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Occupational Safety and Health Administration OSHA

Violation Detail

Standard Cited: 5A0001 OSH Act General Duty Paragraph

Violation Items

Nr: 302588991 Citation: 01001 Issuance: 04/05/2001 ReportingID: 1032500

Viol Type:Serious NrInstances:1 Contest Date:04/10/2001
Abatement Date:05/01/2001 X Nr Exposed:9 Final Order:12/27/2001
Initial Penalty: $7,000.00 REC:C Emphasis:
Current Penalty: $3,010.00 Gravity:10 Haz Category:EXPLOSION

Penalty and Failure to Abate Event History
Type Event Date Penalty Abatement Type FTA Insp
Penalty Z: Issued 04/05/2001 $7,000.00 05/01/2001 Serious  
Penalty F: Formal Settlement 12/27/2001 $3,010.00 05/01/2001 Serious  

Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 001 Hazard: EXPLOSION

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to the hazard of fire and explosion from the increased likelihood of a catastrophic failure of an inadequately maintained Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) Compression System: (a)On or about October 11, 2000, and times prior thereto, the employer did not maintain the two CNG compressors (Model No. IMW 50/150S3-4000), the Lectrodryer and the two gas dispensers at the facility to ensure their continued safe operation. Conditions noted at the time of this inspection which contributed to this hazard included: 1)Scheduled (preventive) maintenance was not conducted on Compressor No.1 at any of the manufacturer recommended times. No maintenance had been conducted after 4,967 hours of operation. 2)Scheduled (preventive) maintenance was not conducted on Compressor No. 2 at any of the manufacturer recommended times. No maintenance had been conducted after 4,811 hours of operation. 3)The Daily Maintenance Log was not maintained on the CNG compressor system. The last daily log entry was dated June, 29, 1996. 4)Compressor No. 2 was two gallons low on crankcase oil. The suction valves, when inspected, had oil residue. The discharge valves had excessive build-up of oil residue. Pistons were visibly damaged for lack of maintenance. The priority valves, that isolated the CNG buffer tanks from the compressors, did not close when the emergency shutdown (ESD) or the gas detection system was activated. 5)The rod packing was over saturated with crankcase oil. The crankcase oil was carried through the CNG compressors, into the natural gas, and into the vehicles fuel system. 6)The Det Tronics Combustible Gas Detection System was not calibrated for two years. 7)The fill pressure at the No. 2 dispenser was constant at approximately 4,000 psi. The micro motion sensor was bypassed preventing the fill pressure from compensating for the ambient temperature. 8)The fueling hoses were not tested for leaks. A dispenser hose was visibly leaking before it was replaced. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to establish, implement, and enforce an effective scheduled maintenance program forinspecting and maintaining the mechanical integrity of the CNG compression system as recommended by the manufacturer and stated in the IMW Atlas CNG compressor manual.

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