[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 59 (Friday, March 27, 2015)][Notices][Pages 16440-16449]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-06975]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
[Docket No. OSHA-2012-0035]
Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture: Grant of a Permanent
Variance
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.
ACTION: Notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA grants a permanent variance to Traylor/
Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture from the provisions of OSHA standards
that regulate work in compressed air environments at 29 CFR 1926.803.
DATES: The permanent variance specified by this notice becomes
effective on March 27, 2015 and shall remain in effect until January
31, 2016.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is
available from the following sources:
Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue
NW., Room N-3647, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-1999;
email: Meilinger.francis2@dol.gov.
General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson,
Acting Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination
Activities, Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of
Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210;
phone: (202) 693-2110 or email: robinson.kevin@dol.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Copies of this Federal Register notice. Electronic copies of this
Federal Register notice are available at http://www.regulations.gov.
This Federal Register notice, as well as news releases and other
relevant information, also are available at OSHA's Web page at
http://www.osha.gov.
I. Notice of Application
On April 26, 2012, Traylor Bros., Inc., 835 N. Congress Ave.,
Evansville, IN 47715, and Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture, Blue
Plains Tunnel, 5000 Overlook Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20032,
submitted under Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 ("OSH Act"; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 1905.11 ("Variances
and other relief under section 6(d)") an application for a permanent
variance from several provisions of the OSHA standard that regulates
work in compressed air at 29 CFR 1926.803. OSHA is addressing this
request as two separate applications: (1) Traylor Bros., Inc.
("Traylor") request for a permanent variance for future tunneling
projects; and (2) Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture, Blue Plains
Tunnel ("Traylor JV" or "the applicant"). This notice only
addresses the Traylor JV application for an interim order and permanent
variance for the Blue Plains Tunnel project.\1\ This notice does not
address the Traylor application for a permanent variance for future
projects. That request will be addressed separately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Section III discussion of condition A Scope.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Traylor JV also requested an interim order pending OSHA's decision
on the application for a variance (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0008).
Specifically, this notice addresses the application submitted by
Traylor JV for the Blue Plains Tunnel project in which the applicant
seeks a permanent variance and interim order from the provisions of the
standard that: (1) Prohibit compressed-air worker exposure to pressures
exceeding 50 pounds per square inch (p.s.i.) except in an emergency (29
CFR 1926.803(e)(5)); \2\ (2) require the use of the decompression
values specified in decompression tables in Appendix A of the
compressed-air standard for construction (29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)); and
(3) require the use of automated operational controls and a special
decompression chamber (29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii),
respectively).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The decompression tables in Appendix A of subpart S express
the maximum working pressures as pounds per square inch gauge
(p.s.i.g.), with a maximum working pressure of 50 p.s.i.g.
Therefore, throughout this notice, OSHA expresses the 50 p.s.i.
value specified by Sec. 1926.803(e)(5) as 50 p.s.i.g., consistent
with the terminology in Appendix A, Table 1 of subpart S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The applicant is a contractor that works on complex tunnel projects
using recently developed equipment and procedures for soft-ground
tunneling. The applicant's workers engage in the construction of
tunnels using advanced shielded mechanical excavation
techniques in conjunction with an earth pressure balanced tunnel boring
machine (EPBTBM).
According to its application, Traylor is currently the managing
partner of Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture ("Traylor JV"), the
general contractor for the DC Water and Sewer Authority's project to
construct the Blue Plains Tunnel. Traylor JV asserts that generally, it
bores tunnels (i.e., Blue Plains Tunnel) below the water table through
soft soils consisting of clay, silt, and sand. Traylor JV employs
specially trained personnel for the construction of the tunnel, and
states that this construction will use shielded mechanical-excavation
techniques. Traylor JV asserts that its workers perform hyperbaric
interventions at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. in the excavation
chamber of the EPBTBM; these interventions consist of conducting
inspections and maintenance work on the cutter-head structure and
cutting tools of the EPBTBM.
Traylor JV asserts that innovations in tunnel excavation,
specifically with EPBTBMs, have, in most cases, eliminated the need to
pressurize the entire tunnel. This technology negates the requirement
that all members of a tunnel-excavation crew work in compressed air
while excavating the tunnel. These advances in technology modified
substantially the methods used by the construction industry to excavate
subaqueous tunnels compared to the caisson work regulated by the
current OSHA compressed-air standard for construction at 29 CFR
1926.803. Such advances reduce the number of workers exposed, and the
total duration of exposure, to hyperbaric pressure during tunnel
construction.
Using shielded mechanical-excavation techniques, in conjunction
with precast concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBTBMs provide
methods to achieve the face pressures required to maintain a stabilized
tunnel face through various geologies, and isolate that pressure to the
forward section (the working chamber) of the EPBTBM. Interventions in
the working chamber (the pressurized portion of the EPBTBM) take place
only after halting tunnel excavation and preparing the machine and crew
for an intervention. Interventions occur to inspect or maintain the
mechanical-excavation components located in the working chamber.
Maintenance conducted in the working chamber includes changing
replaceable cutting tools and disposable wear bars, and, in rare cases,
repairing structural damage to the cutter head.
In addition to innovations in tunnel-excavation methods, Traylor JV
asserts that innovations in hyperbaric medicine and technology improve
the safety of decompression from hyperbaric exposures. According to
Traylor JV, the use of decompression protocols incorporating oxygen is
at least as effective for tunnel workers as compliance with the
decompression tables specified by the existing OSHA standard (29 CFR
part 1926, subpart S, Appendix A decompression tables). These
hyperbaric exposures are possible due to advances in technology, a
better understanding of hyperbaric medicine, and the development of a
project-specific Hyperbaric Operations Manual (HOM) that requires
specialized medical support and hyperbaric supervision to provide
assistance to a team of specially trained man-lock attendants and
hyperbaric or compressed-air workers.
OSHA initiated a technical review of the Traylor JV's variance
application and developed a set of follow-up questions that it sent to
Traylor JV on September 17, 2012 (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0003). On October
26, 2012, Traylor JV submitted its response and a request for an
interim order for the Blue Plains Tunnel Project (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-
0008). In its response to OSHA's follow-up questions, Traylor JV
indicated that the maximum pressure to which it is likely to expose
workers during interventions for the Blue Plains Tunnel project is 52
p.s.i.g. and does not involve the use of trimix breathing gas (composed
of a mixture of oxygen, nitrogen, and helium in varying concentrations
used for breathing by compressed air workers for compression and
decompression when working at pressures exceeding 73 p.s.i.g.).
Therefore, to work effectively on this project, Traylor JV must perform
hyperbaric interventions in compressed air at pressures higher than the
maximum pressure specified by the existing OSHA standard, 29 CFR
1926.803(e)(5), which states: "No employee shall be subjected to
pressure exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. except in emergency" (see footnote 2).
