Violation Detail
Standard Cited: 19100119 J05 Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals.
Inspection Nr: 314767575
Citation: 02001
Citation Type: Serious
Abatement Status: X
Initial Penalty: $70,000.00
Current Penalty: $21,000.00
Issuance Date: 04/08/2011
Nr Instances: 2
Nr Exposed: 4
Abatement Date: 04/27/2011
Gravity: 10
Report ID: 0625700
Contest Date: 04/28/2011
Final Order: 06/13/2012
Related Event Code (REC):
Emphasis:
Type | Latest Event | Event Date | Penalty | Abatement Due Date | Citation Type | Failure to Abate Inspection |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Penalty | F: Formal Settlement | 06/13/2012 | $21,000.00 | 04/27/2011 | Serious | |
Penalty | Z: Issued | 04/08/2011 | $70,000.00 | 04/27/2011 | Willful |
Text For Citation: 02 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: CHEMNEP
29 CFR 1910.119(j)(5): The employer did not correct deficiencies in equipment th at were outside acceptable limits (as defined by process information in 29 CFR 1 910.119(d)) before further use or in a safe and timely manner: The employer does not correct each deficiency in process equipment (that are outside of acceptabl e limits) in a safe and timely manner before further use. a) This violation was observed on or about December 2, 2010, at pressure vessels in the Butadiene Recovery Area of the Lion Copolymer Baton Rouge facility, wher e valves were observed to be missing handles. Valves missing handles included th e valves at flash tanks 26-V- 24, 26-V-25, 26-V-26, 26-V-27, 26-V-28, and 26-V-2 9. The valves cannot be operated without handles and thus control of the process is not possible. b) This violation was observed on or about December 15, 2010, on the ground level of the Butadiene Recovery Area of the Lion Copolymer Baton R ouge facility where valves in critical piping systems were observed to be missin g handles at/near critical pumps, including 26-P-13A, 26-P-13B, 26-P-14A, 26-P-1 4B, 26-P-15A, 26-P-15B, and 26-P-36. The valves cannot be operated without handl es. c) This violation was observed on or about January 6, 2010 in the Butadiene Recovery Area of the Lion Copolymer Baton Rouge facility, where CSHO observed a valve in the pipi ng system at 26-V-67 with a come-along attached. The come-along was used to oper ate the valve because the valve could not be opened by hand. d) This violation w as observed on or about November 4, 2010, in the utility Pump House Area at the block valve where liquid ammonia drops from the #5 and #6 condensers before bein g routed back to the two ammonia storage tanks. This block valve will not open o r close. e) This violation was observed on or about November 4, 2010, in the uti lity Pump house Area at the north discharge valve where liquid ammonia is sent t o the reactor chains. This valve is stuck open. f) This violation was observed o n or about November 4, 2010, in the Utility Pump House Area, at the orbit valve utilized to pump ammonia to the booster pump. This valve leaks ammonia. g) This violation was observed on or about November 4, 2010, in the Utility Pump House Area, a grouping of three orbit valves which maintain a control loop from the 10 X 10 Tank to the Flash Tank. One valve leaks. One valve will not close, and another will not open or close and the regulator is inoperable. h) This viol ation was observed on or about November 4, 2010, at the ammonia oil knock-out dr um where the block valve is supported by a valve boot to prevent leaking. The va lve is no longer operable and cannot be closed. This would allow the knock out d rum to be overwhelmed subsequently spilling over into a connected water/oil sepa rator tank and relieving to the outside as both ammonia vapor and ammonia satura ted oil and water. This exposed employees to the hazards of toxic gas, fire and explosion. Pursuant to 29 CFR 1903.19(d), within 10 calendar days of the date of the citation, the employer must submit documentation showing that it is in comp liance with the standard including describing the steps it is taking to ensure that deficiencies in equip ment in the BD Recovery Area and Utility Pump House Area are corrected to assure the mechanical integrity of the process.