Standard Cited: 5A0001 OSH Act General Duty Paragraph
|Nr: 102749868||Citation: 01001||Issuance: 09/17/1991||ReportingID: 0111100|
|Viol Type:||Serious||NrInstances:||1||Contest Date:||10/07/1991|
|Abatement Date:||10/18/1991 X||Nr Exposed:||6||Final Order:||02/10/1993|
|Current Penalty:||$1,650.00||Gravity:||10||Haz Category:||LIFTING|
|Penalty and Failure to Abate Event History|
|Penalty||F: Formal Settlement||02/10/1993||$1,650.00||10/18/1991||Serious|
Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: LIFTING
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to inhalation hazards and to the risk of catastrophic fires and explosions from possible leaks, ruptures, and releases from system pipelines, vessels, and equipment handling liquified petroleum gases. The following conditions contributed to the existence of this hazard: a. LPG System - Pressure relief valves throughout the LPG system were not tested regularly for corrosion and contamination. b. Piping Between LPG Bulk Storage and Vaporizer Building - Piping containing liquid and vapor that had been covered and therefore created a corrosive environment was not inspected for pitting and corrosion. c. Vaporizer Building - Each pressure relief valve was paint covered and therefore was not plainly and permanently marked with the following: (1) Pressure in psig at which the valve is set to start to leak. (2) Rated relieving capacity. (3) Manufacturer's name and catalogue number. d. C-3 System, H-Furnace - On or about 4/4/91, the lower pressure (LPG) switch that was interlocked with the H-furnace tripped but the furnace continued to operate; inoperative safety interlocking devices could cause high concentrations of gas to form with ensuing fire and explosion. e. LPG Bulk Storage - The transfer hose was not equipped with a shutoff and a hydrostatic relief valve at the free end to prevent liquid from draining out onto the ground following transfer. f. LPG System - The employer did not perform a hazard analysis for identifying, evaluating, and controlling hazards involved in the process. ABATEMENT NOTE: Feasible means of abatement, among others, include, respectively: a. Pressure relief valves on containers of more than 2,000-gallon water capacity should be tested at approximately 10-year intervals. Note: Some types of valves may be tested in place by means of an external lifting device while others must be removed from the containers. (30 days) b. Volumetric inspection (or replacement) of that section of piping previously covered should be employed to detect the presence of excessive corrosion. (30 days) c. Remove paint from each pressure relief valve. (10 days) d. Replace defective switches and incorporate a routine/preventative maintenance program to identify defective components. (1 day) e. Equip transfer hose with a shutoff valve at the free end to prevent spillage following transfer; further install hydrostatic relief valve to accommodate expansion and prevent rupture of hose. (10 days) f. Perform a hazard analysis addressing: (30 days) (1) The hazards of the process. (2) Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships. (3) Consequences of failure of these controls. (4) A consequence analysis of the effects on all workplace employees.
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