Text For Citation: 02 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: EXPLOSION

Section 5 (a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to the recognized hazard of fire and explosion: The following conditions contributed to the existence of this hazard. a.) On or about March 10, 1992, a total of twenty process lines were in the attic of the Solvent Treating Plant's control room. The process lines that varied in sizes, from 1.5 inch to 4 inch in diameter, were used to transfer a combination of water, oil, and solvent. The pressure of the process fluids in the pipings varied from 24 vacuum to 225 psig; and the temperature ranged from 85 F to 360 F. Feasible abatement method(s) to correct this hazard may include, but not limited to: 1.) Removal of all pipings over the control room ceiling. b.) On or about March 10, 1992, the following control rooms were adjacent to process areas which presented severe fire and explosion hazard to employees in the control rooms and other employees in the refinery. These control rooms are: 1.) Solvent Treating Plant control room surrounded and encircled by process equipment, such as propane condensers on the roof which contain Propane, Phenol, and Cresylic Acid. Also, process equipment contains other flammable, combustible, and corrosive gases and liquids. 2.) West Plant control room surrounded and encircled by process units, such as CTU #1 & #4 used to process crude oil. The other units are Vac #1, Isomerization, and Sat Gas. There are also piperacks that contain flammable and combustible gas and liquids. 3.) Alkylation control room not separated from process vessels and piperacks that contain flammable and corrosive liquids and gases, such as Hydrofluoric Acid (highly corrosive) and Gasoline. 4.) Bender control room not separated from process vessels and piperacks that contain flammable and combustible liquids and gases, such as Naphtha and Kerosene. 5.) South Plant control room surrounded by process units, such as Butamer, VRU, FCC #5, Cryo #1 and SRU which are used to process highly flammable and combustible hydrocarbon liquids, and gases. 6.) Combination Unit control room surrounded and encircled by process equipment and piperacks that contain flammable and combustible hydrocarbons. 7.) Coker control room in close proximity to process equipment and piperacks that contain flammable and combustible liquids and gases. The control has no blast resistance. 8.) East Plant control room surrounded by process units and piperacks that contain flammable and combustible liquids, such as Gas, Oil, Naphtha, and Crude Oil. 9.) Blender control room five feet from the gasoline piperack and within thirty feet from the gasoline manifold. Feasible abatement method(s) to correct these hazards may include, but not limited to: 1.) Removal of all pipings over the control room ceiling. c.) On or about March 10, 1992, the Solvent Treating Plant control room was not pressurized. Employees were exposed to the hazard of Propane and/or other Hydrocarbon cloud. Feasible abatement method(s) to correct these hazards may include, but not limited to: 1.) Provide positive pressurization to the control room. d.) On or about March 10, 1992, three manual valves provided to shut down or bypass the Propane-propylene (PP) feed to the Catalytic Polymerization (Cat Poly) unit were so located that they may become inaccessible and inadequate in the event of fire and/or explosion at the unit. Feasible abatement method(s) to correct this hazard may include, but not limited to: 1.) Implementation of a hazard identification program designed to detect and correct such a hazard, and to maintain the proper functioning of those devices through periodic inspections. 2.) Provide a remotely-operated control valve for shutting down the PP supply to the Cat Poly in the event of an emergency. e.) On or about March 10, 1992, at the Cat Poly, the R-28 and J-70 propane charge pumps (reciprocating pumps) presented and inherent leakage hazard. There were no hydrocarbon monitors throughout the entire Cat Poly unit processing area. Feasible abatement method(s) to correct this hazard may include, but not limited to: 1.) Provide monitoring/devices at the Cat Poly to detect and provide audible and/or visual warning of an accidental/uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons. 2.) Provide seal detectors on the propane pumps. f.) On or about March 10, 1992, at the Cat Poly, thermo detection or flow indicators were not provided in the flare lines from the Feed Surge Tower (W93), the Caustic Wash Tower (W95), and the Depropanizer (W91). Relieving of Propane from the high pressure flare lines may cause metal embrittlement, leaks, and fire. Feasible abatement method(s) to correct this hazard may include, but not limited to: 1.) Installation of thermo detection or flow indicators in the propane relief lines. g.) On or about March 10, 1992, the unit operating manuals for the processing units were not maintained up to date. Approximately two years ago, equipment such as X-630 and X-631 were added to the Cat Poly unit as well as the processing capacity was increased from 1000 B/D per reactor to 1200 B/D per reactor without updating the operating manual that was revised on August 1, 1986. Feasible abatement method(s) to correct this hazard may include, but not limited to: 1.) A management system that assigns clear responsibility for correcting and updating any changes to the unit operating manuals for the processing units. h.) On or about March 10, 1992, the Solvent Treating Plant control room ventilation system air intake did not prevent the entrance of flammable vapors/gases such as, but not limited to hydrocarbon gases, and that through an automatic interlock, close the ventilation system, as referenced in NFPA 496, Chapter 3. Feasible abatement method(s) to correct this hazard may include, but not limited to: 1.) Implementation of a hazard identification program designed to detect and correct such a hazard, and to maintain the proper functioning of those devices through periodic inspections.