Violation Detail
Standard Cited:5A0001 OSH Act General Duty Paragraph
Violation Items | |||||
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Nr: 1221846.015 | Citation: 01001 | Issuance: 09/29/2017 | ReportingID: 0729300 | ||
Viol Type: | Serious | NrInstances: | 1 | Contest Date: | |
Abatement Date: | 02/12/2018 2 | Nr Exposed: | 70 | Final Order: | 10/19/2017 |
Initial Penalty: | $8,873.00 | REC: | A | Emphasis: | |
Current Penalty: | $5,918.00 | Gravity: | 10 | Haz Category: |
Penalty and Failure to Abate Event History | |||||||
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Type | Event | Date | Penalty | Abatement | Type | FTA Insp | |
Penalty | Z: Issued | 09/29/2017 | $8,873.00 | 02/12/2018 | Serious | ||
Penalty | I: Informal Settlement | 10/19/2017 | $5,918.00 | 02/12/2018 | Serious |
Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 001 Hazard:
OSH ACT of 1970 Section (5)(a)(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to recognized hazards of burn or struck by injuries relating to the catastrophic corrosion failure and subsequent explosion of a pressure vessel containing high temperature water and steam that was part of the employers steam generation system: On and before April 3, 2017, at the Loy-Lange Box Company facility located at 222 Russel Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri, the employer exposed employees to the recognized hazard of burn and struck by injuries relating to the catastrophic corrosion failure of a pressure vessel called a Semi-Closed Receiver (SCR), which, contained steam and boiling water, under pressure. On April 3, the employer allowed the steam generation system to be started for normal operations with the SCR leaking as a result of corrosion without having performed an adequate inspection to determine the extent of corrosion damage in the SCR, either upon discovery of the leak or at other times before discovery of the leak. As the pressure in the steam generator system built, the bottom of the SCR suffered a catastrophic corrosion failure that resulted in a steam explosion which killed one employee and critically injured another. On Friday, March 31, three days before the explosion, the employer learned of an actual leak in the bottom portion of the SCR, but allowed the SCR to remain in service on Monday, April 3, when the steam generation system was restarted after being idle over the weekend, without conducting further inspection or investigation. Among other methods, feasible and acceptable means of hazard abatement include: Developing and implementing measures to effectively monitor, control, discover, maintain and repair corrosion damage in the steam generation system, including the SCR, by (i) responding when leaks in pressure vessels are discovered, including removing leaking pressure vessels from service pending a thorough investigation of the extent of and reasons for the leak, (ii) establishing an appropriate corrosion inspection and control program for monitoring corrosion in all components of the steam generation system, including the SCR, (iii) maintaining and repairing the steam generation system, including the SCR, to prevent catastrophic leaks from occurring, and (iv) training supervisors and employees in the hazards of corrosion failure and the proper practices for corrosion inspection, monitoring, control, maintenance, and repair.