Violation Detail
Standard Cited: 5A0001 OSH Act General Duty Paragraph
Inspection Nr: 593958.015
Citation: 01001
Citation Type: Serious
Abatement Status: Abatement Completed
Initial Penalty: $4,900.00
Current Penalty: $2,800.00
Issuance Date: 02/07/2013
Nr Instances: 1
Nr Exposed: 24
Abatement Date: 03/06/2013
Gravity: 10
Report ID: 1032500
Contest Date: 03/06/2013
Final Order: 05/11/2013
Related Event Code (REC):
Emphasis:
| Type | Latest Event | Event Date | Penalty | Abatement Due Date | Citation Type | Failure to Abate Inspection |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Penalty | R: Review Commission | 05/11/2013 | $2,800.00 | 03/06/2013 | Serious | |
| Penalty | F: Formal Settlement | 05/11/2013 | $2,800.00 | 03/06/2013 | Serious | |
| Penalty | C: Contested | 03/08/2013 | $4,900.00 | 03/06/2013 | Serious | |
| Penalty | Z: Issued | 02/07/2013 | $4,900.00 | 03/06/2013 | Serious |
Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 001 Hazard:
OSH ACT of 1970 Section (5)(a)(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees, in that employees were exposed to the hazards of entrapment, burns and other hazards associated with wild land firefighting: (a) On August 10 and 11, 2012, employees of C-PTPA, Forest Service, and others were working to suppress fire in steep terrain that involved timber harvest units and the densely-wooded forest canopy adjacent to the units. This incident was larger and more complex than most fire suppression activities normally experienced by the employer. Communication and instructions about tactics, strategies, and safety issues were deficient leading to confusion and potentially hazardous situations. -Forest Service personnel and leadership on the fire were unsure who the incident commander was, as well as the roles of other key positions on the fire. -Methods of radio communication were not standardized creating confusion between the personnel on the fire; C-PTPAs personnel and the incident commander were using a numbering system with which the Forest Service personnel were not familiar. -Gaps were placed in the fireline on the downhill side of the fire in order to avoid identified hazard trees. There was confusion between crew leaders, supervisors, the deputy (partial) incident commander, and the incident commander about the strategy and tactics to address the large gaps and prevent the fire which was backing down the hill from flanking hand crews which could create an entrapment situation. -Operations were not controlled to prevent a helicopter bucket drop where crew members were present on the ground. -Where roll-outs and spot fires were occurring, lookouts were not posted where they could see spot fires in relation to where crews were working. -Escape routes and safety zones had not been clearly communicated to crews. NOTE: Among other methods, feasible and acceptable abatement methods to correct these hazards are to follow accepted interagency fire operations procedures, such as those in the Incident Response Pocket Guide (IRPG), PMS-461 / NFES-1077, revised January 2010. Utilizing the simplified LCES (Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes and Safety Zones) to prevent or mitigate the hazardous conditions in a timely manner. Ensure clear communication and instructions are provided and understood with the opportunity to receive and consider feedback. If high-risk hazards likely to cause death or serious physical harm are identified, hazard controls will be adhered to according to accepted wildland firefighting safety principles, including those identified in the most current version of the Incident Response Pocket Guide. ABATEMENT CERTIFICATION AND DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED FOR THIS ITEM
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