OSHA considered Traylor JV's application for a permanent variance
and interim order for the Blue Plains Tunnel project. OSHA determined
that Traylor JV proposed an alternative that will provide a workplace
as safe and healthful as that provided by the standard. On July 11,
2013, OSHA granted Traylor JV a project-specific interim order for the
completion of the Blue Plains Tunnel (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0011) in order
to permit the applicant to begin work while OSHA continued to consider
its application for a permanent variance. Further, on December 11,
2014, OSHA published a Federal Register notice announcing Traylor JV's
application for a permanent variance and interim order, grant of an
interim order, and request for comments (79 FR 73631) for the Blue
Plains Tunnel project.
II. The Variance Application
A. Background
As indicated earlier in this notice, Traylor JV asserts that the
advances in tunnel excavation technology described in Section I of this
notice modified significantly the equipment and methods used by
contractors to construct subaqueous tunnels, thereby making several
provisions of OSHA's compressed-air standard for construction at 29 CFR
1926.803 inappropriate for this type of work. These advances reduce
both the number of workers exposed, and the total duration of exposure,
to the hyperbaric conditions associated with tunnel construction.
Using shielded mechanical-excavation techniques, in conjunction
with pre-cast concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBTBMs
provide methods to achieve the face pressures required to maintain a
stabilized tunnel face, through various geologies, while isolating that
pressure to the forward section (working or excavation chamber) of the
EPBTBM.
Interventions involving the working chamber (the pressurized
chamber at the head of the EPBTBM) take place only after the applicant
halts tunnel excavation and prepares the machine and crew for an
intervention. Interventions occur to inspect or maintain the
mechanical-excavation components located in the forward portion of the
working chamber. Maintenance conducted in the forward portion of the
working chamber includes changing replaceable cutting tools, disposable
wear bars, and, in rare cases, repairs to the cutter head due to
structural damage.
In addition to innovations in tunnel-excavation methods, research
conducted after OSHA published its compressed-air standard for
construction in 1971, resulted in advances in hyperbaric medicine. In
this regard, the applicant asserts that the use of decompression
protocols incorporating oxygen is more efficient, effective, and safer
for tunnel workers than compliance with the existing OSHA standard (29
CFR part 1926, subpart S, Appendix A decompression tables). According
to the applicant, contractors routinely and safely expose employees
performing
interventions in the working chamber of EPBTBMs to hyperbaric pressures
up to 75 p.s.i.g., which is 50% higher than maximum pressure specified
by the existing OSHA standard (see 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5)).
The applicant contends that the alternative safety measures
included in its application provide its workers with a place of
employment that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain
under the existing provisions of OSHA's compressed-air standard for
construction. The applicant certifies that it provided employee
representatives of affected workers with a copy of the variance
application.\3\ The applicant also certifies that it notified its
workers of the variance application by posting, at prominent locations
where it normally posts workplace notices, a summary of the application
and information specifying where the workers can examine a copy of the
application. In addition, the applicant informed its workers and their
representatives of their rights to petition the Assistant Secretary of
Labor for Occupational Safety and Health for a hearing on the variance
application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See the definition of "Affected employee or worker" in
section VI. D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Variance From Paragraph (e)(5) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Prohibition of
Exposure to Pressure Greater Than 50 p.s.i.g. (See Footnote 1)
The applicant states that it may perform hyperbaric interventions
at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. in the working chamber of the
EPBTBM; this pressure exceeds the pressure limit of 50 p.s.i.g.
specified for nonemergency purposes by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5). The
EPBTBM has twin man locks, with each man lock having two compartments.
This configuration allows workers to access the man locks for
compression and decompression, and medical personnel to access the man
locks if required in an emergency.
EPBTBMs are capable of maintaining pressure at the tunnel face, and
stabilizing existing geological conditions, through the controlled use
of propel cylinders, a mechanically driven cutter head, bulkheads
within the shield, ground-treatment foam, and a screw conveyor that
moves excavated material from the working chamber. As noted earlier,
the forward-most portion of the EPBTBM is the working chamber, and this
chamber is the only pressurized segment of the EPBTBM. Within the
shield, the working chamber consists of two sections: The staging
chamber and the forward working chamber. The staging chamber is the
section of the working chamber between the man-lock door and the entry
door to the forward working chamber. The forward working chamber is
immediately behind the cutter head and tunnel face.
The applicant will pressurize the working chamber to the level
required to maintain a stable tunnel face. Pressure in the staging
chamber ranges from atmospheric (no increased pressure) to a maximum
pressure equal to the pressure in the working chamber. The applicant
asserts that most of the hyperbaric interventions will be around 14.7
p.s.i.g. However, the applicant maintains that they may have to perform
interventions at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
During interventions, workers enter the working chamber through one
of the twin man locks that open into the staging chamber. To reach the
forward part of the working chamber, workers pass through a door in a
bulkhead that separates the staging chamber from the forward working
chamber. The maximum crew size allowed in the forward working chamber
is three. At certain hyperbaric pressures (i.e., when decompression
times are greater than work times), the twin man locks allow for crew
rotation. During crew rotation, one crew can be compressing or
decompressing while the second crew is working. Therefore, the working
crew always has an unoccupied man lock at its disposal.
The applicant developed a project-specific HOM for the Blue Plains
Tunnel (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0007) that describes in detail the
hyperbaric procedures and required medical examinations used during the
tunnel-construction project. The HOM discusses standard operating
procedures and emergency and contingency procedures. The procedures
include using experienced and knowledgeable man-lock attendants who
have the training and experience necessary to recognize and treat
decompression illnesses and injuries. The attendants are under the
direct supervision of the hyperbaric supervisor and attending
physician. In addition, procedures include medical screening and review
of prospective compressed-air workers (CAWs). The purpose of this
screening procedure is to vet prospective CAWs with medical conditions
(e.g., deep vein thrombosis, poor vascular circulation, and muscle
cramping) that could be aggravated by sitting in a cramped space (e.g.,
a man lock) for extended periods or by exposure to elevated pressures
and compressed gas mixtures. A transportable recompression chamber
(shuttle) is available to extract workers from the hyperbaric working
chamber for emergency evacuation and medical treatment; the shuttle
attaches to the topside medical lock, which is a large recompression
chamber. The applicant believes that the procedures included in the HOM
provide safe work conditions when interventions are necessary,
including interventions above 50 p.s.i.g.
