Abstract: At approximately 3:30 a.m. on December 18, 2001, Employee #1, a maintenance mechanic, was servicing a blower disconnect with the lead electrician. The blower, used as a dust collecting agent, was reported not in working condition. Employee # 1, accompanied by a coworker, responded to the service call and began trouble shooting the blower's disconnect to see if current was flowing into the disconnect. The blower disconnect was located on an elevated platform and Employee #1 had to kneel in order to check the current. Employee #1 connected one probe of multi-meter to the box (ground) and the other probe to the terminal wire of the blower disconnect. An arcing was then caused by the contacts and created an explosion that blew Employee #1 backward and caused him to land on his back. This disconnect was for a 75-horsepower blower wired as three-phase and 440 volts. The company has developed a general lockout procedure in 1991 and each maintenance personnel had been issued an individual lock, however, the lead electrician did not implement the procedure because that would have taken a lot longer to trouble shoot. Both Employee#1 and the coworker were not adequately trained by the company to perform maintenance duty as electricians; nevertheless, they were assigned to perform the duty as licensed electrician. Neither Employee #1 nor the coworker was wearing insulated gloves or any other protective gears on their bodies to prevent them from inadvertent contact with a live part. In addition, no written procedure was provided by the employer to emphasize work techniques and hazards involved in working on energized equipment. The direct supervisor was not present at the time of the accident to determine whether it was necessary to work on the blower disconnect live. Employee #1 sustained bilateral third-degree burns on his hands as a result of the electrical explosion. Employee #1 was hospitalized.