Abstract: Two power line workers were restoring power to a jobsite. The first line worker was dispatched to the worksite to investigate and repair an outage. About 20 minutes later, he called for assistance. He also requested a tester to test the underground conductor between two utility poles and a coil of AWG #6 cable. The second line worker arrived, and the two employees conducted several troubleshooting procedures, including checking the underground line for faults with the tester, changing blown fuses, disconnecting the transformer from the primary, and replacing fuses with those of different current ratings for the purpose of fuse coordination. The employees decided to let the primary circuit remain energized for a time to see if the fuse blew. After 15 to 20 minutes, the employees decided to deenergize the line between the two utility poles and reinstall the transformer tap. (The transformer tap was still disconnected from the primary at that time.) The first line worker was at one pole, using a live-line tool to open the fuse and deenergize the line. The second line worker climbed the ladder on the other pole, apparently to connect the transformer tap to the primary. Before the first line worker deenergized the line, the second line worker contacted the line and was electrocuted. Under the employer's procedures, the first line worker was the lead worker on the job and was supposed to be in charge of the clearance. However, on this job, neither employee was designated as the person in charge of the clearance. Additionally, the first line worker had not established communication with the other employee to let him know when the line was deenergized.