Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: EXPLOSION

KRS 338.031(1)(a): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free form recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to an employee in that: a.The company failed to ensure that pressure vessels that were operated at pressures greater than 15 psig in the battery plant were constructed in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes Section 8 in that: (1). The vessel was not fabricated or manufactured by a facility that held a certificate of authorization from the ASME boiler and pressure vessel committee. (2). The maximum allowable working pressure was not determined. (3). The vessel did not have a pressure relief device installed. (4). The vessel was not hydrostatically tested prior to use. The unit was purchased from Bryant Sheet Metal in Lexington per the specifications of a Yuasa management official. The vessel did not meet ASME codes, nor was the vessel certified or registered. The vessel used was approximately 23 inches by 49 inches. It had flat heads and floor supports and three nipples, screw threaded and capped in the vertical position. The metal was approximately 1/8th inch thick. The heads appeared to have been manually welded. There was evidence of leakage at these welds where a gas tank putty was applied over the weld. An air regulator rated at 250 psi inlet pressure at 175 degrees F manufactured by Parker Pneumatic had the adjustment knob missing and the stem had markings resembling the use of pliers on the stem for adjustment. There was no safety relief valve on the vessel. The vessel could be valved off at the feed using inch manual ball valve manufactured by Watts. The feed side could also be valved off using similar ball valves.