Abstract: A fault occurred at a power line tower causing a fuse to open and disrupting electrical service to a sugar company. A supervisor and two power line workers were dispatched to repair the power line. The supervisor called the dispatcher and informed him that neither he nor his crew was familiar with the particular circuit involved. A third power line worker, who was familiar with the circuit, was sent to assist the crew. This employee received clearance to proceed with the work from the dispatcher, who had collaborated with the utility company's engineering department, and presumably arrived at the work site. One of the power line workers was assigned to work from an aerial lift and to disconnect the leads from three 21-kilovolt regulators. As the employee disconnected the neutral from the primary bushing, he received an electric shock. He was hospitalized for fourth-degree burns to his hands and left inner arm. Upon inspection, the compliance staff noted three factors that contributed to the accident: (1) the dispatch office map did not show the neutral in the circuit with the reference bank, (2) the switching log did not require the disconnect to be opened, and (3) the neutral was not marked to indicate its purpose.