C. Variance From Paragraph (f)(1) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement To
Use OSHA Decompression Tables
OSHA's compressed-air standard for construction requires
decompression in accordance with the decompression tables in Appendix A
of 29 CFR part 1926, subpart S (see 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)). As an
alternative to the OSHA decompression tables, the applicant proposes to
use newer decompression schedules that supplement breathing air used
during decompression with pure oxygen. The applicant asserts that these
decompression protocols are safer for tunnel workers than the
decompression protocols specified in Appendix A of 29 CFR part 1926,
subpart S.
Accordingly, the applicant proposes to use the 1992 French
Decompression Tables to decompress CAWs after they exit the hyperbaric
conditions in the working chamber. Depending on the maximum working
pressure and exposure times, the 1992 French Decompression Tables
provide for air decompression with or without oxygen. Traylor JV
asserts that oxygen decompression has many benefits, including (1)
keeping the partial pressure of nitrogen in the lungs as low as
possible; (2) keeping external pressure as low as possible to reduce
the formation of bubbles in the blood; (3) removing nitrogen from the
lungs and arterial blood and increasing the rate of elimination of
nitrogen; (4) improving the quality of breathing during decompression
stops so that workers are less tired and to prevent bone necrosis; (5)
reducing decompression time by about 33 percent as compared to air
decompression; and (6) reducing inflammation. As described in Section V
of this notice, OSHA's review of the use of oxygen in several major
tunneling projects completed in the past indicates that it contributed
significantly to the reduction of decompression illness (DCI) and other
associated adverse effects observed and reported among CAWs.
In addition, the HOM requires a physician certified in hyperbaric
medicine to manage the medical condition of CAWs during hyperbaric
exposures and decompression. A trained and experienced man-lock
attendant also will be present during
hyperbaric exposures and decompression. This man-lock attendant will
operate the hyperbaric system to ensure compliance with the specified
decompression table. A hyperbaric supervisor (competent person),
trained in hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety, directly
oversees all hyperbaric interventions, and ensures that staff follow
the procedures delineated in the HOM or by the attending physician.
The applicant asserts that at higher hyperbaric pressures,
decompression times exceed 75 minutes. The HOM establishes protocols
and procedures that provide the basis for alternate means of protection
for CAWs under these conditions. Accordingly, based on these protocols
and procedures, the applicant requests to use the 1992 French
Decompression Tables for hyperbaric interventions up to 52 p.s.i.g. for
completion of the Blue Plains Tunnel project. The applicant is
committed to follow the decompression procedures described in the Blue
Plains Tunnel project-specific HOM during these interventions.
D. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of 29 CFR 1926.803,
Automatically Regulated Continuous Decompression
According to the applicant, breathing air under hyperbaric
conditions increases the amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in a CAW's
tissues. The greater the hyperbaric pressure under these conditions,
and the more time spent under the increased pressure, the greater the
amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in the tissues. When the pressure
decreases during decompression, tissues release the dissolved nitrogen
gas into the blood system, which then carries the nitrogen gas to the
lungs for elimination through exhalation. Releasing hyperbaric pressure
too rapidly during decompression can increase the size of the bubbles
formed by nitrogen gas in the blood system, resulting in DCI, commonly
referred to as "the bends." This description of the etiology of DCI
is consistent with current scientific theory and research on the issue
(see footnote 13 in this notice discussing a 1985 NIOSH report on DCI).
The 1992 French Decompression Tables proposed for use by the
applicant provide for stops during worker decompression (i.e., staged
decompression) to control the release of nitrogen gas from tissues into
the blood system. Studies show that staged decompression, in
combination with other features of the 1992 French Decompression Tables
such as the use of oxygen, result in a lower incidence of DCI than the
OSHA decompression requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803, which specify the
use of automatically regulated continuous decompression (see footnotes
9 through 14 in this notice for references to these studies).\4\ In
addition, the applicant asserts that staged decompression is at least
as effective as an automatic controller in regulating the decompression
process because:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ In the study cited in footnote 11, starting at page 338, Dr.
Eric Kindwall notes that the use of automatically regulated
continuous decompression in the Washington State safety standards
for compressed-air work (from which OSHA derived its decompression
tables) was at the insistence of contractors and the union, and
against the advice of the expert who calculated the decompression
table and recommended using staged decompression. Dr. Kindwall then
states, "Continuous decompression is inefficient and wasteful. For
example, if the last stage from 4 psig . . . to the surface took 1
h, at least half the time is spent at pressures less than 2 psig . .
., which provides less and less meaningful bubble suppression . .
." In addition, the report referenced in footnote 5 under the
section titled, "Background on the Need for Interim Decompression
Tables" addresses the continuous-decompression protocol in the OSHA
compressed-air standard for construction, noting that "[a]side from
the tables for saturation diving to deep depths, no other widely
used or officially approved diving decompression tables use straight
line, continuous decompressions at varying rates. Stage
decompression is usually the rule, since it is simpler to control."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. A hyperbaric supervisor (a competent person experienced and
trained in hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety) directly
supervises all hyperbaric interventions and ensures that the man-lock
attendant, who is a competent person in the manual control of
hyperbaric systems, follows the schedule specified in the decompression
tables, including stops; and
2. The use of the 1992 French Decompression Tables for staged
decompression offers an equal or better level of management and control
over the decompression process than an automatic controller and results
in lower occurrences of DCI.
Accordingly, the applicant is applying for a permanent variance
from the OSHA standard at 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii), which requires
automatic controls to regulate decompression. As noted above, the
applicant is committed to conduct the staged decompression according to
the 1992 French Decompression Tables under the direct control of the
trained man-lock attendant and under the oversight of the hyperbaric
supervisor.
E. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement
of Special Decompression Chamber
The OSHA compressed-air standard for construction requires
employers to use a special decompression chamber when total
decompression time exceeds 75 minutes (see 29 CFR
1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)). Another provision of OSHA's compressed-air
standard calls for locating the special decompression chamber adjacent
to the man lock on the atmospheric pressure side of the tunnel bulkhead
(see 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(2)(vii)). However, since only the working
chamber of the EPBTBM is under pressure, and only a few workers out of
the entire crew are exposed to hyperbaric pressure, the man locks
(which, as noted earlier, connect directly to the working chamber) are
of sufficient size to accommodate the exposed workers. In addition,
available space in the EPBTBM does not allow for an additional special
decompression lock. Again, the applicant uses the man locks, each of
which adequately accommodates a three-member crew, for this purpose
when decompression lasts up to 75 minutes. When decompression exceeds
75 minutes, crews can open the door connecting the two compartments in
each man lock during decompression stops or exit the man lock and move
into the staging chamber where additional space is available. This
alternative enables CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent
neuromuscular problems during decompression.
F. Previous Tunnel Construction Variance
OSHA notes that on May 23, 2014, it granted a sub-aqueous tunnel
construction permanent variance to Tully/OHL USA Joint Venture (79 FR
29809) from the same provisions of the standard that regulates work in
compressed air (at 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and
(g)(1)(xvii)) that are the subject of the present application.
