, and only a few workers out of
the entire crew are exposed to hyperbaric pressure, the man locks
(which, as noted earlier, connect directly to the working chamber) are
of sufficient size to accommodate the exposed workers. In addition,
available space in the EPBTBM does not allow for an additional special
decompression lock. Again, the applicant uses the man locks, each of
which adequately accommodates a three-member crew, for this purpose
when decompression lasts up to 75 minutes. When decompression exceeds
75 minutes, crews can open the door connecting the two compartments in
each man lock during decompression stops or exit the man lock and move
into the staging chamber where additional space is available. This
alternative enables CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent
neuromuscular problems during decompression.
F. Previous Tunnel Construction Variance
OSHA notes that on May 23, 2014, it granted a sub-aqueous tunnel
construction permanent variance to Tully/OHL USA Joint Venture (79 FR
29809) from the same provisions of the standard that regulates work in
compressed air (at 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and
(g)(1)(xvii)) that are the subject of the present application.
Generally, the proposed alternate conditions in this notice are based
on and very similar to the alternate conditions of the previous
permanent variance.
G. Multi-State Variance
As stated earlier in this notice, Traylor JV applied for an interim
order for its Blue Plains Tunnel project only. On July 11, 2013, OSHA
granted an interim order to cover only the Blue Plains tunnel project,
which is located entirely in the District of Columbia and thus under
Federal OSHA's exclusive jurisdiction.
Additionally, twenty-seven state safety and health plans have been
approved by OSHA under section 18 of the (OSH) Act.\5\ As part of the
permanent variance process, the Directorate of Cooperative and State
Programs will notify the State Plans of Traylor JV's variance
application and grant of the Blue Plains interim order. In considering
Traylor JV's application for a permanent variance and interim order,
OSHA noted that four states have previously granted sub-aqueous tunnel
construction variances and imposed different or additional requirements
and conditions (California, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington). California
also promulgated a new standard (e.g., California \6\) for similar sub-
aqueous tunnel construction work.
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\5\ Five State Plans (Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New
York, and the Virgin Islands) limit their occupational safety and
health authority to state and local employers only. State Plans that
exercise their occupational safety and health authority over both
public- and private-sector employers are: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming.
\6\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7,
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
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Five State Plans (Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and
the Virgin Islands) cover only public-sector workers and have no
authority over the private-sector workers addressed in this variance
application (i.e., that authority continues to reside with Federal
OSHA).
III. Description of the Conditions Specified by the Application for a
Permanent Variance
As indicated in Section I of this notice, on July 11, 2013, OSHA
granted Traylor JV a project specific interim order for the completion
of the Blue Plains tunnel in order to permit the applicant to begin
work. The project-specific interim order is to remain in effect until
completion of the Blue Plains tunnel project \7\ or until the Agency
modifies or revokes the interim order or makes a decision on Traylor
JV's application for a permanent variance. The substantive terms of the
interim order are identical to the terms of the proposed permanent
variance discussed further below.
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\7\ The contractual completion date of the Blue Plains tunnel is
November 10, 2015.
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This section describes the alternative means of compliance with 29
CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) and provides
additional detail regarding the proposed conditions that form the basis
of Traylor JV's application for a permanent variance.
Proposed Condition A: Scope
The scope of the proposed permanent variance limits coverage to the
work situations specified under this proposed condition. Clearly
defining the scope of the proposed permanent variance provides Traylor
JV, Traylor JV's employees, other stakeholders, the public, and OSHA
with necessary information regarding the work situations in which the
proposed permanent variance would apply.
According to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer or class or group of
employers \8\ may request a permanent variance for a specific workplace
or workplaces. If granted, the variance would apply to the specific
employer(s) that submitted the application. In this instance, if OSHA
were to grant a permanent variance, it would apply to the applicant,
Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture at the Blue Plains Tunnel project
only. As a result, it is important to understand that the interim order
and proposed variance does not apply to any other employers.
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\8\ A class or group of employers (such as members of a trade
alliance or association) may apply jointly for a variance provided
an authorized representative for each employer signs the application
and the application identifies each employer's affected facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Condition B: Application
This proposed condition specifies the circumstances under which the
proposed permanent variance would be in effect, notably only for
hyperbaric work performed during interventions. The proposed condition
places clear limits on the circumstances under which the applicant can
expose its employees to hyperbaric pressure.
Proposed Condition C: List of Abbreviations
Proposed condition C defines a number of abbreviations used in the
proposed permanent variance. OSHA believes that defining these
abbreviations serves to clarify and standardize their usage, thereby
enhancing the applicant's and its employees' understanding of the
conditions specified by the proposed permanent variance.
