Abstract: At approximately 10:00 p.m. on February 8, 1998, Employee #1 was preparing to launch a pipeline scraper that was to travel the propane pipeline from the Star Enterprise Louisiana plant to the Sorrento, LA, storage facility. He had apparently removed the vent value plug, opened the vent valve to the pressure gauge, and closed the pressure gauge isolation valve. He had removed the pressure warning lock from the metal tab that extended from the outside edge of the launcher door over the launcher housing; unscrewed the launcher door, moved it aside, and inserted the pipeline scraper, and positioned it for launching; and greased the threads for the launcher door. Employee #1 started screwing the door back on the launcher when he was overcome with hydrogen sulfide that had backed up from the flare system. He was found unconscious on the ground and died of asphyxia. Apparently Employee #1 had not closed the depressurizing valve to the flare before opening the launcher door. The launcher had been depressurized to zero pressure and the flare line had a positive pressure of 3 psi. Employee #1 was not using any form of respiratory protection.