Generally, the alternate conditions in this notice are based on and
very similar to the alternate conditions of the previous permanent
variance.
G. Multi-State Variance
As stated earlier in this notice, Traylor JV applied for an interim
order for its Blue Plains Tunnel project only. On July 11, 2013, OSHA
granted an interim order to cover only the Blue Plains Tunnel project,
which is located entirely in the District of Columbia and thus under
Federal OSHA's exclusive jurisdiction. Further, on December 11, 2014,
OSHA published a Federal Register notice announcing Traylor JV's
application for a permanent variance and interim order, grant of an
interim order, and request for comments (79 FR 73631).
Additionally, twenty-seven state safety and health plans have been
approved by OSHA under section 18 of the (OSH) Act.\5\ As part of the
permanent variance process, the Directorate of Cooperative and State
Programs will notify the State Plans of Traylor JV's variance
application and grant of the Blue Plains permanent variance. In
considering Traylor JV's application for a permanent variance and
interim order, OSHA noted that four states have previously granted sub-
aqueous tunnel construction variances and imposed different or
additional requirements and conditions (California, Nevada, Oregon, and
Washington). California also promulgated a new standard \6\ for similar
sub-aqueous tunnel construction work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Five State Plans (Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New
York, and the Virgin Islands) limit their occupational safety and
health authority to state and local employers only. State Plans that
exercise their occupational safety and health authority over both
public- and private-sector employers are: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming.
\6\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7,
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Description of the Conditions Specified for the Permanent Variance
This section describes the alternative means of compliance with 29
CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) and provides
additional detail regarding the conditions that form the basis of
Traylor JV's permanent variance.
Condition A: Scope
The scope of the permanent variance limits coverage to the work
situations specified under this condition. Clearly defining the scope
of the permanent variance provides Traylor JV, Traylor JV's employees,
other stakeholders, the public, and OSHA with necessary information
regarding the work situations in which the permanent variance applies.
According to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer or class or group of
employers \7\ may request a permanent variance for a specific workplace
or workplaces. If granted, the variance applies to the specific
employer(s) that submitted the application. In this instance, the
permanent variance applies to the applicant, Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee
Joint Venture at the Blue Plains Tunnel project and does not apply to
any other employers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ A class or group of employers (such as members of a trade
alliance or association) may apply jointly for a variance provided
an authorized representative for each employer signs the application
and the application identifies each employer's affected facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Condition B: Application
This condition specifies the circumstances under which the
permanent variance is in effect, notably only for hyperbaric work
performed during interventions. The condition places clear limits on
the circumstances under which the applicant can expose its employees to
hyperbaric pressure.
Condition C: List of Abbreviations
Condition C defines a number of abbreviations used in the permanent
variance. OSHA believes that defining these abbreviations serves to
clarify and standardize their usage, thereby enhancing the applicant's
and its employees' understanding of the conditions specified by the
permanent variance.
Condition D: Definitions
The condition defines a series of terms, mostly technical terms,
used in the permanent variance to standardize and clarify their
meaning. Defining these terms serves to enhance the applicant's and its
employees' understanding of the conditions specified by the permanent
variance.
Condition E: Safety and Health Practices
This condition requires the applicant to develop and submit to OSHA
an HOM specific to the Blue Plains project at least six months before
using the EPBTBM for tunneling operations. Additionally, the condition
includes a series of related hazard prevention and control requirements
and methods (e.g., decompression tables, job hazard analyses (JHA),
operations and inspections checklists, incident investigation,
recording and notification to OSHA of recordable hyperbaric injuries
and illnesses, etc.) designed to ensure the continued effective
functioning of the hyperbaric equipment and operating system.
Review of the HOM enables OSHA to: (1) Determine that the safety
and health instructions and measures it specifies are appropriate and
do adequately protect the safety and health of the CAWs; and (2)
request the applicant to revise or modify the HOM if it finds that the
hyperbaric safety and health procedures are not suitable for the
specific project and do not adequately protect the safety and health of
the CAWs. Once approved, the project-specific HOM becomes part of the
variance, thus enabling OSHA to enforce its safety and health
procedures and measures.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Grant of the July 11, 2013, project-specific interim order
constituted OSHA's approval of Traylor JV's Blue Plains Tunnel
project-specific HOM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Condition F: Communication
Condition F requires the applicant to develop and implement an
effective system of information sharing and communication. Effective
information sharing and communication ensures that affected workers
receive updated information regarding any safety-related hazards and
incidents, and corrective actions taken, prior to the start of each
shift. The condition also requires the applicant to ensure that
reliable means of emergency communications are available and maintained
for affected workers and support personnel during hyperbaric
operations. Availability of such reliable means of communications
enables affected workers and support personnel to respond quickly and
effectively to hazardous conditions or emergencies that may develop
during EPBTBM operations.
Condition G: Worker Qualification and Training
This condition requires the applicant to develop and implement an
effective qualification and training program for affected workers. The
condition specifies the factors that an affected worker must know to
perform safely during hyperbaric operations, including how to enter,
work in, and exit from hyperbaric conditions under both normal and
emergency conditions. Having well-trained and qualified workers
performing hyperbaric intervention work ensures that they recognize,
and respond appropriately to, hyperbaric safety and health hazards.
These qualification and training requirements enable affected workers
to cope effectively with emergencies, as well as the discomfort and
physiological effects of hyperbaric exposure, thereby preventing worker
injury, illness, and fatalities.
Paragraph (2)(e) of this condition also requires the applicant to
provide affected workers with information they can use to contact the
appropriate healthcare professionals if they believe they are
developing hyperbaric-related health effects. This requirement provides
for early intervention and treatment of DCI and other health effects
resulting from hyperbaric exposure, thereby reducing the potential
severity of these effects.
Condition H: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
Condition H requires the applicant to develop, implement, and
operate a program of frequent and regular inspections of the EPBTBM's
hyperbaric equipment and support systems, and associated work areas.
This condition helps to ensure the safe operation and physical
integrity of the equipment and work areas necessary to conduct
hyperbaric operations. The condition also enhances worker safety by
reducing the risk of hyperbaric-related emergencies.
Paragraph (3) of this condition requires the applicant to document
tests, inspections, corrective actions, and repairs involving the
EPBTBM, and maintain these documents at the job site for the duration
of the job. This requirement provides the applicant with information
needed to schedule tests and inspections to ensure the continued safe
operation of the equipment and systems, and to determine that the
actions taken to correct defects in hyperbaric equipment and systems
were appropriate, prior to returning them to service.
