Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 001 Hazard:

OSH ACT of 1970 Section (5)(a)(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees, in that employees were exposed to inhalation and burn hazards resulting from an uncontrolled release of anhydrous ammonia. (a) Anhydrous ammonia refrigeration system, on or prior to 4/3/2013: Refrigeration system was not adequately designed, installed, and maintained to protect employees from an uncontrolled release of anhydrous ammonia vapor in that: · Quantity of ammonia in the refrigeration system was not known. A sign was not posted in the machine room, displaying the following information: name, address and phone number of servicing contractor; approximate quantity of ammonia; lubricant identity and amount; field test pressure. (See for example: IIAR Bulletin 109; ASHRAE 15 2010, section 11.2.1). · Emergency shutdown procedures were not established. Emergency shutdown procedures, including precautions to be observed in the event of a leak, were not displayed on a sign or card located as near as possible to the refrigerant compressors (See for example: ASHRAE 15 2010, Section 11.7) · Labeling of ammonia service piping was not consistent throughout the facility. All piping mains, headers and branches were not identified as to the physical state of the refrigerant (gas or liquid), the relative pressure level of the refrigerant, and the direction of flow (See for example: IIAR-2 Section 10.5). · Labeling of pipes, valves, and equipment in the compressor room was inconsistent. Some valves, pipes, and equipment were not labeled (See for example: IIAR Bulletin 109). Valves and controls in compressor room were not identified with durable signs having letters more than 0.5 inch in height designating: valves or switches for controlling refrigerant flow, ventilation, and compressor(s) (See for example: ASHRAE 15 2010, section 11.2.2). · Pressure relief valve (PRV) replacement tags did not indicate the installation date. As a result, the service life of many PRVs could not be determined. (See for example: IIAR Bulletin109) · Where PRVs were piped to a common manifold relief header, termination of the relief header outside of the compressor room (on the E side of the facility) did not extend 15 feet above ground level (See for example: ASHRAE 15 2010, section 9.7.8). · There was no remote means of controlling the king valve. The only way plant personnel could close the king valve was via a manual gate valve installed approximately 12 feet above the floor level along the east wall of the compressor room. Closing the valve required use of a step ladder which might be difficult in an emergency situation. A remote-controlled solenoid valve which can be closed from outside of the compressor room was not installed. (See for example: IIAR Bulletin 109) · Corrosion protection was not uniform on all piping in anhydrous ammonia service. Some pipe runs were painted while others showed significant corrosion. Inspections for corrosion or insulation damage were not performed on uninsulated and insulated piping (See for example: IIAR Bulletin 109 Sections 4.7.4 and 4.7.5). · The compressor room was not completely sealed and segregated from the rest of the plant. Multiple penetrations were observed in the west wall of the room, which could allow ammonia vapor to migrate into the main plant in the event of a release. (See for example: ASHRAE 15 2010, section 8.11.2). · The facility did not maintain complete maintenance or inspection records. Other than work orders maintained by the servicing contractor, there were no records of additional maintenance, such as vibration testing on compressors or inspection of safety cutout switches (See for example: IIAR Bulletin 109).