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Violation Detail
Standard Cited: 5A0001 OSH Act General Duty Paragraph
Inspection Nr: 100596980
Citation: 01002
Citation Type: Serious
Abatement Status: I
Initial Penalty: $7,000.00
Current Penalty: $7,000.00
Issuance Date: 06/30/1992
Nr Instances: 1
Nr Exposed: 10
Abatement Date: 07/03/1992
Gravity: 10
Report ID: 0316400
Contest Date: 07/20/1992
Final Order: 01/10/1993
Related Event Code (REC):
Emphasis:
| Type | Latest Event | Event Date | Penalty | Abatement Due Date | Citation Type | Failure to Abate Inspection |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Penalty | F: Formal Settlement | 01/10/1993 | $7,000.00 | 07/03/1992 | Serious | |
| Penalty | Z: Issued | 06/30/1992 | $7,000.00 | 07/03/1992 | Serious |
Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 002 Hazard: EXPLOSION
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to fire/explosion hazards causing multi injuries and/or death: a. Powerhouse - The liquid seals of the ketene knockout pot and the absorber knockout pot which were made up of fuel oil and were used in lieu of flame arrestors, were not maintained according to the employees standard operating procedures. The ketene knockout pot had been blown dry and put back in service while the absorber pot had only 3 gallons of fuel oil at the time of the accident. The following conditions contributed to the hazard; a) operators were not trained in the revised Standard Operating Procedure dated June 28, 1991 which explained and directed employees in the appropriate manner in which they were to attain the fuel oil. b) the law level trips were not operable in that the ketene pot was blown dry and put back in service while the absorber pot only had 3 gallons of fuel oil according to the employee's sampling after the accident. c) the employer did not implement a routine maintenance program for the ketene and the absorber knockout pots low level trips to insure their operability which was critical in maintaining the appropriate liquid seal consisting of fuel oil. Among other methods, one feasible an acceptable abatement method to correct the hazards would be to: a) train all powerhouse operators in the revised SOP dated June 28, 1991 in the manner in which they are to attain fuel oil, b) require powerhouse operators to purge the pots completely dry each time they reacht he high level alarm (80) and then establish the required 30liquid seal and; c) the employer could establish and implement a routine maintenance program for the low level trips such as they did with the high level trips to insure their operability which is critical in maintaining the appropriate liquid seal consisting of fuel oil.