Proposed Condition D: Definitions
The proposed condition defines a series of terms, mostly technical
terms, used in the proposed permanent variance to standardize and
clarify their meaning. Defining these terms serves to enhance the
applicant's and its employees' understanding of the conditions
specified by the proposed permanent variance.
Proposed Condition E: Safety and Health Practices
This proposed condition requires the applicant to develop and
submit to OSHA an HOM specific to the Blue Plains project at least six
months before using the EPBTBM for tunneling operations. Additionally,
the proposed condition includes a series of related hazard prevention
and control requirements and methods (e.g., decompression tables, job
hazard analyses (JHA), operations and inspections checklists, incident
investigation, recording and notification to OSHA of recordable
hyperbaric injuries and illnesses, etc.) designed to ensure the
continued effective functioning of the hyperbaric equipment and
operating system.
Review of the HOM enables OSHA to: (1) Determine that the safety
and health instructions and measures it specifies would be appropriate
and would adequately protect the safety and health of the CAWs; and (2)
request the applicant to revise or modify the HOM if it finds that the
hyperbaric safety and health procedures are not suitable for the
specific project and would not adequately protect the safety and health
of the CAWs. Once approved, the project specific HOM becomes part of
the variance, thus enabling OSHA to enforce its safety and health
procedures and measures.\9\
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\9\ Grant of the July 11, 2013, project-specific interim order
constitutes interim acknowledgement by OSHA of the acceptability of
the HOM provided by Traylor JV for the Blue Plains tunnel project.
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Proposed Condition F: Communication
Proposed condition F would require the applicant to develop and
implement an effective system of information sharing and communication.
Effective information sharing and communication ensures that affected
workers receive updated information regarding any safety-related
hazards and incidents, and corrective actions taken, prior to the start
of each shift. The proposed condition also requires the applicant to
ensure that reliable means of emergency communications are available
and maintained for affected workers and support personnel during
hyperbaric operations. Availability of such reliable means of
communications would enable affected workers and support personnel to
respond quickly and effectively to hazardous conditions or emergencies
that may develop during EPBTBM operations.
Proposed Condition G: Worker Qualification and Training
This proposed condition would require the applicant to develop and
implement an effective qualification and training program for affected
workers. The proposed condition specifies the factors that an affected
worker must know to perform safely during hyperbaric operations,
including how to enter, work in, and exit from hyperbaric conditions
under both normal and emergency conditions. Having well-trained and
qualified workers performing hyperbaric intervention work ensures that
they recognize, and respond appropriately to, hyperbaric safety and
health hazards. These qualification and training requirements enable
affected workers to cope effectively with emergencies, as well as the
discomfort and physiological effects of hyperbaric exposure, thereby
preventing worker injury, illness, and fatalities.
Paragraph (2)(e) of this proposed condition also would require the
applicant to provide affected workers with information they can use to
contact the appropriate healthcare professionals if they believe they
are developing hyperbaric-related health effects. This requirement
provides for early intervention and treatment of DCI and other health
effects resulting from hyperbaric exposure, thereby reducing the
potential severity of these effects.
Proposed Condition H: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
Proposed condition H would require the applicant to develop,
implement, and operate a program of frequent and regular inspections of
the EPBTBM's hyperbaric equipment and support systems, and associated
work areas. This condition would help to ensure the safe operation and
physical integrity of the equipment and work areas necessary to conduct
hyperbaric operations. The condition would also enhance worker safety
by reducing the risk of hyperbaric-related emergencies.
Paragraph (3) of this proposed condition would require the
applicant to document tests, inspections, corrective actions, and
repairs involving the EPBTBM, and maintain these documents at the job
site for the duration of the job. This requirement would provide the
applicant with information needed to schedule tests and inspections to
ensure the continued safe operation of the equipment and systems, and
to determine that the actions taken to correct defects in hyperbaric
equipment and systems were appropriate, prior to returning them to
service.
Proposed Condition I: Compression and Decompression
This proposed condition would require the applicant to consult with
its designated medical advisor regarding special compression or
decompression procedures appropriate for any unacclimated CAW. This
proposed provision would ensure that the applicant consults with the
medical advisor, and involves the medical advisor in the evaluation,
development, and implementation of compression or decompression
protocols appropriate for any CAW requiring acclimation to the
hyperbaric conditions encountered during EPBTBM operations.
Accordingly, CAWs requiring acclimation would have an opportunity to
acclimate prior to exposure to these hyperbaric conditions. OSHA
believes this condition would prevent or reduce adverse reactions among
CAWs to the effects of compression or decompression associated with the
intervention work they perform in the EPBTBM.
