Abstract: At approximately 8:30 a.m. on August 2, 2005, Employee #1, a maintenance worker, was working with a coworker, a maintenance lead man, on a 5-ton auxiliary hoist of a 30-ton crane. The coworker was training Employee #1 on the maintenance procedures for this crane. The crane operator was below to warn adjacent cranes away from the work being performed, but was not watching the pendant, and was not told to do so. The lead man assumed the operator below would watch the pendant. The employer's written lock-out procedure for this crane calls for the entire rail to be deenergized and locked out, which was rarely done as there are 3 cranes operating on this rail. Typically, power is disconnected and locked-out at the crane itself. The power was left on in this instance because the hoist had to be operated to diagnose and adjust-fix the hoist problem. There was no acceptable procedure addressing how to accomplish this particular task. The general lock-out procedures call for a spotter. Another coworker below needed to move the crane and did so at the pendant. He did not know anyone was on top of the crane, and there were no warning signs or tags posted. He grabbed the pendant and began to move the crane. Several workers yelled to stop, and he immediately dropped the controls. The crane coasted a few feet to the point where Employee #1 and the coworker were pinned between the gearbox of the crane and the roof beam of the foundry. The coworker, being a smaller person, was able to work himself out from the pinching point without injury. Employee #1 was crushed and eventually died.