Condition I: Compression and Decompression
This condition requires the applicant to consult with its
designated medical advisor regarding special compression or
decompression procedures appropriate for any un-acclimated CAW. This
provision ensures that the applicant consults with the medical advisor,
and involves the medical advisor in the evaluation, development, and
implementation of compression or decompression protocols appropriate
for any CAW requiring acclimation to the hyperbaric conditions
encountered during EPBTBM operations. Accordingly, CAWs requiring
acclimation have an opportunity to acclimate prior to exposure to these
hyperbaric conditions. OSHA believes this condition will prevent or
reduce adverse reactions among CAWs to the effects of compression or
decompression associated with the intervention work they perform in the
EPBTBM.
Condition J: Recordkeeping
Condition J requires the applicant to maintain records of specific
factors associated with each hyperbaric intervention. The information
gathered and recorded under this provision, in concert with the
information provided under condition K (using the OSHA 301 Incident
Report form to investigate and record hyperbaric recordable injuries as
defined by 29 CFR 1904.4, 1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12), enables the
applicant and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent
variance in preventing DCI and other hyperbaric-related effects.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See 29 CFR part 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses (http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631);
recordkeeping forms and instructions (http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf*);
OSHA Recordkeeping Handbook (http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/handbook/index.html); and updates
to OSHA's recordkeeping rule and Web page ((79 FR 56130); http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping2014/index.html)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Condition K: Notifications
Under this condition, the applicant is required, within specified
periods to: (1) Notify OSHA of any recordable injuries, illnesses, in-
patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an eye, or fatalities
that occur as a result of hyperbaric exposures during EPBTBM
operations; (2) provide OSHA with a copy of the incident investigation
report (using OSHA 301 form) of these events; (3) include on the 301
form information on the hyperbaric conditions associated with the
recordable injury or illness, the root-cause determination, and
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented; (4)
provide its certification that it informed affected workers of the
incident and the results of the incident investigation; (5) notify the
Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities (OTPCA) and
the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office within 15 working days should
the applicant need to revise its HOM to accommodate changes in its
compressed-air operations that affect its ability to comply with the
conditions of the permanent variance; and (6) provide OTPCA and the
Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office, at the end of the project, with a
report evaluating the effectiveness of the decompression tables.
These notification requirements enable the applicant, its
employees, and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent
variance in providing the requisite level of safety to the applicant's
workers and, based on this determination, whether to revise or revoke
the conditions of the permanent variance. Timely notification permits
OSHA to take whatever action may be necessary and appropriate to
prevent further injuries and illnesses. Providing notification to
employees informs them of the precautions taken by the applicant to
prevent similar incidents in the future.
This condition also requires the applicant to notify OSHA if it
ceases to do business, has a new address or location for its main
office, or transfers the operations covered by the permanent variance
to a successor company. In addition, the condition specifies that OSHA
must approve the transfer of the permanent variance to a successor
company. These requirements allow OSHA to communicate effectively with
the applicant regarding the status of the permanent variance, and
expedite the Agency's administration and enforcement of the permanent
variance. Stipulating that an applicant must have OSHA's approval to
transfer a variance to a successor company provides assurance that the
successor company has knowledge of, and will comply with, the
conditions specified by the permanent variance, thereby ensuring the
safety of workers involved in performing the operations covered by the
permanent variance.
IV. Comments on the Proposed Variance Application
OSHA received no comments on the proposed variance, including no
comments from State Plans.
V. Decision
After reviewing Traylor JV's proposed variance as described above,
and having received no comment, OSHA determines that:
A. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, effective
alternative measures to the prohibition of using compressed air under
hyperbaric conditions exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. The alternative measures
include use of engineering and administrative controls of the hazards
associated with work performed in compressed-air conditions exceeding
50 p.s.i.g. while engaged in the construction of a subaqueous tunnel
using advanced shielded mechanical-excavation techniques in conjunction
with an EPBTBM. Prior to conducting interventions in the EPBTBM's
pressurized working chamber, the applicant halts tunnel excavation and
prepares the machine and crew to conduct the interventions.
Interventions involve inspection, maintenance, or repair of the
mechanical-excavation components located in the working chamber.
B. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, safe hyperbaric
work procedures, emergency and contingency procedures, and medical
examinations for the Blue Plains Tunneling project's CAWs. The
applicant compiled these standard operating procedures into a project-
specific HOM (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0007). The HOM discusses the
procedures and personnel qualifications for performing work safely
during the compression and decompression phases of interventions. The
HOM also specifies the decompression tables the applicant proposes to
use. Depending on the maximum working pressure and exposure times
during the interventions, the tables provide for decompression using
air, pure oxygen, or a combination of air and oxygen. The decompression
tables also include delays or stops for various time intervals at
different pressure levels during the transition to atmospheric pressure
(i.e., staged decompression). In all cases, a physician certified in
hyperbaric medicine will manage the medical condition of CAWs during
decompression. In addition, a trained and experienced man-lock
attendant, experienced in recognizing decompression sickness or
illnesses and injuries, will be present. Of key importance, a
hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in hyperbaric
operations, procedures, and safety, will directly supervise all
hyperbaric operations to ensure compliance with the procedures
delineated in the project-specific HOM or by the attending physician.
C. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, a training
program to instruct affected workers in the hazards associated with
conducting hyperbaric operations.
D. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective
alternative to the use of automatic controllers that continuously
decrease pressure to achieve decompression in accordance with the
tables specified by the standard. The alternative includes using the
1992 French Decompression Tables for guiding staged decompression to
achieve lower occurrences of DCI, using a trained and competent
attendant for implementing appropriate hyperbaric entry and exit
procedures, and providing a competent hyperbaric supervisor and
attending physician certified in hyperbaric medicine, to oversee all
hyperbaric operations.
E. Traylor JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective
alternative to the use of the special decompression chamber required by
the standard. EPBTBM technology permits the tunnel's work areas to be
at atmospheric pressure, with only the face of the EPBTBM (i.e., the
working chamber) at elevated pressure during interventions. The
applicant limits interventions conducted in the working chamber to
performing required inspection, maintenance, and repair of the cutting
tools on the face of the EPBTBM. The EPBTBM's man lock and working
chamber provide sufficient space for the maximum crew of three CAWs to
stand up and move around, and safely accommodate decompression times up
to 360 minutes. Therefore, OSHA preliminarily determined that the
EPBTBM's man lock and working chamber function as effectively as the
special decompression chamber required by the standard.
