Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 003 Hazard:

29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(ii): The employer did not document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. a) On or about 11/16/2017, System #2; the employer failed to document that the sliding door on the east wall of engine room #2 complied with the employer's chosen RAGAGEP such as, but not limited to, Section 8.12(b) of ASHRAE 15-2010 and/or Section 10.14(b) of ASHRAE 15-1989, when there was an approximately 4-inch gap between the bottom of the door and the floor, exposing employees to the hazards of ammonia in the event of a release in engine room #2. b) On or about 11/16/2017, System #2; the employer failed to document that the sliding door on the east wall of engine room #2 complied with the employer's chosen RAGAGEP such as, but not limited to, Section 8.12(b) of ASHRAE 15-2010 and/or Section 10.14(b) of ASHRAE 15-1989, when it was observed to be open and was not self-closing, exposing employees to the hazards of ammonia in the event of a release in engine room #2. c) On or about 11/16/2017, System #2; the employer failed to document that two wall penetrations for 5 ammonia containing pipes in engine room #2 complied with the employer's chosen RAGAGEP such as, but not limited to, Section 8.12(b) of ASHRAE 15-2010 and/or Section 10.14(f) of ASHRAE 15-1989, when the wall openings were clearly visible and not sealed, exposing employees to the hazards of ammonia in the event of a release in engine room #2. d) On or about 11/16/2017, in Engine Room #1; the employer failed to document that the High Stage Oil Separator 0003 complied with the employer's chosen RAGAGEP such as, but not limited to, Section 4.2 of IIAR Bulletin 114-1991 ?Guidelines for: Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping System Components?, when it was not identified properly with markers including the name of the equipment and pressure level designation, exposing employees to the hazards of ammonia in the event of a release due to misidentification of equipment. e) On or about 11/16/2017, in Engine Room #1; the employer failed to document that the High Stage Oil Separator 0004 complied with the employer's chosen RAGAGEP such as, but not limited to, Section 4.2 of IIAR Bulletin 114-1991 ?Guidelines for: Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping System Components?, when it was not identified properly with markers including the name of the equipment and pressure level designation, exposing employees to the hazards of ammonia in the event of a release due to misidentification of equipment. f) On or about 11/16/2017, in Engine Room #1; the employer failed to document that the Intercooler 0001 complied with the employer's chosen RAGAGEP such as, but not limited to, Section 4.2 of IIAR Bulletin 114-1991 ?Guidelines for: Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping System Components?, when it was not identified properly with markers including the name of the equipment and pressure level designation, exposing employees to the hazards of ammonia in the event of a release due to misidentification of equipment. g) On or about 11/16/2017, in Engine Room #1; the employer failed to document that the Intercooler 0002 complied with the employer's chosen RAGAGEP such as, but not limited to, Section 4.2 of IIAR Bulletin 114-1991 ?Guidelines for: Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping System Components?, when it was not identified properly with markers including the name of the equipment and pressure level designation, exposing employees to the hazards of ammonia in the event of a release due to misidentification of equipment. h) On or about 11/16/2017, in Engine Room #2; the employer failed to document that the High Stage Oil Separator 0005 complied with the employer's chosen RAGAGEP such as, but not limited to, Section 4.2 of IIAR Bulletin 114-1991 ?Guidelines for: Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping System Components?, when it was not identified properly with markers including the name of the equipment and pressure level designation, exposing employees to the hazards of ammonia in the event of a release due to misidentification of equipment. i) On or about 11/16/2017, in Engine Room #2; the employer failed to document that the High Stage Oil Separator 0006 complied with the employer's chosen RAGAGEP such as, but not limited to, Section 4.2 of IIAR Bulletin 114-1991 ?Guidelines for: Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping System Components?, when it was not identified properly with markers including the name of the equipment and pressure level designation, exposing employees to the hazards of ammonia in the event of a release due to misidentification of equipment. j) On or about 11/16/2017, in Engine Room #2; the employer failed to document that the Intercooler 0004 complied with the employer's chosen RAGAGEP such as, but not limited to, Section 4.2 of IIAR Bulletin 114-1991 ?Guidelines for: Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping System Components?, when it was not identified properly with markers including the name of the equipment and pressure level designation, exposing employees to the hazards of ammonia in the event of a release due to misidentification of equipment. k) On or about 11/16/2017, in Engine Room #2; the employer failed to document that the ammonia piping by Intercooler 0003 near the oil pot tag 8005 complied with the employer's chosen RAGAGEP such as, but not limited to, Section 4.1 of IIAR Bulletin 114-1991 ?Guidelines for: Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping System Components?, when it was not identified properly with markers of the physical state, the relative pressure level, and the direction of the flow of ammonia, exposing employees to the hazards of ammonia in the event of a release due to misidentification of piping. l) On or about 11/16/2017, in Engine Room #2; the employer failed to document that the ammonia piping by Intercooler 0004 at tag 4520 & RV line tag 6524 complied with the employer's chosen RAGAGEP such as, but not limited to, Section 4.1 of IIAR Bulletin 114-1991 ?Guidelines for: Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping System Components?, when it was not identified properly with markers of the physical state, the relative pressure level, and the direction of the flow of ammonia, exposing employees to the hazards of ammonia in the event of a release due to misidentification of piping. ABATEMENT CERTIFICATION REQUIRED