Violation Detail
Standard Cited: 5A0001 OSH Act General Duty Paragraph
Inspection Nr: 102279312
Citation: 01001
Citation Type: Serious
Abatement Status: X
Initial Penalty: $1,500.00
Current Penalty: $1,500.00
Issuance Date: 09/14/1992
Nr Instances: 1
Nr Exposed: 3
Abatement Date: 10/19/1992
Gravity: 10
Report ID: 0625700
Contest Date:
Final Order:
Related Event Code (REC):
Emphasis:
Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: STRUCK BY
The employer is not limited to abatement methods suggested by OSHA, i.e., methods explained are general and may not be effective in all cases. Other methods of abatement may be equally or more appropriate. Ultimate responsibility for determining the most appropriate abatement methods rests with the employer, given its superior knowledge of the specific conditions on its worksite. Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to: (a) Employees were exposed to serious hazards, including fire or being struck by debris as a result of catastrophic failure of several pressure vessels owned and operated by Forman Petroleum Corporation due to the lack of a Pressure Vessel Inspection Program as outlined in Section 6 of the API 510 Pressure Vessel Inspection Code. On or about October, 1990, Forman Petroleum Corporation began buying from Mullins & Pritchard, Inc., certain oil and gas interests in the Manila Village Oilfield ot include surface facilities. Forman Petroleum Corporation had not developed a pressure vessel inspection program to include the pressure vessels purchased from Mullins & Pritchard, Inc. at Manila Village Oilfield. On April 13, 1992, a gas/liquid separator violently ruptured at the Forman Petroleum Commingling Facility #3, Manila Village Oilfield, killing two contractor employees. A feasible and useful method of correcting these hazards related to a catastrophic pressure vessel rupture and failure is to establish and properly implement an effective program for inspection, maintenance, rating, repair, alteration and/or replacement of natural resource pressure vessels and their associated safety devices. Such a program must include the following as a minimum: 1) All pressure vessels without records must be inspected certified by an authorized inspector who is qualified and certified to perform inspections under API 510. 2) Develop a written pressure vessel inspection program to cover all pressure vessels owned by the company. 3) Records shall be maintained by the owner or user of pressure vessels. These records shall contain pertinent data reports, vessel identification, relief equipment test information and documents recording the results of inspection and repairs. 4) Comply with all applicable provisions of the API 510 Pressure Vessel Inspection Code.
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