OSHA conducted a review of the scientific literature regarding
decompression to determine whether the alternative decompression method
(i.e., the 1992 French Decompression Tables) Traylor JV proposed
provide a workplace as safe and healthful as that provided by the
standard. Based on this review, OSHA determined that tunneling
operations performed with these tables \10\ resulted in a lower
occurrence of DCI than the decompression tables specified by the
standard.11 12 13
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ In 1992, the French Ministry of Labour replaced the 1974
French Decompression Tables with the 1992 French Decompression
Tables, which differ from OSHA's decompression tables in Appendix A
by using: (1) Staged decompression as opposed to continuous (linear)
decompression; (2) decompression tables based on air or both air and
pure oxygen; and (3) emergency tables when unexpected exposure times
occur (up to 30 minutes above the maximum allowed working time).
\11\ Kindwall, EP (1997). Compressed air tunneling and caisson
work decompression procedures: Development, problems, and solutions.
Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 24(4), pp. 337-345. This article
reported 60 treated cases of DCI among 4,168 exposures between 19
and 31 p.s.i.g. over a 51-week contract period, for a DCI incidence
of 1.44% for the decompression tables specified by the OSHA
standard.
\12\ Sealey, JL (1969). Safe exit from the hyperbaric
environment: Medical experience with pressurized tunnel operations.
Journal of Occupational Medicine, 11(5), pp. 273-275. This article
reported 210 treated cases of DCI among 38,600 hyperbaric exposures
between 13 and 34 p.s.i.g. over a 32-month period, for an incidence
of 0.54% for the decompression tables specified by the Washington
State safety standards for compressed-air work, which are similar to
the tables in the OSHA standard. Moreover, the article reported 51
treated cases of DCI for 3,000 exposures between 30 and 34 p.s.i.g.,
for an incidence of 1.7% for the Washington State tables.
\13\ In 1985, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) published a report entitled "Criteria for Interim
Decompression Tables for Caisson and Tunnel Workers"; this report
reviewed studies of DCI and other hyperbaric-related injuries
resulting from use of OSHA's tables. This report is available on
NIOSH's Web site: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/decompression/default.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The review conducted by OSHA found several research studies
supporting the determination that the 1992 French Decompression Tables
resulted in a lower rate of DCI than the decompression tables specified
by the standard. For example, H. L. Anderson studied the occurrence of
DCI at maximum hyperbaric pressures ranging from 4 p.s.i.g. to 43
p.s.i.g. during construction of the Great Belt Tunnel in Denmark (1992-
1996); \14\ this project used the 1992 French Decompression Tables to
decompress the workers during part of the construction. Anderson
observed 6 DCI cases out of 7,220 decompression events, and reported
that switching to the 1992 French Decompression tables reduced the DCI
incidence to 0.08%. The DCI incidence in the study by H. L. Andersen is
substantially less than the DCI incidence reported for the
decompression tables specified in Appendix A. OSHA found no studies in
which the DCI incidence reported for the 1992 French Decompression
Tables were higher than the DCI incidence reported for the OSHA
decompression tables.\15\ Therefore, OSHA concludes that use of the
1992 French Decompression Tables protects workers at least as
effectively as the OSHA decompression tables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Anderson HL (2002). Decompression sickness during
construction of the Great Belt tunnel, Denmark. Undersea and
Hyperbaric Medicine, 29(3), pp. 172-188.
\15\ Le P[eacute]chon JC, Barre P, Baud JP, Ollivier F
(September 1996). Compressed air work--French Tables 1992--
operational results. JCLP Hyperbarie Paris, Centre Medical
Subaquatique Interentreprise, Marseille: Communication a l'EUBS, pp.
1-5 (see Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on a review of available evidence, the experience of State
Plans that either granted variances (Nevada, Oregon and Washington)
\16\ or promulgated a new standard (California) \17\ for hyperbaric
exposures occurring during similar subaqueous tunnel-construction work,
and the information provided in the applicant's variance application,
OSHA is granting the permanent variance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ These state variances are available in the docket: Exs.
OSHA-2012-0035-0006 (Nevada), OSHA-2012-0035-0005 (Oregon), and
OSHA-2012-0035-0004 (Washington).
\17\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7,
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (29 U.S.C. 655), the Agency finds that when the employer complies
with the conditions of the following order, the working conditions of
the employer's workers are at least as safe and healthful as if the
employer complied with the working conditions specified by paragraphs
(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803.
Therefore, Traylor JV will: (1) Comply with the conditions listed in
section VI of this notice for the period between the grant of the
interim order and completion of the Blue Plains Tunnel project, but no
later than January 31, 2016; (2) comply fully with
all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; and (3) provide a
copy of this Federal Register notice to all employees affected by the
conditions, including the affected employees of other employers, using
the same means it used to inform these employees of its application for
a permanent variance. Additionally, this final order will remain in
effect until OSHA modifies or revokes it in accordance with 29 CFR
1905.13.
VI. Order
As of the effective date of this final order, OSHA is revoking the
interim order granted to the employer on July 11, 2013, and affirmed on
December 11, 2014 (79 FR 73631). OSHA issues this final order
authorizing Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture ("Traylor JV") to
comply with following conditions instead of complying with the
requirements of paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii),
and (g)(1)(xvii). This final order applies to all employees of Traylor
JV exposed to hyperbaric conditions at the Blue Plains Tunnel project.
These conditions are:
A. Scope
The permanent variance applies only to work:
1. That occurs in conjunction with construction of the Blue Plains
Tunnel project, a tunnel constructed using advanced shielded
mechanical-excavation techniques and involving operation of an EPBTBM;
2. Performed under compressed-air and hyperbaric conditions up to
52 p.s.i.g;
3. In the EPBTBM's forward section (the working chamber) and
associated hyperbaric chambers used to pressurize and decompress
employees entering and exiting the working chamber;
4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5),
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii), Traylor JV must comply fully
with all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; and
5. This order remains in effect until one of the following
conditions occurs: (1) Completion of the Blue Plains Tunnel project,
but no later than January 31, 2016; or (2) OSHA modifies or revokes
this final order in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13.
B. Application
The permanent variance applies only when Traylor JV stops the
tunnel-boring work, pressurizes the working chamber, and the CAWs
either enter the working chamber to perform interventions (i.e.,
inspect, maintain, or repair the mechanical-excavation components), or
exit the working chamber after performing interventions.
C. List of Abbreviations
Abbreviations used throughout this permanent variance include the
following:
1. CAW--Compressed-air worker
2. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
3. DCI--Decompression Illness
4. EPBTBM--Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine
5. HOM--Hyperbaric Operations and Safety Manual
6. JHA--Job hazard analysis
7. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities
D. Definitions
The following definitions apply to this permanent variance. These
definitions supplement the definitions in Traylor JV's project-specific
HOM.
1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is
affected by the conditions of this permanent variance, or any one of
his or her authorized representatives. The term "employee" has the
meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.)
