Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: FALLING

Title 40.1-51.1(a) Code of Virginia. At Washington Dulles International Airport, the employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to fall hazards while using the FMC Commander Container/Pallet Loader, serial CR96034, identification number CL348, during opening and closing operations of the cargo doors of a Boeing 777 airplane to unload cargo from the airplane. On April 1, 2011, an employee was fatally injured when he fell approximately 8 4 off of the folding wing/wing extension between the front of the loaders bridge platform and the right rear cargo door of the airplane. Ground clearance data for the Boeing 777 reveals the ground clearance can vary between approximately 127 and 134 for the Aft Cargo Compartment. Based on the above measurements, the bridge of the container/pallet loader was lowered between approximately 27 and 34 below the doorsill of the cargo door at the time of the accident. The loader is equipped with two large platforms, which are operated independently by scissor lifts. The platform closest to the airplane cargo door is referred to as the bridge. The bridge can be tilted to reach a cargo door independently of the scissor lift mechanism. The operator maneuvers the loader from an operators station which is provided with a guard rail. The loader is equipped with a folding wing/wing extension at the front of the bridge, which is designed to line up with base of the cargo door so that large containers and pallets can be unloaded from the airplane. Because different model airplanes can have cargo doors of different widths, the folding wing/wing extension is adjustable in either an up or down position. When in the up position, the folding wing/wing extension allows the loader to accommodate a wider cargo door, and when the down position it accommodates a narrower cargo door. When in the up position, the folding wing/wing extension is held in place by a manual latch/lock bar that slides from the bridge and is held in place by a spring-loaded latch pin that fits into a detent located in the manual latch/lock bar. When the scissors supporting the bridge are fully lowered and the tilt feature is fully lowered at the front, the folding wing/wing extension comes to rest on a fixed roller stop. The roller stop holds the folding wing/wing extension in the up position, level with the bridge and allows the manual latch/lock bar to freely move under the folding wing/wing extension, because there is no downward pressure on the manual latch/lock bar from the tilt feature. Adjustment of the manual latch/lock bar is completed from the ground. If the scissors supporting the bridge are not fully lowered or the tilt feature is not fully lowered at the front, the manual latch/lock bar may not freely move under the folding wing/wing extension. It is possible for the manual latch/lock bar to be partially under the folding wing/wing extension, with the spring-loaded latch pin not engaged in the detent, and provide enough support to hold the folding wing/wing extension up when the bridge is lifted. If this condition occurs, the folding wing/wing extension can fall to the down position if the manual latch/lock bar travels towards the rear position while the bridge is elevated. a.The investigation revealed that multiple near miss accidents have occurred where operators were exposed to a collapsed folding wing/wing extension. A near miss accident occurred on April 24, 2010, when an operator stepped from an elevated bridge onto a folding wing/wing extension and it collapsed causing him to be caught between the folding wing/extension wing and the side of the plane, with his legs dangling in the air. As a result of the April 24, 2010, accident, the employer added a yellow line on the manual latch/lock bar and the frame to assist operators in determining whether the manual latch/lock bar is fully under the folding wing/wing extension and the spring loaded latch pin is lined up with detent in the manual latch/lock bar. The investigation also revealed that the employer instructed operators to avoid standing on the wing extensions where possible, although it is apparently necessary to do so to open certain aircraft cargo doors. Employees are exposed to serious fall hazards as a result of the collapsing folding wing/wing extension. b.The investigation further revealed that the United Air Lines, Inc., Airport Operations ! AirportUniversity training program entitled Ground Equipment Training, Cargo Loader ! Movement, version 11.05.09, instructs cargo loader operators when approaching and positioning the loader next to the airplanes cargo door to STOP Cargo Loader no closer than 1 foot from the aircraft. The Structured On Site Training ! Performance Checklist & Qualification training documentation form, section 7, entitled Operate Command Container Loader, the operator standard when positioning the loader at the aircraft is to 4. Stop loader 1 to 2 feet from aircraft. This practice leaves a horizontal gap between the body of the plane and the bridge and exposes operators to serious fall hazards during cargo door opening and closing operations due to the 1 to 2 foot gap between the bridge and the airplane cargo door, and between the airplane and the vertical guard rails next to the operators station. c. The investigation further revealed that the training program entitled Ground Equipment Training, Cargo Loader ! Movement, version 11.05.09, cautions that CAUTION. The Cargo Door swings down (extends below the doorsill) during the initial opening process. The investigation revealed that it is a regular practice for operators to lower the bridge up to 2 feet below the cargo doorsill in order to access the pallet locks/doorsill locks when the cargo doors are being opened and closed. This practice leaves a vertical gap between the body of the plane and the bridge and exposes operators to serious fall hazards during cargo door opening and closing operations due to the 1 to 2 foot gap between the bridge and doorsill of the cargo door, and between the airplane and the vertical guard rails next to the operators station. One feasible and acceptable method, among others, to correct this hazard is for the employer to provide and assure that operators are trained on and use a personal fall arrest system consisting of a body harness, lanyard, anchorage and connectors meeting the requirements of 1926.502(d). Reference: 1926.502(d) of the Standards for the Construction industry.