Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: BURNS

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to: On or about 1/20/90, employees were exposed to severe burns, lacerations, concussions, multiple traumatic injuries and/or death from the hazards of fire and/or explosion due to the castrophic rupture of the acetokettle. This rupture was due to over-pressurization from a violent polymerization reaction which took place inside the acetokettle caused by acrylonitrile contaminated feedstockthat was introduced into the kettle during the start-up (charging) cycle. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to establish administrative and engineering controls that will include, but not necessarily be limited to the following: 1) Add low temperature alarms bottom of the recovery column. 2) Routinely analyze the column bottoms and the stripper column to check for the presence of acrylonitrile. 3) Routinely analyze crude aceto storage and acetonitrile 4) Routinely analyze the P-h of teh circulating water systems. 5) Revise start up procedures for the a & B Reactor and (Kill Kettle) azeotrope kettle to include contingencies for upset/abnormal conditions. 6) Revise operating logs to include tank trransfers during upset/ abnormal conditions. 7) Revise operating and supervisor training materials/procedures for the recovery section of the acrylonitrile unit to assure adequate training of the importance of critical operating parameters and their appropriate ranges including but not limited to recovery column. temperature profile and bottoms temperature, and adequate training to understand a low specific gravity and an interface in the stripper overhead sample. 8) Train operators and supervisors in revised start-up procedures and the hazards of upset/abnormal A & B rector and kill kettle operations including procedures to be followed to return the A & B reactor and kill kettle to a safe operating condition or initiate an emergency shut down. 9) Re-evaluate the size and capacity of emergency relief systems for the acetokettle and vent line using the methodology developed by AICHE's design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems (DIERS) with credible worst case scenerios.