Abstract: On the morning of October 3, 2000, Employee #1 was part of a crew engaged in general repair work on the cargo transfer crane barge, the Paddy Ryan. The crew was welding metal grommets under the crane tracks on the deck of the barge. Employee #1 removed a cover from an 18 in. diameter manhole leading into one of the barge's flood compartments. For some reason--possibly to check support structures under the deck for the crane tracks--Employee #1 entered the 10 ft deep by 40 ft long by 10 ft wide hold. He climbed down the straight, fixed access ladder and was overcome by anoxia. He was eventually found by coworkers and transported to a local hospital, where he was pronounced dead. The hold showed evidence of rust that could have displaced the oxygen while the hold was sealed. Employee #1 did not mechanically ventilate the compartment or check the oxygen content prior to entering. The company had no confined space entry policy and did not use oxygen monitors for such compartments. The crew normally went into stern and bow compartments, but these had easier entrances and exits. Employee #1 was the superintendent's substitute when he was not at the site, and thus had a managerial function.