Violation Detail
Standard Cited: 5A0001 OSH Act General Duty Paragraph
This violation item has been deleted.
Inspection Nr: 103624532
Citation: 03001
Citation Type: Willful
Abatement Status: X
Initial Penalty: $63,000.00
Current Penalty:
Issuance Date: 09/18/1996
Nr Instances: 1
Nr Exposed: 3
Abatement Date: 10/28/1996
Gravity: 10
Report ID: 0625100
Contest Date:
Final Order:
Related Event Code (REC):
Emphasis:
Type | Latest Event | Event Date | Penalty | Abatement Due Date | Citation Type | Failure to Abate Inspection |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Penalty | I: Informal Settlement | 10/17/1996 | 10/28/1996 | Willful | ||
Penalty | Z: Issued | 09/18/1996 | $63,000.00 | 10/28/1996 | Willful |
Text For Citation: 03 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: EXPLOSION
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were not free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to: White Sands Missile Range, Permanent High Explosives Test Site (PHETS) located 13 miles South of Stallion. On April 24, 1996 an accident occurred in which an overloaded Bobcat tipped forward catching two ARA employees between the bucket and the floor of the building in which they were working. This accident claimed one employee's life and seriously injured the other. The operations part of this Dipole Orbit test, involved placing a BLU-109A/B 2000 pound bomb, a class A explosive, beneath the floor of a specially constructed building and then detonating it. This was a major change in the Dipole Orbit test protocol as the BLU-109A/B 2000 pound bomb originally was to have been air dropped and not placed beneath the floor and detonated. ARA had provided a detailed Safety Standing Operating Procedure (SSOP) which was approved on 27 November 1995 for an earlier Dipole Orbit test. There was no mention of using a Bobcat to position the BLU-109A/B 2000 pound bomb in the approved SSOP. The Bobcat was operated by another contractor's employee. None of this contractor's personnel were on the list of personnel approved to handle the bomb. Section 2.3 of the ARA Standard Operating Procedures and Safety Plan deals with explosives safety. ARA failed to follow paragraph 2.3.1.1 of this plan, which required a detailed Safety Standard Operating Procedure for each explosive operation including the handling of munitions. ARA was working for Field Command Defense Nuclear Agency (FCDNA) under contract DNA001-93-C-0147, Field Test Support. Technical Instruction (TI) 2.30/00 paragraph 3.0 required the contractor (ARA) to provide an approved technical instruction before performing any specific task. Had the above requirements been followed this should have prevented the April 24, 1996 accident. One feasible method of abatement would be for ARA to follow their own and FCDNA directives.