Abstract: On February 28, 2000, Employee #1 and a coworker, of Pacific Resource Recovery, were cleaning sludge and residual liquid from a tanker truck after 3,800 gallons of flammable liquid waste had been pumped from it into storage tanks at a hazardous waste treatment facility. They were going to use the procedure developed by the employer: a pressure washer to clear the walls of the tank, then a squeegee to push the remaining material to the back of the tank. They were standing atop the tanker truck trying to loosen the sludge with the pressure washer but there was not enough water pressure. Employee #1 asked the coworker to connect the water hose to another connection on the ground that was adjacent to the tanker truck. While the coworker went to do this, Employee #1 began to clean the tank with a squeegee. He was scraping the bottom of the tank when the material exploded into flames. He sustained multiple traumatic injuries and thermal burns. A fire engine and paramedics arrived on the scene and transferred Employee #1 to Los Angeles County/USC Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead. Subsequent investigation revealed that the employer had failed to ensure that the workers had emptied, flushed, or purged flammable vapors trapped inside the tank truck. The employer also failed to test that the flammable vapors were less than 25 percent of the lower explosive limit before they were allowed to clean the tank, a violation of T8CCR 5420(a)(2). The squeegee being used was constructed with a 1 in. Teflon scraper base and a 9 in. aluminum handle attached with seven iron bolts. The metal bolts could have created a spark if they had contacted the sides of the tank. The pressure washer used for cleaning the tank truck was not grounded and bonded, so any static electric charges generated by water rushing at high speed through the washer could not be dissipated, a violation of T8CCR 5168(b).