Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 005 Hazard:

29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(ii): The employer did not document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. (a) On or about May 12, 2021, at Limetree Bay Refining, LLC., Delayed Coker Unit (DCU) - The employer failed to document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices such as but not limited to ASME BPVC Section VIII Division 1 (2013) OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION UG 125 (c)(1) when the accumulated pressure for Coke Drum (D-8504) exceeded the Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) of 16% for a multiple relief non-fire scenario. This hazardous situation could result in vessel failure and expose employees to vessel rupture, flammable, toxic and respiratory hazards. (b) On or about May 12, 2021, at Limetree Bay Refining, LLC., Flare No. 8 Complex - The employer failed to document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices such as, but not limited to, API 521 Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems (2014), Section 5.7.9.5 when the FCC Complex Flare Knockout Drum (D-7941) and Coker Flare Knockout Drum (D-8702) did not have sufficient capacity to handle liquids during an emergency release from the Coker Unit. Failure to provide sufficient capacity for knockout drum caused drums to overflow with an oily mist, resulting in liquid carryover to flare, flare rainout, fire, and employee exposure and surrounding community to flammable, toxic and respiratory hazards. (c) On or about May 12, 2021, at Limetree Bay Refining, LLC., Delayed Coker Unit (DCU) - The employer failed to document that equipment complies with the employer's chosen recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices Hovensa Engineering Standard 1310.1 Fireproofing - General Requirement, Section 3.19, and API 2218, Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical Processing Plants (1st edition, 1998) Sections 3.1.8 and 3.1.9, when the emergency isolation valves (MOV-4513) used to isolate Coke Blowdown Tower (T-8512) was not equipped with fireproofing (i.e. insulation on tubing and conduit) to withstand fire. This hazardous situation could result in failure of emergency isolation valve and expose employees to fire and toxic hazards during emergency. (d) On or about May 12, 2021, at Limetree Bay Refining, LLC., Flare No. 8 Complex - the employer failed to document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices such as but not limited to API 521 (2014) Sections 5.7.2.3.1 and 5.8.4.4, Table 12-Recommended Design Thermal Radiation for Personnel Permissible Design Level K kW/m2 (Btu/h�ft2) Conditions when the radiation levels exceeded the maximum radiation rate of 1,500 Btu/ ft2*hr at the Flare Knockout Drums - FCC Flare KO Drum (D-7941) and Coker Flare Knockout Drum (D-8702). Failure to protect employees and equipment from thermal radiation levels during flaring event can result in severe burn injuries, exposure to toxic and respiratory hazards, and cause equipment to catastrophically fail. (e) On or about May 12, 2021, at Limetree Bay Refining, LLC., Delayed Coker Unit (DCU) - the employer failed to document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices such as but not limited to API 521 (2014) Sections 4.4.7 and 5.5.11 when the employer's relief system did not consider two-phase overpressure scenarios creating unbalanced forces on relief system piping and supports. Failure to design relief system piping and associated supports for two phase flow can result in failure of piping, pipe supports, and employee exposure to flammable, toxic and respiratory hazards.