Proposed Condition J: Recordkeeping
Proposed condition J would require the applicant to maintain
records of specific factors associated with each hyperbaric
intervention. The information gathered and recorded under this
provision, in concert with the information provided under proposed
condition K (using the OSHA 301 Incident Report form to investigate and
record hyperbaric recordable injuries as defined by 29 CFR 1904.4,
1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12), would enable the applicant and OSHA to
determine the effectiveness of the permanent variance in preventing DCI
and other hyperbaric-related effects.\10\
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\10\ See 29 CFR 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631);
recordkeeping forms and instructions
(http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf);
and OSHA Recordkeeping Handbook
(http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/handbook/index.html).
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Proposed Condition K: Notifications
Under this proposed condition, the applicant would be required,
within specified periods to: (1) Notify OSHA of any recordable
injuries, illnesses, or fatalities that occur as a result of hyperbaric
exposures during EPBTBM operations; (2) provide OSHA with a copy of the
incident investigation report (using OSHA 301 form) of these events; (3)
include on the 301 form information on the hyperbaric conditions associated
with the recordable injury or illness, the root-cause determination, and
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented; (4)
provide its certification that it informed affected workers of the
incident and the results of the incident investigation; (5) notify the
Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities (OTPCA) and
the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office within 15 working days should
the applicant need to revise its HOM to accommodate changes in its
compressed-air operations that affect its ability to comply with the
conditions of the proposed permanent variance; and (6) provide OTPCA
and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office, at the end of the project,
with a report evaluating the effectiveness of the decompression tables.
These notification requirements would enable the applicant, its
employees, and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent
variance in providing the requisite level of safety to the applicant's
workers and, based on this determination, whether to revise or revoke
the conditions of the proposed permanent variance. Timely notification
would permit OSHA to take whatever action may be necessary and
appropriate to prevent further injuries and illnesses. Providing
notification to employees would inform them of the precautions taken by
the applicant to prevent similar incidents in the future.
This proposed condition would also require the applicant to notify
OSHA if it ceases to do business, has a new address or location for its
main office, or transfers the operations covered by the proposed
permanent variance to a successor company. In addition, the condition
specifies that OSHA must approve the transfer of the permanent variance
to a successor company. These requirements would allow OSHA to
communicate effectively with the applicant regarding the status of the
proposed permanent variance, and expedite the Agency's administration
and enforcement of the permanent variance. Stipulating that an
applicant would be required to have OSHA's approval to transfer a
variance to a successor company would provide assurance that the
successor company has knowledge of, and will comply with, the
conditions specified by proposed permanent variance, thereby ensuring
the safety of workers involved in performing the operations covered by
the proposed permanent variance.
IV. Grant of Interim Order
As noted earlier, on July 11, 2013, OSHA granted Traylor JV an
interim order to remain in effect until completion of the Blue Plains
tunnel project or until the Agency modifies or revokes the interim
order or makes a decision on its application for a permanent variance.
(Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0007.) Based on Traylor JV's assertions in its
application, the interim order addresses CAWs performing interventions
in hyperbaric conditions up to 52 p.s.i.g. that do not involve the use
of trimix. OSHA affirms the Blue Plains tunnel project-specific interim
order. During the period starting with the publication of this notice
until completion of the Blue Plains tunnel or the Agency modifies or
revokes the interim order or makes a decision on its application for a
permanent variance, the applicant is required to comply fully with the
conditions of the interim order (as an alternative to complying with
the requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803 (hereafter, "the standard") that:
A. Prohibit employers using compressed air under hyperbaric
conditions from subjecting workers to pressure exceeding 50 p.s.i.g.,
except in emergency (29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5));
B. Require the use of decompression values specified by the
decompression tables in Appendix A of the compressed-air standard (29
CFR 1926.803(f)(1)); and
C. Require the use of automated operational controls and a special
decompression chamber (29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii),
respectively).
After reviewing the proposed alternatives OSHA preliminarily
determined that:
A. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, effective
alternative measures to the prohibition of using compressed air under
hyperbaric conditions exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. The alternative measures
include use of engineering and administrative controls of the hazards
associated with work performed in compressed-air conditions exceeding
50 p.s.i.g. while engaged in the construction of a subaqueous tunnel
using advanced shielded mechanical-excavation techniques in conjunction
with an EPBTBM. Prior to conducting interventions in the EPBTBM's
pressurized working chamber, the applicant halts tunnel excavation and
prepares the machine and crew to conduct the interventions.
Interventions involve inspection, maintenance, or repair of the
mechanical-excavation components located in the working chamber.
B. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, safe hyperbaric
work procedures, emergency and contingency procedures, and medical
examinations for the Blue Plains tunneling project's CAWs. The
applicant compiled these standard operating procedures into a project-
specific HOM (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-007). The HOM discusses the procedures
and personnel qualifications for performing work safely during the
compression and decompression phases of interventions. The HOM also
specifies the decompression tables the applicant proposes to use.
Depending on the maximum working pressure and exposure times during the
interventions, the tables provide for decompression using air, pure
oxygen, or a combination of air and oxygen. The decompression tables
also include delays or stops for various time intervals at different
pressure levels during the transition to atmospheric pressure (i.e.,
staged decompression). In all cases, a physician certified in
hyperbaric medicine will manage the medical condition of CAWs during
decompression. In addition, a trained and experienced man-lock
attendant, experienced in recognizing decompression sickness or
illnesses and injuries, will be present. Of key importance, a
hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in hyperbaric
operations, procedures, and safety, will directly supervise all
hyperbaric operations to ensure compliance with the procedures
delineated in the project-specific HOM or by the attending physician.
C. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, a training
program to instruct affected workers in the hazards associated with
conducting hyperbaric operations.
D. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective
alternative to the use of automatic controllers that continuously
decrease pressure to achieve decompression in accordance with the
tables specified by the standard. The alternative includes using the
1992 French Decompression Tables for guiding staged decompression to
achieve lower occurrences of DCI, using a trained and competent
attendant for implementing appropriate hyperbaric entry and exit
procedures, and providing a competent hyperbaric supervisor and
attending physician certified in hyperbaric medicine, to oversee all
hyperbaric operations.
E. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective
alternative to the use of the special decompression chamber required by
the standard. EPBTBM technology permits the tunnel's work areas to be
at atmospheric pressure, with only the face of the EPBTBM (i.e., the
working chamber) at elevated pressure during interventions. The
applicant would limit interventions conducted in the working chamber to
performing required inspection, maintenance, and repair of the cutting
tools on the face of the EPBTBM. The EPBTBM's man lock and working
chamber provide sufficient space for the maximum crew of three CAWs to
stand up and move around, and safely accommodate decompression times up
to 360 minutes. Therefore, OSHA preliminarily determined that the
EPBTBM's man lock and working chamber function as effectively as the
special decompression chamber required by the standard.
OSHA conducted a review of the scientific literature regarding
decompression to determine whether the alternative decompression method
(i.e., the 1992 French Decompression Tables) Traylor JV proposed would
provide a workplace as safe and healthful as that provided by the
standard. Based on this review, OSHA determined that tunneling
operations performed with these tables \11\ resulted in a lower
occurrence of DCI than the decompression tables specified by the
standard.12 13 14
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\11\ In 1992, the French Ministry of Labour replaced the 1974
French Decompression Tables with the 1992 French Decompression
Tables, which differ from OSHA's decompression tables in Appendix A
by using: (1) Staged decompression as opposed to continuous (linear)
decompression; (2) decompression tables based on air or both air and
pure oxygen; and (3) emergency tables when unexpected exposure times
occur (up to 30 minutes above the maximum allowed working time).
\12\ Kindwall, EP (1997). Compressed air tunneling and caisson
work decompression procedures: Development, problems, and solutions.
Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 24(4), pp. 337-345. This article
reported 60 treated cases of DCI among 4,168 exposures between 19
and 31 p.s.i.g. over a 51-week contract period, for a DCI incidence
of 1.44% for the decompression tables specified by the OSHA
standard.
\13\ Sealey, JL (1969). Safe exit from the hyperbaric
environment: Medical experience with pressurized tunnel operations.
Journal of Occupational Medicine, 11(5), pp. 273-275. This article
reported 210 treated cases of DCI among 38,600 hyperbaric exposures
between 13 and 34 p.s.i.g. over a 32-month period, for an incidence
of 0.54% for the decompression tables specified by the Washington
State safety standards for compressed-air work, which are similar to
the tables in the OSHA standard. Moreover, the article reported 51
treated cases of DCI for 3,000 exposures between 30 and 34 p.s.i.g.,
for an incidence of 1.7% for the Washington State tables.
