Violation Detail
Standard Cited: 19100119 E03 IV Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals.
This violation item has been deleted.
Inspection Nr: 314188251
Citation: 01004B
Citation Type: Serious
Abatement Status:
Initial Penalty:
Current Penalty:
Issuance Date: 11/09/2010
Nr Instances: 2
Nr Exposed: 30
Abatement Date: 12/08/2010
Gravity: 10
Report ID: 0854910
Contest Date: 12/06/2010
Final Order: 10/31/2011
Related Event Code (REC):
Emphasis:
| Type | Latest Event | Event Date | Penalty | Abatement Due Date | Citation Type | Failure to Abate Inspection |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Penalty | W: Empr Withdrew | 10/31/2011 | 12/08/2010 | Serious | ||
| Penalty | I: Informal Settlement | 07/21/2011 | 12/08/2010 | Serious | ||
| Penalty | Z: Issued | 11/09/2010 | 12/08/2010 | Serious |
Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 004B Hazard: REFINERY
29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(iv) The process hazard analysis shall address consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls. A) The process hazard analysis at Big West Oil, 333 W Center Street, North Salt Lake, UT 84054, did not address consequences of failure of the administrative control, car seal open procedure. This violation was observed during the inspection of the facility, on August 5, 2010. The Compliance Officer reviewed Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU) Piping & Instrument Diagrams (in the LPG Storage Unit, Sheet 7), where a valve that is upstream of RV-302 and located between RV-302 and Isobutane Storage Tank, TK-308, and the possibility that it could be closed during operation was not included on the SRU Revalidation for the Hydrogen Desulfuration Unit (HDS), Document UOSH-102, January 2008. The consequences of closing an intervening valve on a line upstream of the relief device prevents the employer from foreseeing and minimizing hazardous chemical exposures to employees. This may be a system wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all procedures throughout the facility. B) The process hazard analysis at Big West Oil, 333 W Center Street, North Salt Lake, UT 84054, did not address consequences of failure of the administrative control, car seal open procedure. This violation was identified during the inspection of the facility, on August 5, 2010; the Compliance Officer reviewed Sulfur Recovery Unit Piping & Instrument Diagrams (in the LPG Storage Unit, Sheet 7), where a valve that is upstream of RV-301 and located between RV-301 and Isobutane Storage Tank, TK-307, and the possibility that it could be closed during operation, was not included on the SRU Revalidation for the HDS Unit (Document 102), January 2008. The consequences of closing an intervening valve on a line upstream of the relief device prevents the employer from foreseeing and minimizing hazardous chemical exposures to employees. This may be a system wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all procedures throughout the facility.
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