Violation Detail
Standard Cited: 6A0001 General Duty Clause
Inspection Nr: 307931741
Citation: 01001
Citation Type: Serious
Abatement Status: I
Initial Penalty: $3,500.00
Current Penalty: $2,500.00
Issuance Date: 03/26/2007
Nr Instances: 1
Nr Exposed: 1
Abatement Date: 03/29/2007
Gravity: 10
Report ID: 0257260
Contest Date: 04/18/2007
Final Order: 01/28/2008
Related Event Code (REC): A
Emphasis:
Type | Latest Event | Event Date | Penalty | Abatement Due Date | Citation Type | Failure to Abate Inspection |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Penalty | F: Formal Settlement | 01/28/2008 | $2,500.00 | 03/29/2007 | Serious | |
Penalty | Z: Issued | 03/26/2007 | $3,500.00 | 03/29/2007 | Serious |
Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: FALLING
Section 6(a) of the Puerto Rico Occupational Safety and Health Act: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to: Seccion 6(a) de la Ley de Seguridad y Salud en el Trabajo de Puerto Rico: El patrono no proveyo empleo y un sitio de empleo libre de riesgos reconocidos que esten causando o que puedan causar muerte o dano fisico a los empleados, por cuanto empleados estaban expuestos a: At the Combined Cycle of San Juan Power Authority Central, located at the Central Mercado street, corner 28, lot 28, Portuary Zone, San Juan, a valve (JFW Valve, 1000 # Port Ball Valve), was connected to a pipe system, installed to a boiler, to conduct a hydrostatic test. This test is done to certify boilers which consists of filling the boiler with water and then apply pressure with a pump, to assure there are no leaks in the boiler's system. On the 14 of november of 2006, the employees of Alstom Caribe Inc., were performing a hydrostatic test in the unit number six (#6), when the valve exploted, causing the death of an employee. The procedure of the pressure test was to reach 2516 psi, but exploted when it reached 2100 psi. The specifications of the valve indicated that it could resist or sustained a maximun of 1000 psi. The employer did not assure that the equipment used was the adecuate one, because the valve installed could only endure 1000 psi and the pressure at which the valve was submited was of 2516 psi. Besides, the model used to installed the pipe system indicated to utilize a Gate Valve and not a Ball Valve. Also, did not assure the capability of the employees to recognized the valve to be installed and if it would endure or sustained the pressure to be applied, and know the difference between a Gate Valve and a Ball Valve. Also, the presence of an Authorized Inspector during the test was taken for granted, specified in Section 1, Part PG 90 of ASME, also contemplated in their own procedure. This employer is dedicated to boilers installation and has knowledge of procedure to follow when conducting hydrostatic test. Hazard: Failure of equipment. Among other correction methods, some feasible and acceptable methods to correct this hazard are use the correct valve and to train the employees. En el Proyecto Ciclo Combinado de San Juan Central de la AEE, localizado en la calle Mercado Central esquina 28 lote 28, Zona Portuaria, San Juan, exploto una valvula (JFW Valve, 1000# Port Ball Valve), que estaba conectada a un sistema de tuberias, instalado a una caldera, para realizar una prueba hidrostatica. Esta prueba se realiza para certificar calderas y consiste en llenar la caldera de agua para luego aplicarle presion con una bomba, para asegurase de que no haya filtraciones por los tubos de la caldera. El dia 14 de noviembre de 2006 los empleados de Alstom Caribe Inc., estaban realizando una prueba hidrostatica en la unidad #6, cuando exploto la valvula, ocasionandole la muerte a un empleado. Segun el procedimiento de dicha prueba la presion iba a ser llevada hasta las 2516 psi, pero exploto cuando iba por las 2100 psi. Las especificaciones de la valvula indicaban que la misma soportaba un maximo de 1000 psi. El patrono no se aseguro queel equipo que se utilizo fuera el adecuado, ya que la valvula instalada soportaba 1000 psi y la presion a la cual iba a ser sometida era de 2516 psi. Ademas, el modelo que utilizaron para instalar el sistema de tuberia indicaba que se utilizara una "Gate Valve" y utilizaron una "Ball Valve". Tampoco se aseguro que los empleados fueran capaces de reconocer que la valvula que instalaron, soportara la presion que le iban a aplicar y que pudieran diferenciar entre una "Gate Valve" y una "Ball Valve". Ademas, no requirio que estuviera presente un Inspector Autorizado, tal como especifica la Seccion 1, Parte PG 90 del ASME y lo especificaba su propio procedimiento. Este patrono se dedica a la instalacion de calderas y tiene conocimiento de cual es le procedimiento a seguir para realizar la prueba hidrostatica. Riesgo: Fallo del equipo. Entre otros metodos de correccion, varios metodos factibles y aceptables para corregir este riesgo son usar la valvula correcta y adiestrar a los empleados.