Abstract: At 5:25 a.m. on December 3, 2020, an employee was working as an electrical and electronic technician at a steel foundry. He was an electrical supervisor or foreman. He was troubleshooting a proxy sensor located on the shot blast tank for the hand blast on shot blaster number 60112. The firm's safety director stated that it was common for their electricians to have to service this proxy sensor, as the sensors sometimes provided a false error that the shot blast tank was empty. Such tasks were performed on a weekly to biweekly basis. The employee went up to the upper platform of the machine to troubleshoot the proxy sensor on the pressure tank. He was working about 20 feet (6.1 m) up. He removed the sensor from the tank to diagnose it. He either cleaned the existing sensor or replaced it. As he was plugging the existing or replacement sensor back in, the pressure tank machinery activated. The employee was hit in the face by pressurized air and steel shot blast. He fell approximately 20 feet (6.1 m) to the cement floor below. He suffered a broken eye socket, multiple broken ribs, a punctured lung, a broken right hip, tears in his right shoulder, injuries to his pelvis and leg, and what turned into ongoing issues with his right knee. He was hospitalized. The firm's safety director stated that he knew that the foot pedal that activated the blaster was stuck. When the employee plugged in the sensor, the machine activated. The safety director was not sure if the employee replaced the sensor with a new proxy sensor or if he had cleaned and reset the old proxy sensor. The safety director was the person who created the incident investigation. The safety director identified the employee in the investigation report as the worker who removed the proxy sensor, revealing that the employee was performing service and maintenance without locking out the shot blast machine.