\14\ In 1985, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) published a report entitled "Criteria for Interim
Decompression Tables for Caisson and Tunnel Workers"; this report
reviewed studies of DCI and other hyperbaric-related injuries
resulting from use of OSHA's tables. This report is available on
NIOSH's Web site: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/decompression/default.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The review conducted by OSHA found several research studies
supporting the determination that the 1992 French Decompression Tables
resulted in a lower rate of DCI than the decompression tables specified
by the standard. For example, H. L. Anderson studied the occurrence of
DCI at maximum hyperbaric pressures ranging from 4 p.s.i.g. to 43
p.s.i.g. during construction of the Great Belt Tunnel in Denmark (1992-
1996); \15\ this project used the 1992 French Decompression Tables to
decompress the workers during part of the construction. Anderson
observed 6 DCI cases out of 7,220 decompression events, and reported
that switching to the 1992 French Decompression tables reduced the DCI
incidence to 0.08%. The DCI incidence in the study by H. L. Andersen is
substantially less than the DCI incidence reported for the
decompression tables specified in Appendix A. OSHA found no studies in
which the DCI incidence reported for the 1992 French Decompression
Tables were higher than the DCI incidence reported for the OSHA
decompression tables.\16\ Therefore, OSHA preliminarily concludes that
the proposed use of the 1992 French Decompression Tables would protect
workers at least as effectively as the OSHA decompression tables.
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\15\ Anderson HL (2002). Decompression sickness during
construction of the Great Belt tunnel, Denmark. Undersea and
Hyperbaric Medicine, 29(3), pp. 172-188.
\16\ Le P[eacute]chon JC, Barre P, Baud JP, Ollivier F
(September 1996). Compressed air work--French Tables 1992--
operational results. JCLP Hyperbarie Paris, Centre Medical
Subaquatique Interentreprise, Marseille: Communication a l'EUBS, pp.
1-5 (see Ex. OSHA-2012-0036-0005).
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Based on a review of available evidence, the experience of State
Plans that either granted variances (Nevada, Oregon and Washington)
\17\ or promulgated a new standard (California) \18\ for hyperbaric
exposures occurring during similar subaqueous tunnel-construction work,
and the information provided in the applicant's variance application,
OSHA is proposing the grant of the permanent variance.
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\17\ See 79 FR 29816, footnote 12.
\18\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7,
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
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Under section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (29 U.S.C. 655), the Agency finds that when the employer complies
with the conditions of the previously granted interim order, or the
conditions of the proposed variance, the working conditions of the
employer's workers would be at least as safe and healthful as if the
employer complied with the working conditions specified by paragraphs
(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803.
Therefore, Traylor JV will: (1) Comply with the conditions listed in
the Blue Plains tunnel project interim order granted on July 11, 2013,
for the period between the grant of the interim order and Traylor's
completion of the Blue Plains tunnel project (or until the Agency
modifies or revokes the interim order or makes a decision on its
application for a permanent variance); (2) comply fully with the
specific conditions of the variance, if granted; (3) comply fully with
all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; and (4) provide a
copy of this Federal Register notice to all employees affected by the
proposed conditions, including the affected employees of other
employers, using the same means it used to inform these employees of
its application for a permanent variance.
V. Specific Conditions of the Proposed Permanent Variance
OSHA affirms the previously granted Blue Plains tunnel project
specific interim order authorizing Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint
Venture ("Traylor JV") to comply with said conditions instead of
complying with the requirements of paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5),
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii). In addition, the proposed
conditions included in this notice specify the alternative means of
compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5),
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) that Traylor JV is proposing for
its permanent variance. The proposed conditions would apply to all
employees of Traylor JV exposed to hyperbaric conditions. These
proposed conditions would be:
A. Scope
The permanent variance would apply only to work:
1. That occurs in conjunction with construction of the Blue Plains
tunnel project, a tunnel constructed using advanced shielded
mechanical-excavation techniques and involving operation of an EPBTBM;
2. Performed under compressed-air and hyperbaric conditions up to
52 p.s.i.g;
3. In the EPBTBM's forward section (the working chamber) and
associated hyperbaric chambers used to pressurize and decompress employees
entering and exiting the working chamber;
4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5),
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii), Traylor JV would be required to
comply fully with all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926;
and
B. Application
The permanent variance would apply only when Traylor JV stops the
tunnel-boring work, pressurizes the working chamber, and the CAWs
either enter the working chamber to perform interventions (i.e.,
inspect, maintain, or repair the mechanical-excavation components), or
exit the working chamber after performing interventions.
C. List of Abbreviations
Abbreviations used throughout this proposed permanent variance
would include the following:
1. CAW--Compressed-air worker
2. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
3. DCI--Decompression Illness
4. EPBTBM--Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine
5. HOM--Hyperbaric Operations and Safety Manual
6. JHA--Job hazard analysis
7. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities
D. Definitions
The following definitions would apply to this proposed permanent
variance. These definitions would supplement the definitions in Traylor
JV's project-specific HOM.
1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is
affected by the conditions of this proposed permanent variance, or any
one of his or her authorized representatives. The term "employee" has
the meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.)