2. Atmospheric pressure--the pressure of air at sea-level,
generally 14.7 p.s.i.a., 1 atmosphere absolute, or 0 p.s.i.g.
3. Compressed-air worker--an individual who is specially trained
and medically qualified to perform work in a pressurized environment
while breathing air at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
4. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees,
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to
eliminate them.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Decompression illness (also called decompression sickness or the
bends)--an illness caused by gas bubbles appearing in body compartments
due to a reduction in ambient pressure. Examples of symptoms of
decompression illness include (but are not limited to): Joint pain
(also known as the "bends" for agonizing pain or the "niggles" for
slight pain); areas of bone destruction (termed dysbaric
osteonecrosis); skin disorders (such as cutis marmorata, which causes a
pink marbling of the skin); spinal cord and brain disorders (such as
stroke, paralysis, paresthesia, and bladder dysfunction);
cardiopulmonary disorders, such as shortness of breath; and arterial
gas embolism (gas bubbles in the arteries that block blood flow).\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ See Appendix 10 of "A Guide to the Work in Compressed Air
Regulations 1996," published by the United Kingdom Health and
Safety Executive available from NIOSH at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive/pdfs/NIOSH-254/compReg1996.pdf*.
Note: Health effects associated with hyperbaric intervention but
not considered symptoms of DCI can include: Barotrauma (direct
damage to air-containing cavities in the body such as ears, sinuses
and lungs); nitrogen narcosis (reversible alteration in
consciousness that may occur in hyperbaric environments and is
caused by the anesthetic effect of certain gases at high pressure);
and oxygen toxicity (a central nervous system condition resulting
from the harmful effects of breathing molecular oxygen
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(O2) at elevated partial pressures).
6. Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine--the machinery
used to excavate the tunnel.
7. Hot work--any activity performed in a hazardous location that
may introduce an ignition source into a potentially flammable
atmosphere.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Also see 29 CFR 1910.146(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Hyperbaric--at a higher pressure than atmospheric pressure.
9. Hyperbaric intervention--a term that describes the process of
stopping the EPBTBM and preparing and executing work under hyperbaric
pressure in the working chamber for the purpose of inspecting,
replacing, or repairing cutting tools and/or the cutter head structure.
10. Hyperbaric Operations Manual--a detailed, project-specific
health and safety plan developed and implemented by Traylor JV for
working in compressed air during the Blue Plains' tunnel project.
11. Job hazard analysis--an evaluation of tasks or operations to
identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary controls.
12. Man lock--an enclosed space capable of pressurization, and used
for compressing or decompressing any employee or material when either
is passing into or out of a working chamber.
13. Pressure--a force acting on a unit area. Usually expressed as
pounds per square inch (p.s.i.).
14. p.s.i.--pounds per square inch, a common unit of measurement of
pressure; a pressure given in p.s.i. corresponds to absolute pressure.
15. p.s.i.a.--pounds per square inch absolute, or absolute
pressure, is the sum of the atmospheric pressure and gauge pressure. At
sea-level, atmospheric pressure is approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Adding
14.7 to a pressure
expressed in units of p.s.i.g. will yield the absolute pressure,
expressed as p.s.i.a.
16. p.s.i.g.--pounds per square inch gauge, a common unit of
pressure; pressure expressed as p.s.i.g. corresponds to pressure
relative to atmospheric pressure. At sea-level, atmospheric pressure is
approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Subtracting 14.7 from a pressure expressed in
units of p.s.i.a. yields the gauge pressure, expressed as p.s.i.g.
17. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to the
subject matter, the work, or the project.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Working chamber--an enclosed space in the EPBTBM in which CAWs
perform interventions, and which is accessible only through a man lock.
E. Safety and Health Practices
1. Traylor JV must develop and implement an HOM specific to the
Blue Plains project, and submit the HOM to OSHA at least six months
before using the EPBTBM. Traylor JV must receive a written
acknowledgement from OSHA regarding the acceptability of the HOM.\22\
The HOM shall provide the governing safety and health requirements
regarding hyperbaric exposures during the tunnel-construction project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See footnote 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Traylor JV must implement the safety and health instructions
included in the manufacturer's operations manuals for the EPBTBM, and
the safety and health instructions provided by the manufacturer for the
operation of decompression equipment.
3. Traylor JV must use air as the only breathing gas in the working
chamber.
4. Traylor JV must use the 1992 French Decompression Tables for
air, air-oxygen, and oxygen decompression specified in the HOM,
specifically the extracted portions of the 1992 French Decompression
tables titled "French Regulation Air Standard Tables."
5. Traylor JV must equip man-locks used by its employees with an
oxygen-delivery system as specified by the HOM. Traylor JV must not
store oxygen or other compressed gases used in conjunction with
hyperbaric work in the tunnel.
6. Workers performing hot work under hyperbaric conditions must use
flame-retardant personal protective equipment and clothing.
7. In hyperbaric work areas, Traylor JV must maintain an adequate
fire-suppression system approved for hyperbaric work areas.
8. Traylor JV must develop and implement one or more JHAs for work
in the hyperbaric work areas, and review, periodically and as necessary
(e.g., after making changes to a planned intervention that affects its
operation), the contents of the JHAs with affected employees. The JHAs
must include all the job functions that the risk assessment \23\
indicates are essential to prevent injury or illness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012, American National Standard for
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Traylor JV must develop a set of checklists to guide compressed-
air work and ensure that employees follow the procedures required by
this permanent variance (including all procedures required by the HOM,
which this variance incorporates by reference). The checklists must
include all steps and equipment functions that the risk assessment
indicates are essential to prevent injury or illness during compressed-
air work.
10. Traylor JV must ensure that the safety and health provisions of
the HOM adequately protect the workers of all contractors and
subcontractors involved in hyperbaric operations.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ See ANSI/ASSE A10.33-2011, American National Standard for
Construction and Demolition Operations--Safety and Health Program
Requirements for Multi-Employer Projects, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Communication
1. Prior to beginning a shift, Traylor JV must implement a system
that informs workers exposed to hyperbaric conditions of any hazardous
occurrences or conditions that might affect their safety, including
hyperbaric incidents, gas releases, equipment failures, earth or rock
slides, cave-ins, flooding, fires, or explosions.
2. Traylor JV must provide a power-assisted means of communication
among affected workers and support personnel in hyperbaric conditions
where unassisted voice communication is inadequate.
(a) Traylor JV must use an independent power supply for powered
communication systems, and these systems must operate such that use or
disruption of any one phone or signal location will not disrupt the
operation of the system from any other location.
(b) Traylor JV must test communication systems at the start of each
shift and as necessary thereafter to ensure proper operation.
