Standard Cited: 5A0001 OSH Act General Duty Paragraph

Violation Items
Nr: 110416880 Citation: 01001 Issuance: 08/29/1991 ReportingID: 0625700
Viol Type:Serious NrInstances:9 Contest Date:
Abatement Date:03/06/1992 X Nr Exposed:30 Final Order:
Initial Penalty:5000.00 REC:A Emphasis:
Current Penalty:3850.00 Gravity:10 Haz Category:EXPLOSION

Penalty and Failure to Abate Event History
Type Event Date Penalty abatement Type FTA Insp
Penalty Z: Issued 08/29/1991 5000.00 03/06/1992 Serious  
Penalty I: Informal Settlement 08/29/1991 3850.00 03/06/1992 Serious  


Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: EXPLOSION

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to the hazard of the hazard of fire and explosion: a) The employer did not protect his employees from the recognized hazard of fire and explosion in that all unnecessary windows were not closed in on the Control Room of the FCC "A" Unit (K-4 Building). NOTE: Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is: Close in the glass windows in the front and rear double doors of the K-4 Unit Control Room with Acceptable materials to provide at least the fire and explosion resistance of the existing building. b) The employer did not protect his employees from the recognized hazard of fire and explosion in that all unnecessary Unit (Day Foreman's Office for C-4 Area). NOTE: Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable method to correct this problem is: Close in the glass windows located on the west side, front (including door), and east side of K-3 Building with acceptable materials to provide at least the fire explosion resistance of the existing building. c) The employer did not protect his employees from the recognized hazard of fire and explosion in that safety devices, such as governors and overspeed trips, are not tested at frequent intervals as necessary for safe operation of steam turbines for protection of personnel, in areas such as, but not limited to, Power Area, Reformer Area, and Cat Areas. NOTE: Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is: 1) Establish a definite schedule at frequent intervals (not to exceed nine months) for testing and recalibration of turbine safety devices, such as governors and overspeed trips. 2) Immediately remove from service any turbine that has defective or inoperable governor or overspeed trips. d) Relief valve on top of the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum was removed for servicing or was blocked in for extended periods of time to facilitate resetting without adequate precautions being taken to reduce the hazards involved. NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this hazard is to provide a relief valve on all pressure vessels and/or ensure that a qualified person is assigned with the primary responsibility of monitoring and controlling the process variable affecting the unprotected vessel. e) On or about March 3, 1991, critical instruments and control systems, i.e., but not limited to, flow control (FC-109) and J-12 pump(s) speed controls for the CCU "A" unit were not working properly. NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this hazard is to develop and strictly enforce an inspection procedure that ensures critical instruments and control systems are functional prior to start-up. f) Operators were not informed of charges and of the consequences of the changes, i.e. but not limited to installation of a new 3 inch diameter line from the output of the J-12A pump to the output of J-12 North pump and installation of a new stripper in the bottom of the Reactor, which could affect the safe operation of the unit. NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this hazard is to implement written procedures to communicate the changes and modifications prior to initiating start-up of the CCU "A". g) Pressure relief valve(s) were not regularly serviced and maintained for the CCU "A" unit. NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this hazard is to establish definite time intervals for inspection and testing of pressure relief valve(s) in accordance with API 520. h) Internal audits, such as general hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) assuring that controls and instrumentation were in place for automatic or manual shutdown durig emergency situations, had not been conducted for the CCU "A" unit. NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this hazard is to conduct HAZOP studies, job safety analysis and human factor analysis. i) Remotely operated emergency shut-off controls permitting the rapid termination of hydrocarbon flow for the inlet line (0-156-4) to the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum, were not provided. NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this hazard is to install a remotely operated insolation valve on the inlet line (0-156-4) to the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum and/or a remotely operated shutdown of the steam turbines driving the J-12 pumps.