Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: EXPLOSION

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to fire/explosion and inhalation hazards causing multi injuries and/or death: a. Powerhouse - Ketene Knockout Pot - Water and steam were inadvertently introduced into the ketene knockout pot. The water and steam being incompatible with the reactive materials in the vessel, facilitated the start of an uncontrolled exothermic reaction. The following operating conditions contributed to this hazard: a) in that the employer only calculated the size of the emergency relief device for an external fire and did not take into consideration the potential for an internal reaction although some of the contents of the pot were reactive to water. b) in that the ketene pot was not equipped with temperature gauges, temperature alarms or pressure alarms to alert employees of any dangerous conditions. c) in that the employer did not repair nor remove from service the ketene knockout pot with a shell thickness of 3/16 of an inch which had an area approximately 6"x6" that did not meet the 1/16 inch corrosion allowance which was calculated and established by the manufacturers of the vessel nor was it put in an appropriate inspection schedule. d) in that the safety relief device of the ketene knockout pot was designed to /vent hazardous/flammable material into the atmosphere where there were sources of ignition. e) in that the units Operational Safety Standards did not address the hazardous reactions that could occur in the Island Power House knockout pots if water was to get in them. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct the hazard would be to: a) re evaluate the size and capacity of the emergency relief systems for the ketene knockout pot using the methodology by the AICHE's Design Institute for Emergency Relief System (DIERS) with the credible worst case senario. b) install operable temperature gauges, temperature alarms or pressure alarms to alert employees. c) follow the manufacturers calculated corrision allowances. d) vent the hazardous/flammable materials to a flare. e) address in the Operational Safety Standards for that particular unit the hazardous reactions that could occur in the Island Power House knockout pots if water were to be introduced into them.