Abstract: At approximately, 12:25 p.m. on Sunday May 11, 2003, Employee #1, a carpentry foreman, was working in a fall protection harness and lanyard attached to the blade of the 29-ft-diameter cooling fan. Employee #1 was attaching a 5-ft disk over the hub of the blades. A coworker was assisting the foreman by holding the fan still with his body, preventing the up rising air current from spinning the blade. Other coworkers were attaching the closely fitting vertical shroud around the blades. Previously, the supervisor and the operator agreed they would start testing fans in the order according to their assigned numbers in Unit 8. Because of delays during the assembly of No. 1 cell, the foreman and supervisors agreed to comply with a request from the supervisor to finish cell No. 2, then go back and finish No. 1, because No. 2 was closer to completion. After cell No. 2 was completed the employees returned to cell No. 1 as directed and agreed with the supervisor's request to delay their lunch and complete No. 1, and the tests could proceed during their lunch break. The supervisors completed an inspection and "clearing" process of cell No. 2 and a supervisor contacted the operator in the control station in the next building (via radio) and told them to "stand by." The operator engaged the circuit controls mechanically and waited for the order to start the fan. Shortly afterward, a supervisor said "ok - start it up." The operator started the fan circuit as he was directed to do not knowing cell No. 1 had workers still in it. Employee #1 was fatally injured. A supervisor immediately realized his error upon hearing the nearby fan start and called via radio to stop the motor. The fan was energized by a 460-volt 150 GE electric motor.