G. Worker Qualifications and Training
Traylor JV must:
1. Ensure that each affected worker receives effective training on
how to safely enter, work in, exit from, and undertake emergency
evacuation or rescue from, hyperbaric conditions, and document this
training.
2. Provide effective instruction, before beginning hyperbaric
operations, to each worker who performs work, or controls the exposure
of others, in hyperbaric conditions, and document this instruction. The
instruction must include topics such as:
(a) The physics and physiology of hyperbaric work;
(b) Recognition of pressure-related injuries;
(c) Information on the causes and recognition of the signs and
symptoms associated with decompression illness, and other hyperbaric
intervention-related health effects (e.g., barotrauma, nitrogen
narcosis, and oxygen toxicity).
(d) How to avoid discomfort during compression and decompression;
and
(e) Information the workers can use to contact the appropriate
healthcare professionals should the workers have concerns that they may
be experiencing adverse health effects from hyperbaric exposure.
3. Repeat the instruction specified in paragraph (2) of this
condition periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making changes to
its hyperbaric operations).
4. When conducting training for its hyperbaric workers make this
training available to OSHA personnel and notify the OTPCA at OSHA's
national office and OSHA's Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office before
the training takes place.
H. Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
1. Traylor JV must initiate and maintain a program of frequent and
regular inspections of the EPBTBM's hyperbaric equipment and support
systems (such as temperature control, illumination, ventilation, and
fire-prevention and fire-suppression systems), and hyperbaric work
areas, as required under 29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2) by:
(a) Developing a set of checklists to be used by a competent person
in conducting weekly inspections of hyperbaric equipment and work
areas; and
(b) Ensuring that a competent person conducts daily visual checks
and weekly inspections of the EPBTBM.
2. If the competent person determines that the equipment
constitutes a safety hazard, Traylor JV must remove the
equipment from service until it corrects the hazardous condition and
has the correction approved by a qualified person.
3. Traylor JV must maintain records of all tests and inspections of
the EPBTBM, as well as associated corrective actions and repairs, at
the job site for the duration of the job.
I. Compression and Decompression
Traylor JV must consult with its attending physician concerning the
need for special compression or decompression exposures appropriate for
CAWs not acclimated to hyperbaric exposure.
J. Recordkeeping
Traylor JV must maintain a record of any recordable injury,
illness, or fatality (as defined by 29 CFR part 1904 Recording and
Reporting Occupational Injuries and Illnesses), resulting from exposure
of an employee to hyperbaric conditions by completing the OSHA 301
Incident Report form and OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and
Illnesses.
Note: Examples of important information to include on the OSHA
301 Incident Report form (along with the corresponding question on
the form) are: The task performed (Question (Q) 14); an estimate of
the CAW's workload (Q 14); the composition of the gas mixture (e.g.,
air or oxygen (Q 14)); the maximum working pressure (Q 14);
temperature in the work and decompression environments (Q 14);
unusual occurrences, if any, during the task or decompression (Q
14); time of symptom onset (Q 15); duration between decompression
and onset of symptoms (Q 15); type and duration of symptoms (Q 16);
a medical summary of the illness or injury (Q 16); duration of the
hyperbaric intervention (Q 17); possible contributing factors (Q
17); the number of prior interventions completed by the injured or
ill CAW (Q 17); the number of prior interventions completed by the
injured or ill CAW at this working pressure (Q 17); contact
information for the treating healthcare provider (Q 17); and date
and time of last hyperbaric exposure for this CAW.
In addition to completing the OSHA 301 Incident Report form and
OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses, Traylor JV must
maintain records of:
1. The date, times (e.g., began compression, time spent
compressing, time performing intervention, time spent decompressing),
and pressure for each hyperbaric intervention.
2. The name of each individual worker exposed to hyperbaric
pressure and the decompression protocols and results for each worker.
3. The total number of interventions and the amount of hyperbaric
work time at each pressure.
4. The results of the post-intervention physical assessment of each
CAW for signs and symptoms of decompression illness, barotrauma,
nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity or other health effects associated
with work in compressed air for each hyperbaric intervention.
K. Notifications
1. To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein,
Traylor JV must:
(a) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office of
any recordable injuries, illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations,
amputations, loss of an eye, or fatality (by submitting the completed
OSHA 301 Incident Report form \25\) resulting from exposure of an
employee to hyperbaric conditions including those that do not require
recompression treatment (e.g., nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity,
barotrauma), but still meet the recordable injury or illness criteria
of 29 CFR part 1904. The notification must be made within 8 hours of
the incident or 8 hours after becoming aware of a recordable injury,
illness, in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an eye, or
fatality, and submit a copy of the incident investigation (OSHA form
301) within 24 hours of the incident or 24 hours after becoming aware
of a recordable case. In addition to the information required by the
OSHA form 301, the incident-investigation report must include a root-
cause determination, and the preventive and corrective actions
identified and implemented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ See footnote 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Provide certification within 15 working days of the incident
that Traylor JV informed affected workers of the incident and the
results of the incident investigation (including the root-cause
determination and preventive and corrective actions identified and
implemented).
(c) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office
within 15 working days and in writing, of any change in the compressed-
air operations that affects Traylor JV's ability to comply with the
conditions specified herein.
(d) Upon completion of the Blue Plains Tunnel project, evaluate the
effectiveness of the decompression tables used throughout the project,
and provide a written report of this evaluation to the OTPCA and the
Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office.
Note: The evaluation report must contain summaries of: (1) The
number, dates, durations, and pressures of the hyperbaric
interventions completed; (2) decompression protocols implemented
(including composition of gas mixtures (air and/or oxygen), and the
results achieved; (3) the total number of interventions and the
number of hyperbaric incidents (decompression illnesses and/or
health effects associated with hyperbaric interventions as recorded
on OSHA 301 and 300 forms, and relevant medical diagnoses and
treating physicians' opinions); and (4) root causes of any
hyperbaric incidents, and preventive and corrective actions
identified and implemented.
(e) To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified
herein, inform the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office as
soon as possible after it has knowledge that it will:
(i) Cease to do business;
(ii) Change the location and address of the main office for
managing the tunneling operations specified herein; or
(iii) Transfer the operations specified herein to a successor
company.
(f) Notify all affected employees of this permanent variance by the
same means required to inform them of its application for a variance.
2. OSHA must approve the transfer of the permanent variance to a
successor company.
Authority and Signature
David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, 200 Constitution Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20210, authorized the preparation of this notice.
Accordingly, the Agency is issuing this notice pursuant to Section
29 U.S.C. 655(6)(d), Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR
3912, Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR 1905.11.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2015-06975 Filed 3-26-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
Accessibility Assistance: Contact OSHA's Directorate of Standards and Guidance at (202) 693-1950
for assistance accessing PDF documents.
*These files are provided for downloading.
