Violation Detail
Standard Cited: 510001 A Duties of Employers
Inspection Nr: 303900534
Citation: 02001
Citation Type: Unclass
Abatement Status: W
Initial Penalty: $25,000.00
Current Penalty: $9,500.00
Issuance Date: 04/30/2001
Nr Instances: 1
Nr Exposed: 3
Abatement Date: 05/04/2001
Gravity:
Report ID: 0355114
Contest Date: 05/14/2001
Final Order: 08/16/2004
Related Event Code (REC):
Emphasis:
| Type | Latest Event | Event Date | Penalty | Abatement Due Date | Citation Type | Failure to Abate Inspection |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Penalty | Y: State Decision | 08/16/2004 | $9,500.00 | 05/04/2001 | Unclass | |
| Penalty | Z: Issued | 04/30/2001 | $25,000.00 | 05/04/2001 | Willful |
Text For Citation: 02 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: FALLING
Title 40.1-51.1(a), Code of Virginia: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to a tunnel cave-in hazard while constructing a pedestrian walkback tunnel (south end) at Dulles Airport. On November 1, 2000, an employee of Kiewit Construction Company was killed when a section of the tunnel collapsed. During the week prior to the accident the Employer experienced deteriorating soil conditions and three falloffs of more than 1.0 cubic yard (cy) of soil during tunneling operations between October 24th and October 31st. The falloffs increased in severity from 1.0 cy on October 24th to 4.0 cy on October 25th to 5.0 cy on October 31st the day before the accident. No tunneling occurred on October 29-30, 2000. Based on tunneling records, it appears that there were only a total of ten falloffs equal to or exceeding 1.0 cy, including the three already mentioned, that occurred at the site in the six months preceding the accident. The tunnel was being built using the New Austrian Tunneling Method (NATM). Kiewit Construction Company, the contractor hired to mine the tunnel, with the approval of Parsons Management Consultants (PMC) (the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authoritys Contracting Officers Technical Representative (COTR) on site), reduced the number of spiling bolts to be installed on each girder from approximately 19 to 13 as part of the tunnel support system, by agreement dated August 22, 2000. PMC approved this reduction on two conditions: 1) that the tunneling was being conducted in stable ground conditions, and 2) is approved on a case-by-case basis based on the employers NATM engineers observations and recommendations. The NATM engineer was apparently not on site during the entire month of October, 2000 to observe the escalating level of falloffs and deteriorating soil conditions in the week leading up to the tunnel collapse. The NATM engineer was not available to approve or change from the continued use of 13 spiling bolts instead of the 19 or more provided for in the contract, nor had he even apparently been contacted on the falloffs. One feasible and acceptable abatement method among others to correct this hazard is to comply with the contract specifications, Sheet T3, 4, Cross Section A.
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