Violation Detail
Standard Cited: 19100119 E03 IV Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals.
Inspection Nr: 783282.015
Citation: 01005
Citation Type: Serious
Abatement Date: 03/01/2015 2
Initial Penalty: $5,500.00
Current Penalty: $4,125.00
Issuance Date: 06/06/2013
Nr Instances: 3
Nr Exposed: 94
Related Event Code (REC):
Gravity: 5
Report ID: 0522500
Contest Date: 06/27/2013
Final Order: 01/13/2014
Emphasis:
Type | Latest Event | Event Date | Penalty | Abatement Due Date | Citation Type | Failure to Abate Inspection |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Penalty | C: Contested | 03/11/2014 | $1,375.00 | 07/11/2013 | Serious | |
Penalty | F: Formal Settlement | 01/13/2014 | $4,125.00 | 03/01/2015 | Serious | |
Penalty | Z: Issued | 06/06/2013 | $5,500.00 | 07/11/2013 | Serious |
Text For Citation: 01 Item/Group: 005 Hazard:
29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(iv): The process hazard analysis shall address: Consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls: a. The employer's 2004 PHA-Cast Booster Manufacturing did not include consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls including, but not limited to, the following: metal detection system for screening recycled explosive raw materials; safety relief valves for each kettle and the building; pressure reducing valves for each kettle and the building; locking collars on each kettle agitator; sweep arm to kettle clearances; and belt drives on agitators set to slip with agitator jam. b. The employer's 2004 PHA-Detonating Cord Manufacturing did not include consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls including, but not limited to, the following: speed switches and diameter gauging devices on first spin machines to stop the machine in case of a jam; mechanical trip for the measuring machine; speed switches on over spin machines to stop the machine when there was a cord jam; cord cut-off devices to prevent spool detonations in the sizing operation; regulated steam pressure for the PETN dryer; and high temperature safety shutoff switches on the PETN dryer. c. The employer's 2004 PHA-Emulsion Manufacturing did not include consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls including, but not limited to, the following: high pressure and low pressure sensor, alarm, and shutdown for emulsion pumps; no flow sensor, alarm, and shutdown for emulsion pumps; 200 psi rupture disk for emulsion pumps; programmable logic controller (PLC) to detect and resolve problems during emulsion pumping process; high level alarms for blender and oxidizer bin 2; and hydraulic pressure switch.