Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: BURNS

T.C.A. 50-3-105(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees: In that three employees were exposed to hot (210o F) water splashing over them from the top of a 1,3-Butadiene (BD) storage tank during a tank decontamination process on 12/5/01. The 18,837 gallon east BD storage tank (D-2104), which was located in the (2) BD storage tank diked area near the railroad delivery tracks, had been emptied of BD and filled with water. The water was heated to 210o F, and was initially planned to be held in the tank for 24 hours to clean the tank of potential butadiene peroxides and resultant "popcorn polymers." At approximately 2:45 PM an automatic water drain valve below the tank on a pipeline leading from the tank was opened to purge possible butadiene (BD) from it (since the tank was to be entered for inspection the next day). There was approximately one pound of butadiene liquid (about 2.7 cups liquid volume, with butadiene having a boiling point of about 24o F) in the line and/or valve that, when released upon opening of the valve, rapidly vaporized into about 43 gallons of BD vapor (at the bottom of the tank) which rose through the water and expanded to about 58 gallons of BD vapor when it reached the open manhole at the top of the tank. The BD vapor displaced the 210o F water in the tank, causing it to spill out the 18" diameter manhole on the top of the tank and onto the three employees located below the tank. The employee exposure to the scalding water resulted in one fatality and two serious burn injuries. These employees included a Shift Supervisor, a Shipping and Receiving Supervisor, and a Frucon Construction Corp contractor Maintenance Worker under the control of BASF Corp. Among other methods, examples of feasible and acceptable abatement methods to correct this hazard were: a.Engineering controls such as isolating the area from employees so that no one was allowed under or around BD storage tank (inside diked area) when the tank water was heated, with remote (or protected) means planned and applied to initiate emptying the hot water; b.Safe work procedures (step-by-step, specific and clear operating procedures) that required that the automatic water drain line valve only be opened, to release BD potentially present, at one of several other safe times, such as: i.During cold water filling; ii.After cold water filling, but before heating the water; iii.After the hot water was drained; or iv.After cooling the tank with cold water. In this case the operating procedures for the tank (vessel) decontamination operation ("Monomer Storage Butadiene Vessel Decontamination," Document # UCM-W0105) did not address opening the automatic water drain line; andc.Training and other forms of communication (such as posting) on hazards of scalding hot water. ABATEMENT VERIFICATION REQUIRED.