2. Atmospheric pressure--the pressure of air at sea level,
generally 14.7 p.s.i.a., 1 atmosphere absolute, or 0 p.s.i.g.
3. Compressed-air worker--an individual who is specially trained
and medically qualified to perform work in a pressurized environment
while breathing air at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
4. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees,
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to
eliminate them.\19\
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\19\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f).
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5. Decompression illness (also called decompression sickness or the
bends)--an illness caused by gas bubbles appearing in body compartments
due to a reduction in ambient pressure. Examples of symptoms of
decompression illness include (but are not limited to): Joint pain
(also known as the "bends" for agonizing pain or the "niggles" for
slight pain); areas of bone destruction (termed dysbaric
osteonecrosis); skin disorders (such as cutis marmorata, which causes a
pink marbling of the skin); spinal cord and brain disorders (such as
stroke, paralysis, paresthesia, and bladder dysfunction);
cardiopulmonary disorders, such as shortness of breath; and arterial
gas embolism (gas bubbles in the arteries that block blood flow).\20\
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\20\ See Appendix 10 of "A Guide to the Work in Compressed Air
Regulations 1996," published by the United Kingdom Health and
Safety Executive available from NIOSH at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive/pdfs/NIOSH-254/compReg1996.pdf*.
Note: Health effects associated with hyperbaric intervention
but not considered symptoms of DCI can include: Barotrauma (direct
damage to air-containing cavities in the body such as ears, sinuses
and lungs); nitrogen narcosis (reversible alteration in
consciousness that may occur in hyperbaric environments and is
caused by the anesthetic effect of certain gases at high pressure);
and oxygen toxicity (a central nervous system condition resulting
from the harmful effects of breathing molecular oxygen
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(O2) at elevated partial pressures).
6. Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine--the machinery
used to excavate the tunnel.
7. Hot work--any activity performed in a hazardous location that
may introduce an ignition source into a potentially flammable
atmosphere.\21\
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\21\ Also see 29 CFR 1910.146(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Hyperbaric--at a higher pressure than atmospheric pressure.
9. Hyperbaric intervention--a term that describes the process of
stopping the EPBTBM and preparing and executing work under hyperbaric
pressure in the working chamber for the purpose of inspecting,
replacing, or repairing cutting tools and/or the cutterhead structure.
10. Hyperbaric Operations Manual--a detailed, project-specific
health and safety plan developed and implemented by Traylor JV for
working in compressed air during the Blue Plains' tunnel project.
11. Job hazard analysis--an evaluation of tasks or operations to
identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary controls.
12. Man lock--an enclosed space capable of pressurization, and used
for compressing or decompressing any employee or material when either
is passing into or out of a working chamber.
13. Pressure--a force acting on a unit area. Usually expressed as
pounds per square inch (p.s.i.).
14. p.s.i.--pounds per square inch, a common unit of measurement of
pressure; a pressure given in p.s.i. corresponds to absolute pressure.
15. p.s.i.a.--pounds per square inch absolute, or absolute
pressure, is the sum of the atmospheric pressure and gauge pressure. At
sea-level, atmospheric pressure is approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Adding
14.7 to a pressure expressed in units of p.s.i.g. will yield the
absolute pressure, expressed as p.s.i.a.
16. p.s.i.g.--pounds per square inch gauge, a common unit of
pressure; pressure expressed as p.s.i.g. corresponds to pressure
relative to atmospheric pressure. At sea-level, atmospheric pressure is
approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Subtracting 14.7 from a pressure expressed in
units of p.s.i.a. yields the gauge pressure, expressed as p.s.i.g.
17. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to the
subject matter, the work, or the project.\22\
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\22\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m).
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18. Working chamber--an enclosed space in the EPBTBM in which CAWs
perform interventions, and which is accessible only through a man lock.
E. Safety and Health Practices
1. Traylor JV would have to develop and implement an HOM specific
to the Blue Plains project, and submit the HOM to OSHA at least six
months before using the EPBTBM. Traylor JV would have to receive a
written acknowledgement from OSHA regarding the acceptability of the
HOM.\23\ The HOM would provide the governing safety and health
requirements regarding hyperbaric exposures during the tunnel-
construction project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See footnote 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Traylor JV would have to implement the safety and health
instructions included in the manufacturer's operations manuals for the
EPBTBM, and the safety and health instructions provided by the
manufacturer for the operation of decompression equipment.
3. Traylor JV would have to use air as the only breathing gas in
the working chamber.
4. Traylor JV would have to use the 1992 French Decompression
Tables for air, air-oxygen, and oxygen decompression specified in the
HOM, specifically the extracted portions of the 1992 French
Decompression tables titled "French Regulation Air Standard Tables."
5. Traylor JV would have to equip man-locks used by its employees
with an oxygen-delivery system as specified by the HOM. Traylor JV
would be required to not store oxygen or other compressed gases used in
conjunction with hyperbaric work in the tunnel.
6. Workers performing hot work under hyperbaric conditions would
have to use flame-retardant personal protective equipment and clothing.
7. In hyperbaric work areas, Traylor JV would have to maintain an
adequate fire-suppression system approved for hyperbaric work areas.
8. Traylor JV would have to develop and implement one or more JHAs
for work in the hyperbaric work areas, and review, periodically and as
necessary (e.g., after making changes to a planned intervention that
affects its operation), the contents of the JHAs with affected
employees. The JHAs would have to include all the job functions that
the risk assessment \24\ indicates are essential to prevent injury or
illness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ See ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012, American National Standard for
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Traylor JV would have to develop a set of checklists to guide
compressed-air work and ensure that employees follow the procedures
required by this proposed permanent variance (including all procedures
required by the HOM, which this proposed variance would incorporate by
reference). The checklists would have to include all steps and
equipment functions that the risk assessment indicates are essential to
prevent injury or illness during compressed-air work.
10. Traylor JV would have to ensure that the safety and health
provisions of the HOM adequately protect the workers of all contractors
and subcontractors involved in hyperbaric operations.\25\
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\25\ See ANSI/ASSE A10.33-2011, American National Standard for
Construction and Demolition Operations--Safety and Health Program
Requirements for Multi-Employer Projects, for reference.
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F. Communication
1. Prior to beginning a shift, Traylor JV would have to implement a
system that informs workers exposed to hyperbaric conditions of any
hazardous occurrences or conditions that might affect their safety,
including hyperbaric incidents, gas releases, equipment failures, earth
or rock slides, cave-ins, flooding, fires, or explosions.
2. Traylor JV would have to provide a power-assisted means of
communication among affected workers and support personnel in
hyperbaric conditions where unassisted voice communication is
inadequate.
(a) Traylor JV would have to use an independent power supply for
powered communication systems, and these systems would have to operate
such that use or disruption of any one phone or signal location will
not disrupt the operation of the system from any other location.
(b) Traylor JV would have to test communication systems at the
start of each shift and as necessary thereafter to ensure proper
operation.
G. Worker Qualifications and Training
Traylor JV would have to:
1. Ensure that each affected worker receives effective training on
how to safely enter, work in, exit from, and undertake emergency
evacuation or rescue from, hyperbaric conditions, and document this
training.
2. Provide effective instruction, before beginning hyperbaric
operations, to each worker who performs work, or controls the exposure
of others, in hyperbaric conditions, and document this instruction. The
instruction would have to include topics such as:
(a) The physics and physiology of hyperbaric work;
(b) Recognition of pressure-related injuries;
(c) Information on the causes and recognition of the signs and
symptoms associated with decompression illness, and other hyperbaric
intervention-related health effects (e.g., barotrauma, nitrogen
narcosis, and oxygen toxicity).
(d) How to avoid discomfort during compression and decompression;
and
(e) Information the workers can use to contact the appropriate
healthcare professionals should the workers have concerns that they may
be experiencing adverse health effects from hyperbaric exposure.
3. Repeat the instruction specified in paragraph (b) of this
proposed condition periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making
changes to its hyperbaric operations).
4. When conducting training for its hyperbaric workers make this
training available to OSHA personnel and notify the OTPCA at OSHA's
national office and OSHA's nearest affected Area Office before the
training takes place.
H. Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
1. Traylor JV would have to initiate and maintain a program of
frequent and regular inspections of the EPBTBM's hyperbaric equipment
and support systems (such as temperature control, illumination,
ventilation, and fire-prevention and fire-suppression systems), and
hyperbaric work areas, as required under 29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2) by:
(a) Developing a set of checklists to be used by a competent person
in conducting weekly inspections of hyperbaric equipment and work
areas; and
(b) Ensuring that a competent person conducts daily visual checks
and weekly inspections of the EPBTBM.
2. If the competent person determines that the equipment
constitutes a safety hazard, Traylor JV would have to remove the
equipment from service until it corrects the hazardous condition and
has the correction approved by a qualified person.
3. Traylor JV would have to maintain records of all tests and
inspections of the EPBTBM, as well as associated corrective actions and
repairs, at the job site for the duration of the job.
I. Compression and Decompression
Traylor JV would have to consult with its attending physician
concerning the need for special compression or decompression exposures
appropriate for CAWs not acclimated to hyperbaric exposure.
J. Recordkeeping
Traylor JV would have to maintain a record of any recordable
injury, illness, or fatality (as defined by 29 CFR part 1904 Recording
and Reporting Occupational Injuries and Illnesses), resulting from
exposure of an employee to hyperbaric conditions by completing the OSHA
301 Incident Report form and OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and
Illnesses.
Note: Examples of important information to include on the OSHA
301 Incident Report form (along with the corresponding question on
the form) are: The task performed (Question (Q) 14); an estimate of
the CAW's workload (Q 14); the composition of the gas mixture (e.g.,
air or oxygen (Q 14)); the maximum working pressure (Q 14);
temperature in the work and decompression environments (Q 14);
unusual occurrences, if any, during the task or decompression (Q
14); time of symptom onset (Q 15); duration between decompression
and onset of symptoms (Q 15); type and duration of symptoms (Q 16);
a medical summary of the illness or injury (Q 16); duration of the
hyperbaric intervention (Q 17); possible contributing factors (Q
17); the number of prior interventions completed by the injured or
ill CAW (Q 17); the number of prior interventions completed by the
injured or ill CAW at this working pressure (Q 17); contact
information for the treating healthcare provider (Q 17); and date
and time of last hyperbaric exposure for this CAW.
In addition to completing the OSHA 301 Incident Report form and
OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses, Traylor JV would
have to maintain records of:
1. The date, times (e.g., began compression, time spent
compressing, time performing intervention, time spent decompressing),
and pressure for each hyperbaric intervention.
2. The name of each individual worker exposed to hyperbaric
pressure and the decompression protocols and results for each worker.
3. The total number of interventions and the amount of hyperbaric
work time at each pressure.
4. The results of the post-intervention physical assessment of each
CAW for signs and symptoms of decompression illness, barotrauma,
nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity or other health effects associated
with work in compressed air for each hyperbaric intervention.
K. Notifications
1. To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein,
Traylor JV would have to:
(a) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office of
any recordable injury, illness, or fatality (by submitting the
completed OSHA 301 Incident Report form \26\) resulting from exposure
of an employee to hyperbaric conditions including those that do not
require recompression treatment (e.g., nitrogen narcosis, oxygen
toxicity, barotrauma), but still meet the recordable injury or illness
criteria of 29 CFR 1904. The notification would have to be made within
8 hours of the incident or 8 hours after becoming aware of a recordable
injury, illness, or fatality, and submit a copy of the incident
investigation (OSHA form 301) within 24 hours of the incident or 24
hours after becoming aware of a recordable injury, illness, or
fatality. In addition to the information required by the OSHA form 301,
the incident-investigation report would have to include a root-cause
determination, and the preventive and corrective actions identified and
implemented.
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\26\ See footnote 10.
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(b) Provide certification within 15 working days of the incident
that Traylor JV informed affected workers of the incident and the
results of the incident investigation (including the root-cause
determination and preventive and corrective actions identified and
implemented).
(c) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office
within 15 working days and in writing, of any change in the compressed-
air operations that affects Traylor JV's ability to comply with the
proposed conditions specified herein.
(d) Upon completion of the Blue Plains tunnel project, evaluate the
effectiveness of the decompression tables used throughout the project,
and provide a written report of this evaluation to the OTPCA and the
Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office.
Note: The evaluation report would have to contain summaries of:
(1) The number, dates, durations, and pressures of the hyperbaric
interventions completed; (2) decompression protocols implemented
(including composition of gas mixtures (air and/or oxygen), and the
results achieved; (3) the total number of interventions and the
number of hyperbaric incidents (decompression illnesses and/or
health effects associated with hyperbaric interventions as recorded
on OSHA 301 and 300 forms, and relevant medical diagnoses and
treating physicians' opinions); and (4) root causes of any
hyperbaric incidents, and preventive and corrective actions
identified and implemented.
(e) To assist OSHA in administering the proposed conditions
specified herein, inform the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area
Office as soon as possible after it has knowledge that it will:
(i) Cease to do business;
(ii) Change the location and address of the main office for
managing the tunneling operations specified herein; or
(iii) Transfer the operations specified herein to a successor
company.
(f) Notify all affected employees of this proposed permanent
variance by the same means required to inform them of its application
for a variance.
2. OSHA would have to approve the transfer of the proposed
permanent variance to a successor company.
VI. Authority and Signature
David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, 200 Constitution Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20210, authorized the preparation of this notice.
Accordingly, the Agency is issuing this notice pursuant to Section 29
U.S.C. 655(6)(d), Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR 3912,
Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR 1905.11.
Signed at Washington, DC, on December 5, 2014.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2014-28994 Filed 12-10-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
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